# Vignette:
# Can Minimalism help us better understand how children solve language acquisition?

*For The Cambridge Handbook of Minimalism*

Lisa S. Pearl
University of California, Irvine
lpearl@uci.edu

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## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Solving language acquisition

This vignette focuses on whether Minimalism can help us better understand how children "solve" language acquisition. But, what does it mean to "solve" language acquisition and why should we care? I believe we should care because successful language acquisition – that is, achieving native-level proficiency in one or more languages – is a shockingly difficult problem. (Just ask anyone who's started learning another language as an adult.) Yet children, who seem to have more limited cognitive abilities than adults, somehow manage to achieve native-level proficiency; in contrast, adults typically fail no matter how long they try. How children succeed (especially when adults fail) is a continual source of both wonder and inquiry in the scientific study of language.

More specifically, language acquisition seems to be about solving a series of induction problems, where children need to identify the correct generalizations for their native language(s) from data that are woefully inadequate (e.g., see Chomsky, 1981, Jackendoff, 1994, Laurence and Margolis, 2001, Crain and Pietroski, 2002). As one example, English children need to learn that when there's a single *wh*-word like *what* in an utterance, the default position for that *wh*-word is at the front of its clause (e.g., *What did this penguin do?* and *I saw [what this penguin did]*). One way to think about this generalization is that *wh*-fronting is required in all clauses. This generalization contrasts with the following potential generalizations, which are just some of the ones an English child might consider:

- optionally allow *wh*-fronting everywhere
- require *wh*-fronting in main clauses but optionally allow it in embedded clauses

- optionally allow *wh*-fronting in main clauses but require it in embedded clauses
- require *wh*-fronting in main clauses and singly-embedded clauses, but optionally allow it in multiply-embedded clauses
- require *wh*-fronting in main clauses, optionally allow it in singly-embedded clauses, and require it in multiply-embedded clauses

As I mentioned, these are only some of the possible generalizations. Importantly, the data children encounter are compatible with many generalizations (this has been called the *Poverty of the Stimulus* – see Pearl (2020) for a recent overview). That is, children's input is massively ambiguous. Yet, children's task is to somehow pick the correct generalization every single time, despite this massive ambiguity.

Moreover, children don't just have to deal successfully with the massive ambiguity in their input. They also have to contend with potentially misleading input. For our *wh*-fronting example, it's true that English children's input contains many examples of *wh*-fronting in direct questions and the occasional embedded clause. Yet, English children's input also contains examples that seem to go against *wh*-fronting, such as echo questions (e.g., *This penguin did what??*) and teaching scenarios (e.g., *Now, do you see the penguin? The penguin did something. Tell me: The penguin did what?*). That is, these examples appear to be counterexamples to any generalization that requires *wh*-fronting, rather than optionally allowing it. This *wh*-fronting scenario highlights just one way that children's input can be messy. Importantly, despite this input messiness, children somehow manage to succeed at acquiring all the appropriate generalizations for their native language(s) and thereby achieve native-level proficiency.

## 1.2 What Minimalism could do

Minimalism is a significant shift in how we think about language knowledge. For language acquisition, this means that the linguistic representations that children need to learn may be quite different than what we previously thought. If the linguistic representations differ, then the generalizations children need to make on the basis of their input also differ.

For our *wh*-word example, previous approaches viewed *wh*-fronting as a general property of the language (e.g., see Yang (2012) for a developmental approach in the generative tradition); in contrast, the Minimalist approach views *wh*-fronting as the result of features on individual lexical items (i.e., the *wh*-words) that need to be checked. This difference could potentially affect the difficulty of the language acquisition task.

Also, if the linguistic representations differ, then the hypothesis space of competing representations that children consider during language acquisition may also differ. For our *wh*-fronting example, previous approaches may winnow down the hypothesis space significantly; for example, a macro-parameter approach that has a single *wh*-fronting parameter for all clauses may have children only consider *wh*-fronting being required everywhere or optional everywhere. In contrast, a Minimalist approach based on features of individual lexical items may retain the variety of hypotheses noted before, depending on where the specific lexical features occur. (Of course, the exact hypothesis space will depend on the exact Minimalist representation being assumed – more

on this in Part 2 below.) As with the representations, this difference in hypothesis spaces could also potentially affect the difficulty of the language acquisition task.

Here, I want to walk through some specific ways that the shift to Minimalist representations could impact our understanding of how children solve language acquisition. I'll first review some key problems that children need to overcome during language acquisition, relating to children's input and their ability to harness the information in their input. I'll then discuss why Minimalism might help us better understand how children solve these key problems. I'll conclude with some thoughts on how the spirit of the Minimalist approach, which is about reducing the linguistic knowledge innately built into children's minds, could also be helpful for understanding language acquisition.

# 2 Part 1: Children have to overcome certain problems

## 2.1 Problem 1: The input signal is messy

As mentioned above, children's input can be messy for at least two reasons: (i) it's massively ambiguous, because of all the potential hypotheses that children could be entertaining about the generalizations in their languages, and (ii) it can be "noisy" by containing data that aren't compatible with the correct generalizations. Let's delve into each of these more concretely, using the *wh*-fronting example from before.

**Ambiguity.** Ambiguity in acquisition simply means that the data are compatible with more than one hypothesis under consideration. For *wh*-fronting, I mentioned several potential hypotheses that a child could be considering, involving optional vs. required *wh*-fronting in different structural environments (e.g., main clauses, singly-embedded clauses, doubly-embedded clauses).[1]

If we look at reasonable samples of American English children's input, we can see the actual data they have available to decide among these hypotheses. Since we're focusing first on ambiguity (rather than noise), let's suppose that when we look, we find that children encounter a pristine input landscape with no misleading examples (i.e., no noise). For example, from the CHILDES Treebank (Pearl and Sprouse, 2013), which has about 201,000 utterances of speech directed at children between the ages of six months to five years old, we find approximately 40,700 instances of *wh*-words, with approximately 81% of those in main clauses (as direct questions), approximately 18% of those in singly-embedded clauses, and approximately 1% in multiply-embedded clauses. Under our pristine input assumption, every single one of these instances would have the *wh*-word fronted in its clause, including instances such as ***What*** *are you doing?*, *Do you want to see* ***what*** *I have?*, and *It's* ***how*** *I wonder* ***what*** *you are*. Yet, even in this pristine sample, where children don't have to deal with noise in the input (because all the instances they encounter have the *wh*-word fronted), the ambiguity problem is real. These pristine data are compatible with all six of the hypotheses I explicitly mentioned before:

[1] I note that I previously cast these hypotheses in terms of the language-wide generalizations that previous developmental approaches have used, but it's possible to cast these in terms of lexically-based features as well. The basic issue of ambiguity in this case shouldn't change.

- *h1: require wh-fronting everywhere*. Every single example indeed has *wh*-fronting, whether the example is in a main or embedded clause. This is compatible with *wh*-fronting being required everywhere.

- *h2: optionally allow wh-fronting everywhere*. Every single example happens to use *wh*-fronting, whether the example is in a main or embedded clause. While this situation may be less probable if speakers are actually allowed to leave the *wh*-word in place (more on this below), these data are still perfectly compatible with the hypothesis that *wh*-fronting is optional.

- *h3: require wh-fronting in main clauses but optionally allow it in embedded clauses*. Every single main clause example indeed has *wh*-fronting, and every single embedded example happens to use *wh*-fronting. As before, while this situation is less probable if speakers are actually allowed to leave the *wh*-word in place in embedded clauses, these data are still compatible with the hypothesis that *wh*-fronting is optional in embedded clauses.

- *h4: optionally allow wh-fronting in main clauses but require it in embedded clauses*. Every single main clause example happens to use *wh*-fronting, and every single embedded example indeed has *wh*-fronting. As before, this situation is less probable if speakers are allowed to leave the *wh*-word in place in main clauses, but these data are still compatible with the hypothesis that *wh*-fronting is optional in main clauses.

- *h5: require wh-fronting in main clauses and singly-embedded clauses, but optionally allow it in multiply-embedded clauses*. Every single main clause and singly-embedded clause example indeed has *wh*-fronting, and every multiply-embedded clause example happens to use *wh*-fronting. As before, this situation is less probable, but still compatible with the hypothesis that *wh*-fronting is optional in multiply-embedded clauses.

- *h6: require wh-fronting in main clauses, optionally allow it in singly-embedded clauses, and require it in multiply-embedded clauses*. Every single main clause and multiply-embedded clause example indeed has *wh*-fronting, and every singly-embedded clause example happens to use *wh*-fronting. As before, this situation is less probable, but still compatible with the hypothesis that *wh*-fronting is optional in singly-embedded clauses.

The pattern is clear: if the data examples always use *wh*-fronting, these data are compatible with hypotheses that require *wh*-fronting as well as with hypotheses that optionally allow *wh*-fronting. Of course, as noted in the walkthrough above, some of these hypotheses may be more probable than others, given the data. For example, let's consider the difference between the first two hypotheses, where *wh*-fronting is required everywhere (h1) or *wh*-fronting is optional everywhere (h2). Let's also consider our 40,700 utterance sample with *wh*-words, which corresponds to about 83.5 waking hours (or about 6.4 days) of input for a three-year-old.[2]

[2]See Pearl and Sprouse 2020 for details on how to estimate how much input children hear over time.

Under h1, all 40,700 instances used *wh*-fronting because they had to – that is, for any given instance, speakers have a 100% chance of using *wh*-fronting. So, the probability of using *wh*-fronting for any single instance is 1. Then, the probability of these data, given h1 = $p(data|h1)$ = $1 * 1 * ... * 1$ (40,700 times)=$1^{40,700}$=1.

Under h2, all 40,700 instances just happened to use *wh*-fronting when the *wh*-word could have been left in place. Let's say that speakers have a 50% chance of using *wh*-fronting in any given example. So, the probability of using *wh*-fronting for any single instance is 0.5. Then, the probability of using *wh*-fronting 40,700 times is really small: the probability of these data, given h2 = $p(data|h2)$=$0.5 * 0.5 * ... * 0.5$ (40,700 times)=$(0.5)^{40,700}$≈0.

So, a child capable of doing this kind of savvy statistical calculation would notice that h1 seems a lot more probable than h2 after just a few days, given these data (i.e., 1 is a lot greater than almost 0). Happily, we have good reason to believe that children are capable of just this kind of savvy statistical learning (see Pearl in pressa for an overview). With this kind of learning ability, children could identify which hypotheses are the most probable, given the available ambiguous data. But, the simple fact remains that the data *are* ambiguous, given the hypotheses that children could be considering – and children have to deal successfully with that ambiguity.

**Noise.** We idealized our input sample above to get rid of any noise – in this case, any instances where the *wh*-word remained in place. However, the real input data that children have to deal with includes misleading examples where the *wh*-word isn't fronted – these are the "noise" in the input signal. Some of these instances may be speech errors on the part of the speakers (e.g., a slip from a native speaker speaking too quickly, or a mistake from a non-native speaker whose native language leaves *wh*-words in place like Japanese, Hungarian, Igbo, or Zulu). However, many of these instances may be appropriately leaving the *wh*-word in place, such as the echo questions and teaching scenarios I mentioned in the introduction.

Let's consider again our sample of approximately 40,700 *wh*-word instances from the CHILDES Treebank, which is primarily American English caretakers speaking to children, rather than non-native speakers speaking to children. So, the *wh*-word usage is likely to reflect native speaker usage, rather than unintentional transfer of *wh*-usage by a non-native speaker. Of the approximately 40,700 *wh*-word instances, approximately 3,400 (8.3%) leave the *wh*-word in place. These include instances such as *Do **what** again?*, *She goes and gets **what**?*, and *But her Mommy tells her she has to do **what** before she goes?* These seem to be either echo questions or teaching scenarios (or both), and so aren't mistakes. Also, the fact that 8.3% of the input has the *wh*-word in place – rather than fronted – may be hard to ignore.

American English children nonetheless have to deal effectively with this apparent noise that's in their input. One reasonable solution is to notice that there are certain systematic exceptions – echo questions and teaching scenarios fulfill certain communicative goals – and filter those data out when trying to identify the correct default generalization for the language. Another reasonable solution is to accept that there's going to be some amount of conflicting evidence (i.e., exceptions), and simply look for the hypothesis with "enough" evidence. Two reasonable ways to define "enough" are as the hypothesis with the most evidence or evidence above a certain threshold; the variational learning approach (Yang, 2002, 2004) looks for the most evidence while the approach

using the Tolerance and Sufficiency Principles (Yang, 2005, 2016) looks for evidence above a certain threshold (see Pearl in pressb, Pearl in pressa, and Pearl in pressc, for recent overviews of both approaches).

But, as with ambiguity, the point is that there is in fact noise in the input signal, given the complexity of the language system as a whole. That is, the noise in our example *wh*-fronting case is occurring because the way the language system deals with *wh*-words is more complex than one single rule for all instances, irrespective of other communicative factors. As with ambiguity, children have to deal successfully with the (apparent) noise.

## 2.2 Problem 2: Children's ability to harness the input signal is messy

Above, I discussed an external source of messiness: the ambiguity and noise in children's input signal. Another source of messiness is internal: children's developing ability to harness the information in the input signal (messy or not). In general, children are developing at least two key things simultaneously: their knowledge of their native language system, and their ability to process language data (Lidz and Gagliardi, 2015, Omaki and Lidz, 2015, Lidz and Perkins, 2018, Pearl, in pressb). Both of these can impact how children extract information from their input signal (see Pearl in pressb for more discussion on this point).

**How developing representations can make the information messy.** With our *wh*-fronting example, as mentioned in the previous section, certain types of utterances that seem to fulfill particular communicative goals – echo questions and teaching scenarios – have the *wh*-word in place. These examples seem to go against a default *wh*-fronting generalization. However, suppose that children realize these communicative goals – that is, children's language representations include something about the communicative goal that marks echo questions and teaching scenarios as systematic exceptions. Then, children could filter these examples out when trying to decide if *wh*-fronting is the default. That is, their developed representations allow them to remove these examples from the set of data that has to be accounted for by a default *wh*-position generalization.

In contrast, suppose that children don't realize these communicative goals – or perhaps more specifically, they don't realize that these communicative goals impact *wh*-fronting. That is, children's developing representations of their language don't (yet) incorporate these communicative goals for utterances with *wh*-words. Then, the echo questions and teaching scenarios are misleading counterexamples to default *wh*-fronting. The data that children are learning from becomes messy because their developing representations don't yet separate out the apparent noise. At some point, children's developing representations will include enough information to mark these instances as systematic exceptions. But, until then, these data are (incorrectly) included in the set of data that has to be accounted for by a default *wh*-position generalization.

**How developing language processing can make the information messy.** Throughout language development, children have various cognitive limitations compared to adults (e.g., limited memory, limited attention, how rapidly they can deploy their parsing abilities, among other limitations). These limitations affect how accurately children can extract information in language data. In our

*wh*-fronting example, it might happen that children struggle to accurately extract information in longer utterances because of these limitations. So, for instance, a child might process *Do you want to see **what** I have?* as a truncated version, like *Do you want to see **what**?* In this case, an utterance showing *wh*-fronting in the embedded clause is misperceived as an utterance showing the *wh*-word in place. That is, an example compatible with a default *wh*-fronting generalization is misperceived as an example incompatible with this generalization, solely because the child wasn't able to process the part of the utterance occurring after the *wh*-word. In this way, the child's developing language processing abilities have skewed the information in the input signal in an unhelpful way, making it messier than it truly was.

# 3 Part 2: Could Minimalism help us understand how children overcome these problems?

It's possible that Minimalism could help us understand how children overcome these problems of both external and internal messiness during language acquisition. More specifically, because the representations that children are trying to attain are different in Minimalism than previously thought, it's possible that the external messiness of the input signal is lessened; it's also possible the internal messiness due to children's (mis)processing of the input is lessened. The main point, however, is that the details of the representation matter enormously for both these acquisition problems.

## 3.1 Problem 1: How a different target representation could make the input signal less messy

Depending on the specifics of the Minimalist representation, it's possible that the input could be either less ambiguous or less noisy (or both). Of course, it's also possible that a Minimalist representation could in fact make the input more ambiguous and noisier, too. The key is that we have to have a specific Minimalist representation in mind – as well as the space of competing possible Minimalist representations that children consider. Once we have both of these (i.e., the specific target Minimalist representation and the Minimalist hypothesis space), we can evaluate how ambiguous children's input is by looking at realistic samples, such as those from the CHILDES Treebank (Pearl and Sprouse, 2013, in press) or CHILDES more generally (MacWhinney, 2000). If it turns out that there are fewer potential hypotheses compatible with children's input than with previous representational approaches, then Minimalist representations would make children's input signal less ambiguous.

The same considerations hold for how Minimalist representations could affect the noisiness of children's input. That is, once we have a specific Minimalist representation in mind and the hypothesis space of competing Minimalist representations, we can evaluate these by using realistic child-input samples. In particular, we can evaluate (i) if there are misleading examples with respect to the target representation, and (ii) if so, how many there are. As with ambiguity, it could turn out that Minimalist representations cause the input to have fewer misleading examples than with

previous representational approaches. If so, then the Minimalist approach will have reduced the noise in children's input signal.

## 3.2 Problem 2: How a different target representation could help children better harness the input signal

Again depending on the specifics of the Minimalist representation, it's possible that children's perception of the information in their input could be more helpful (though it could also be less helpful). That is, the information that children are able to extract from the input, given their developing linguistic knowledge and their developing processing abilities, could be more useful if children are trying to acquire a Minimalist representation. How might this occur? Remember that children's developing representations and developing language processing determine children's perception of two things: (i) what information is present in the input signal, and (ii) what information is relevant for learning about the representations under consideration. Because of this, children get a skewed view of their input.

Notably, a general consensus in the acquisition community (echoed in much of my own work) is that children's skewed view of the input often seems *helpful* to acquisition (e.g., Pinker 1984, Dresher 1999, Lightfoot 1999, Pearl 2007, Pearl and Weinberg 2007, Pearl 2008, 2009, Pearl and Lidz 2009, Pearl 2011, Pearl and Sprouse 2013, Pearl 2014, Lidz and Gagliardi 2015, Pearl, Ho and Detrano 2016, Gagliardi, Feldman and Lidz 2017, Pearl 2017, Perkins, Feldman and Lidz 2017, Nguyen and Pearl 2019). That is, the limitations imposed by children's developing representations and developing language processing helpfully filter the information in their input, and this filtering is what allows children to achieve great feats of language acquisition.

This idea is in line with one well-known hypothesis for why children are better able than adults to acquire native-level proficiency in a language, known as the "Less is More" hypothesis (Newport, 1990). Put simply, this hypothesis describes why children having "less" cognitive resources to use when acquiring language nonetheless leads to "more" language acquisition success than adults typically manage: children's limitations lead to helpfully skewed views of the information in their input. Several computational modeling studies have demonstrated how this helpful skewing could occur in a variety of domains (e.g., Pearl, Goldwater and Steyvers 2011, Phillips and Pearl 2015, Pearl and Phillips 2018, Yang 2020). Several behavioral studies have demonstrated that children and adults make different inferences on the basis of language acquisition input (e.g., Hudson Kam and Newport 2005, 2009, Hudson Kam 2015, Hendricks, Miller and Jackson 2018); one explanation for these different inferences is that children have different views of the information in the input than adults do.

So, if children have a helpfully skewed view of the information in their input, it could be that the skewing is even more helpful when the target representation is a Minimalist representation, compared with previous representational approaches. That is, the filtered subset of information in the input that makes it through to children could enable them to more easily identify the target Minimalist representation within a defined hypothesis space of competing Minimalist representations. As before with issues of input ambiguity and noise, we can only evaluate this possibility when we have in mind both a specific Minimalist representation and a specific hypothesis space of

competing Minimalist representations.

# 4 Concluding thoughts: Another potential benefit

While many questions remain to be explored for Minimalist representations and acquisition, I think the spirit of the Minimalist approach may offer an additional benefit for understanding language acquisition. In particular, the Minimalist approach aims to reduce the amount of language-specific knowledge that's biologically built into children (that is, to shrink the amount of material in Universal Grammar). Why is this potentially good for helping us understand language acquisition?

From my perspective, it's because reducing what's in Universal Grammar makes Minimalist explanations of language acquisition more amenable to including domain-general learning components. For example, there are domain-general learning mechanisms like statistical learning and probabilistic reasoning (e.g., see Pearl (in pressb,a,c) for recent overviews of mechanisms like reinforcement learning and Bayesian inference in language acquisition); there are also domain-general learning preferences like preferring more compact representations (e.g., see Pearl (2020) for an overview of the Minimal Description Length framework in language acquisition). The benefit of domain-general components is that these components can solve some parts of the acquisition process (e.g., efficiently navigating a pre-defined hypothesis space: see Pearl in pressa for discussion). If these domain-general components solve those acquisition parts, then Universal Grammar doesn't have to have language-specific components to do so. So, Universal Grammar can be smaller, exactly as Minimalism aims to make it.

We also have a fair amount of evidence that (i) very young children can use certain domain-general components to learn, and (ii) these domain-general components can allow children to leverage their available input more effectively (e.g., see Pearl (in pressa) for an overview). That is, these domain-general components are plausible and useful cognitive components in a child's acquisition process. So, I think that by more easily incorporating plausible, useful domain-general components into explanations of language acquisition, a Minimalist approach could help provide more plausible, complete explanations about how children solve language acquisition. To me, this is a very helpful aspect of Minimalism indeed.

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