The Syntax of English Presentatives

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we analyze the syntax of sentences such as *Here is my daughter*, which we refer to as PRESENTATIVES. Presentatives turn out to have a wide range of properties that distinguish them sharply from ordinary declaratives, interrogatives, imperatives and exclamatives. Drawing on recent work on the left periphery, we develop a novel account of their syntactic structure that uses only independently proposed syntactic primitives. We argue that English presentatives involve an ordinary DP combined with two left-peripheral heads, encoding the time and location of the speaker, along with an anaphoric T head and a light verb. The resulting structure is a triple consisting of the speech time, speech location, and an entity denoted by a DP. The overall picture that emerges suggests that presentatives may constitute their own minor clause type, one which we might expect to be widely available cross-linguistically, since it is built from a particular combination of these widely available primitives. A brief survey of presentatives in languages other than English suggests that they are indeed widely available, and our analysis provides an explicit framework for detailed investigations of presentatives in other languages, which may use an overlapping, but not necessarily fully identical set of primitives.[*]

Keywords: presentatives, speaker, addressee, time of utterance, location of utterance, negation, left periphery, locative inversion,, clause type, English, syntax

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1. WHAT ARE PRESENTATIVES? WHY STUDY THEM NOW?. We use the label PRESENTATIVES to refer to sentences of the type exemplified in 1–4 below, which are both frequently used within a language and commonly found across languages, and yet have not been extensively studied by syntacticians or formal semanticists. In informal terms, we can think of them as sentences that call the addressee's attention to the presence of some entity (or some event) in the here and now of the utterance context. For example, a speaker may use a sentence like 1 to introduce their daughter to the addressee. If speaker and addressee have been talking about their pets and one of the speaker's cats comes into sight, the speaker might utter 2, likely with focal stress on *here*, drawing the addressee's attention to the cat. Similarly, if people are looking for a set of keys, the one who finds them might felicitously utter a presentative of the type exemplified in 3. And the narrator of a documentary might utter a presentative of the type exemplified in 4 to point the viewers' attention to what is happening in the video footage.

(1) Here's my daughter.

(2) Here comes the black cat.

(3) a. Here's the keys.
    b. Here're the keys.

(4) a. Here's the mob attacking the Capitol on January 6th, 2021.
    b. Here's a Northern cardinal building a nest in a cedar tree.

While presentatives are very common and may seem ordinary, they turn out to have a number of special properties that make their analysis challenging. In English, at first sight they resemble sentences with locative inversion, like *Into the room came a black cat*, and indeed, early generative literature treated them as such (Emonds 1970, Hooper & Thompson 1973), where instead of the PP, the locative predicate *here* raises to the initial position. However, closer inspection reveals that the *here* that we see in sentence-initial position in presentatives is quite different from the locative constituents that we find in locative sentences, with or without inversion. The noun phrase that we find in presentatives has restrictions that are not shared by the one we find in locatives, and presentatives differ from declaratives with a locative constituent (with or without inversion) in morphological, syntactic and interpretive properties.

One of the goals of this paper is to shed light on the syntax of presentatives in English, in a way that derives the differences between presentatives and locative clauses. A second, broader goal is to step back from the details of English and ask: what are the syntactic properties that make a sentence a presentative? Building on what we learn from focusing on English and from what the literature reports on presentatives in other languages, we aim to identify the "key ingredients" of presentatives, that is, the elements that are essential in making a clause one that is conventionally paired with the particular discourse function of drawing the addressee's attention

to an entity (or an event) that is salient in the utterance context. We believe that these ingredients could in principle be incorporated into the analysis of presentatives in any framework, including those that might have otherwise taken presentatives to be analyzed holistically as constructions, not necessarily derived from smaller parts. Our investigation is couched within the specific theoretical framework of the Minimalist Program, where a constructional analysis of that kind would not be an option, and builds on developments within this framework over the past few decades.

In addition to contributing a detailed description and a new analysis of presentatives, our work also shows that this is a particularly appropriate time for linguists to undertake the analysis of this type of clause. Why? Presentatives involve referring to an entity or event, and situating them at the time when the speaker is speaking. Over the last few decades, a considerable amount of research in syntax has been devoted to the study of whether and how information concerning the speaker, addressee, time and place of the utterance is encoded in the syntactic representation. We can now build on that body of work and tackle the analysis of a clause type that very prominently involves information from the utterance context, armed with tools that have only recently become available.

In particular, it is now widely assumed that the left periphery of the clause contains various syntactic heads that encode information concerning the utterance context that was once believed to be available for semantic interpretation without being encoded in the syntactic representation.[1] In this work, we show that the structure of presentatives makes use of such heads and that they can be seen as responsible for the construction's special syntactic and semantic properties. In addition, our analysis builds presentatives with other independently proposed syntactic formatives, including an anaphoric T head and a functional light verb (a *v* head). In short, a specific set of independently justified primitives of grammar are combined to build presentatives in a way that derives their syntactic properties. Finally, we outline a brief account of how we think that these syntactic components give rise to the meaning of presentatives and to the force that is conventionally paired with them.

The structure of our paper is the following. In section 2 we provide an informal description of the form and function of presentatives. In section 3, we make a number of novel observations that highlight the differences between presentatives and locative clauses in English, concluding that English presentatives are *not* locative clauses with fronting of the predicate. In section 4, we put forth our new proposal on the structure of presentatives. We argue that two functional heads that express the time and location of the speaker (c_T and c_L) merge with anaphoric T ($T_{[-T]}$), which in turn combines with a light verb (*v*). This light verb takes a noun phrase as its complement. In section 5, we show how our structure accounts for a wide variety of properties of presentatives, many of which have not been observed before, as far as we know. In section 6, we

show how the ingredients of our analysis of English are reflected in presentatives in several other languages, and discuss some ways in which languages might minimally differ in how they build presentatives. Section 7 offers a brief conclusion.

2. OVERVIEW OF THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF PRESENTATIVES. Presentatives typically consist of two main components: (i) an element in sentence initial position, sometimes called a 'presentative particle' in the literature, and (ii) a noun phrase or a clause in what could be called the complement position. The element in sentence initial position varies across languages: some languages have a special word, others employ a form that resembles a deictic element, like a locative or a demonstrative. A form of some light verb, often the copula, but sometimes a motion verb or a perception verb (such as *come* in 2 above), might or might not be present. (See section 4.3 for discussion of light verbs in English presentatives, and section 6 for broader cross-linguistic discussion.)

In English, for example, presentatives exhibit *here* or *there* in co-occurrence with a form of the copula, followed by a noun phrase or a gerund. German employs the locatives *hier* 'here' or *da* 'there' or the demonstrative *das* 'this', in co-occurrence with a form of the copula and a noun phrase or a clause. Turkish presentatives exhibit *işte* (a connective, according to Göksel & Kerslake 2005, which has a connection to demonstratives that we return to in Section 6), a noun phrase and no copula. Serbian presentatives have *evo, eto* or *eno* (reflecting distal/proximate distinctions), followed by a noun phrase or a clause, without an overt form of the copula. Italian presentatives exhibit a special word, *ecco*, followed by a noun phrase or a clause, also without any overt form of the copula. French employs *voici* or *voilà*, forms that derive from the combination of a form of the verb *voire* 'see' and a locative element (*ci* 'here' and *là* 'there') (see Morin 1985, Bouchard 1988, Morin 1988, Porhiel 2012, Zanuttini 2017, among others).

In 5–7 we provide a number of examples of presentatives, setting up the kind of contexts where they can be used felicitously. As pointed out in Zanuttini 2017 for Italian and confirmed here for other languages, the noun phrase can be lexical, as in 5, pronominal, as in 6, or quantificational, as in 7.

(5) When looking for a place to get gas and seeing one:

a. Here's a gas station. (English)

b. Hier ist eine Tankstelle! (German)
here is a gas station

c. İşte (bir) benzin istasyonu! (Turkish)
işte (a) gas station

d. Evo benzinsk-e pump-e. (Serbian)
evo gas-GEN.SG pump-GEN.SG

e. Voilà une station d'essence. (French)
voilà a station of-gas

f. Ecco un benzinaio! (Italian)
ecco a gas distributor

(6) When looking at photographs, and spotting the interlocutor in one of them:[2]

a. Here you are./There you are. (English)

b. Da bist du ja! (German)
there are you ja

c. İşte burda-sın! (Turkish)
işte here-you

d. Evo tebe/te. (Serbian)
evo you.GEN.SG

e. Tiens, te voilà! (French)
hold you voilà

f. Eccoti. (Italian)
ecco-you

(7) When showing someone a part of your home or your office:

a. Here's all my books. / Here are all my books. (English)

b. Das sind all meine Bücher. (German)
this are all my books

c. İşte bütün kitap-lar-ım. (Turkish)
işte all book-PL.POSS

d. Evo svi-h moj-ih knjig-a. (Serbian)
evo all-GEN my-GEN.PL book-GEN.PL

e. Voilà l'ensemble de mes livres. (French)
voilà the set of my books

f. Ecco tutti i miei libri. (Italian)
ecco all the my books

In all these examples, the presentatives draw attenton to some entity or set of entities that are in the perceptual sphere of the speaker. Note that the notion of 'perceptual sphere' must include mental representations, because, as pointed out by Sadka (2001:Sect. 4) for Biblical Hebrew, the entity could also be contemplated by speakers in their mind, without being available to the senses.[3] Examples of this type are the presentatives in 8.

(8) When discussing how to solve a problem:

a. Here's a possible solution. (English)

b. Hier ist eine mögliche Lösung. (German)

c. İşte olası bir çözüm. (Turkish)
işte possible a solution

d. Evo moguć-eg rešenj-a. (Serbian)
evo possible-GEN.SG.NEUT solution-GEN.SG

e. Voici une piste. (French)
voici a track

f. Ecco una possibile soluzione. (Italian)
ecco a possible solution

Our claim that presentatives draw attention to an entity in the perceptual sphere or in the mind of the speaker is subtly distinct from some previous claims in the literature. Lakoff (1987:481) claims that presentatives are used "to direct the hearer's attention to something in the perceptual field of both speaker and hearer and to identify it with the expression given" (see also Dubrig 1988:91). In his analysis, the speaker is drawing the addressee's attention to the location, in order to make the addressee focus on the object (Lakoff 1987:496). Green 1982:147 claims that presentatives describe something "simultaneous with the utterance, in the presence of an addressee". Though in the contexts given in 5–7 the entities are likely to be in the perceptual sphere of both speech participants, there are contexts where a presentative can draw attention to something that is only in the perceptual sphere or mind of the speaker, and not in that of the addressee.[4] For example, suppose that a speaker who is at home, talking on the phone, has mentioned that her children will be coming home soon; when they arrive, she can felicitously say "Here're the kids!'. In this case, the speaker is drawing the attention of the addressee to an entity (the kids) who is present only in her own perceptual sphere. We do not think that this is accomplished by making the addressee focus on a particular region of the speaker's perceptual field. This point is important, and we will propose that presentatives direct the addressee's attention by making an object that is within the *speaker's* sphere of perception the most salient entity in the discourse.

We thus adopt the following informal characterization of the function of presentatives:

> Pragmatic function of presentatives: Presentatives draw the addressee's attention to the presence of some entity (or set of entities) or the unfolding of an event that is within the perceptual sphere or in the mind of the speaker.[5]

We will return to this pragmatic function and its effects in section 5.

Thoms et al. 2019 claim that presentatives necessarily encode a "discovery inference", that is, that the use of presentatives "requires a context where some interlocutor, typically the speaker, has just discovered the exact location of the entity referred to by the subject" (Thoms et al.

2019:424). By 'discover', they mean "that the speaker is signaling a sharp change in their epistemic state, usually the discovery of new information about location, although this may be weakened in certain pragmatic contexts" (Thoms et al. 2019:424). We disagree with this claim. Though the hedge ("although this…") makes their claim difficult to conclusively disprove, there are many perfectly ordinary examples of presentatives where no one is discovering anything and there is no sharp change in anyone's epistemic state. For example, if a cashier is printing out a receipt and says, "Here is your receipt," everyone knows throughout the whole process that there would be a receipt and where it would come from; there is no discovery or epistemic state change. What happens is that the receipt is encoded as part of the speaker's perceptual sphere and made into the most salient entity in the discourse. Sometimes presentatives may involve a discovery, but we do not think that this is a fundamental part of the construction. However, we agree with Thoms et al. 2019 that the effect is primarily based on the perspective of the speaker, rather than the speaker and the addressee.

In sum, we characterize presentatives as having the two following properties.

First, they contain a deicitic element (which might be a locative adverb, a locative reinforcer, a demonstrative or a special word) in co-occurrence with a DP or a clause. Second, they have the function of drawing attention to the presence of an entity, set of entities or the unfolding of an event that are in the perceptual sphere or the mind of the speaker. Next, we compare presentatives with other clauses that have a locative predicate, both in a position following the subject and in sentence initial position, as in the case of locative inversion.

3. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENGLISH PRESENTATIVES AND LOCATIVE CLAUSES. We have seen in the previous section that presentatives draw attention to something that is in the 'here and now' of the utterance context, and that their sentence initial element may resemble a locative adverb. It is therefore natural to ask how presentatives compare to locative clauses. Previous literature on English presentatives, dating back to the 1970's and all the way to the present, has proposed that they contain a fronted locative predicate (Emonds 1970, Hooper & Thompson 1973), similarly to cases of locative inversion. Emonds 1970:16 considers *Here he comes* to be in the same syntactic class as locative inversion sentences like *Down the street rolled the baby carriage*. He analyzes *here* as moving from the predicate position and claims that the pronoun does not invert with the verb because it forms a kind of prefix to the verb. Hooper & Thompson 1973 also consider presentatives to be derived by a transformation, in what they call "directional adverb preposing", which also derives locative inversion sentences. This kind of analysis was criticized and rejected by Lakoff (1987) on the grounds that presentatives have numerous special properties that could not be plausibly derived via a transformation with a locative predicate.

Thoms et al. 2019, however, analyze presentatives as deriving from leftward movement of a locative predicate, and argue that any special properties of the construction stem from the presence of a special mirative C(omplementizer) head that drives this movement. They consider presentatives to be "Mirative Fronting Constructions". Mirativity is understood as a transition from not knowing to knowing the content of the proposition. They argue that pragmatic inferencing leads to an effect of "surprise", and that the restrictions on the construction stem from "the mirative component of the construction's meaning and general pragmatic considerations" (Thoms et al. 2019:437). This is supposed to be at the heart of a wide range of restrictions, including some of the ones we will discuss in this article.

We find it implausible that such a wide range of effects could stem from a grammatically encoded transition from not knowing to knowing a proposition. In 3.2 below we highlight several differences between presentatives and locatives that are particularly unlikely to be derived in this way. We think that the differences between locatives and presentatives go well beyond the kinds of effects that any derivational analysis of this sort could be expected to have, even if supplemented with mirativity, and are robust enough to warrant pursuing a different analysis. We will argue instead that the properties of presentatives stem from a particular combination of independently-motivated syntactic primitives, and do not require any construction-specific elements, such as the mirative C-head of Thoms et al. 2019.[6]

We devote this section to comparing English presentatives with other English sentences that have a locative interpretation and exhibit a locative predicate either in post-verbal or in sentence-initial position (as in the case of locative inversion constructions). In drawing this comparison, we make a number of novel empirical observations that highlight the distinct nature of presentatives.

3.1. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PRESENTATIVES AND LOCATIVES IN ENGLISH. In English, presentatives and sentences with a locative predicate exhibit two striking superficial similarities. One is that both may exhibit the locative indexicals *here* or *there*. A second one is that, though they are not felicitous in the same contexts and they do not convey the same type of meaning, they both can be used in response to a *where* question in the present tense.

(9) Where is the cat?
   a. Here he is. (presentative)
   b. He's here. (locative)

(10) Where are the beautiful views you promised us?
   a. There they are. (presentative)
   b. They're there. (locative)

It is therefore natural to wonder whether presentatives like the ones above, or like the ones in 11a and 12a below – which have a lexical DP rather than a pronoun as a subject – have the same underlying structure as their locative counterparts, given in 11b and 12b.

(11) a. *Here*'s Daria. (presentative)
b. Daria's *here*. (locative)

(12) a. *There*'s her book. (presentative)
b. Her book is *there*. (locative)

More generally, are English presentatives derived from the underlying structure of locative clauses, via fronting of the predicate, possibly triggered by the presence of a Mirative head?

3.2. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRESENTATIVES AND LOCATIVES IN ENGLISH. In what follows, we discuss eight empirical observations that highlight differences between presentatives and various types of locative clauses in English, including cases of locative inversion. These differences highlight the distinct nature of presentatives and lead us to develop an analysis that does not derive them simply from predicate fronting (nor by predicate fronting plus a Mirative head, as in Thoms et al. 2019).

1. **Presentatives are incompatible with sentential negation.** In contrast, sentences with a locative predicate in post-verbal position are compatible with it.

(13) Presentatives
a. *Here's not your suitcase.
b. *Here isn't your suitcase

(14) Locatives
a. Your suitcase's not here.
b. Your suitcase isn't here.

The incompatibility with sentential negation is a property that presentatives share with sentences with locative inversion.

(15) Locative Inversion
a. Into the room walked three polar bears.
b. *Into the room won't walk three polar bears.

Levin & Rappaport Hovav (1995) have analyzed these restrictions as related to the discourse properties of sentences with locative inversion. It may be the case that similar

discourse constraints hold in the case of presentatives, as well. However, we will also suggest a possible syntactic source for this restriction, along the following lines. Sentential negation is used to convey that a predicate does not hold of the subject, i.e., that the subject is not in the set of entities that have a certain property. In our analysis, presentatives do not contain a subject and a predicate that denotes a property attributed to the subject, in the usual subject-predicate relation. If this aspect of our analysis is correct, it could be the reason why they are not compatible with sentential negation. We will return to this in section 5.3 and 5.4, where we also raise problems for previous explanations for the constraint against sentential negation.

2. **Presentatives cannot be used to answer a question about the referent of the noun phrase.** In contrast, sentences with a locative predicate in post-verbal position can. This can be seen in the following examples.

(16) Who's here?
   a. *Here's Susan. (presentative)
   b. Susan's here. (locative)

Again, this property of presentatives is shared with sentences that contain locative inversion in English. See Zanuttini 2017:244 for a parallel observation in Italian presentatives. We also observe that presentatives cannot answer questions like the one below, where the referent of the noun phrase is an event (rather than a person).

(17) What's going on?
   a. *Here's Jason singing. (presentative)
   b. Jason is here singing. (locative)

(18) What's the matter?
   a. *Here're people making a lot of noise. (presentative)
   b. There are people here making a lot of noise. (existential/locative)

In section 5 we will suggest that this is because one of the characteristic properties of presentatives is that the noun phrase denotes an entity that is discourse-old or a familiar/Given topic, and as such it cannot be used in answer to a question, which requires it to be new information.

Since the two properties of presentatives illustrated above are also characteristic of sentences with locative inversion, we might think that presentatives are a type of locative inversion – with

here or *there* rather than with a lexical locative PP in fronted position. However, in other respects, presentatives depart both from sentences with a locative predicate (in post- or pre-verbal position) and from cases of locative inversion. Let us see how:

3. **Presentatives cannot be the clausal complement of a higher predicate**, not even with the verb *say*. In contrast, other locative clauses, including those with locative inversion (illustrated in 20c) can serve as the complement of verbs of speaking (and thinking).

   (19) Presentatives as a complement clause
   a. *She said that here's your coffee.
   b. *She believes that there's your suitcase.

   (20) Locatives as a complement clause
   a. She said that your coffee is here.
   b. She believes that your suitcase is there.
   c. She believes that in this room stands a tall marble statue. (locative inversion)

   Later, in section 5.5, we will see that presentatives can be embedded in *because*-clauses. However, even in those cases, there are restrictions: presentatives in *because*-clauses cannot, for example, be in the scope of negation, a restriction that does not hold for locatives in *because*-clauses. We will account for the restrictions on embedding presentatives by arguing that the structure of presentatives does not generate the kind of semantic object that the higher predicate needs. We will elaborate on this aspect of the analysis in section 5.2.

4. **In presentatives, *here* cannot be modified**, as we see in 21.[7] In contrast, in locative clauses, *here* can be modified by *right*, both when it follows the copula and when it is fronted, and even in sentences with locative inversion, as we see in 22d.

   (21) Presentatives
   a. **Right here*'s my bag.
   b. **Right here* it is.

   (22) Locatives
   a. My bag is *right here*.
   b. I said it would be right here, and *right here* it is.
   c. *Right here* though it might be, it won't matter.
   d. *Right into my car* flew a big yellow bird. (locative inversion)

This suggests that the *here* that we find in presentatives is not the same as the *here* we find in locative clauses (similarly for *there*). In our analysis, we will propose that, in presentatives, *here/there* spells out a left-peripheral head. This accounts for why it cannot be modified as though it were a phrase.

5. **Not all presentatives have a locative counterpart.** We can see this in the following pairs.

(23) a. Here's a problem. (presentative)
b. #A problem is here. (locative)

(24) a. Here's Jason singing. (presentative)
b. #Jason singing is here. (locative)

The presentative in 23a draws attention to a problem that is in the speaker's mind (recall from section 2 that the notion of 'perceptual sphere' includes mental representations). It can be paraphrased with 'This is a problem that comes to my mind' or 'This is a problem I see.' The meaning of the locative in 23b is quite odd; it could be paraphrased as 'A problem is present where we are'. We think that the meaning difference between 23a and 23b goes beyond the kind of meaning changes associated with movement (such as focus, quantificational scope, or aboutness). It also casts doubt on the idea that the locative in 23b is the derivational source for the presentative in 23a.[8]

Lakoff (1987:510), arguing against a transformational analysis of presentatives, offers a different pair of examples that points to the same conclusion (cf. also Prado-Alonso 2016).

(25) a. There's the beep. (presentative)
b. #The beep is there. (locative)

Here again, it is unlikely that 25b is the derivational source of 25a. Several other examples that Lakoff (1987) discusses can make this same point (although in these cases, he does not bring them up for this purpose or mention the non-inverted versions).

(26) a. Here comes another outburst. (presentative) (Lakoff 1987:518)
b. #Another outburst comes here. (locative)

(27) a. Now there is a great cup of coffee. (presentative) (Lakoff 1987:526)
b. #Now a great cup of coffee is there. (locative)

Note that the contrasts in 23–26 seem to be impossible to understand as a consequence of any notion of mirativity, as proposed in Thoms et al. 2019, even if supplemented with

general pragmatic considerations. One does not get anything resembling the meaning of 23a (*Here's a problem*) by taking 23b (*A problem is here*) and adding a transition from not knowing to knowing, plus a surprisal effect, or anything along these lines.

We will develop an analysis of presentatives in which *here* (or *there*) is not a regular locative predicate that is predicated of the subject *a problem*. Therefore we do not expect the meaning of *A problem is here* (or any of the other degraded non-inverted locative sentences) to be part of the derivation of *Here is a problem*.

6. **Presentatives point out that an entity is now present in the perceptual sphere of the speaker**. Note that this can also be a set of entities or an event; in the latter case, the event is unfolding at the time of speech. Locatives, in contrast, are interpreted as asserting that an entity (or set of entities or an event) is present (or unfolding) in a certain location that is not restricted to the perceptual sphere or the mind of the speaker, even when the form of the copula is in the present tense and the locative predicate is the indexical *here*. For example, a locative clause like 28 with *here* as the predicate is compatible with an interpretation in which the cat is present in the context that includes the speaker, without necessarily being in their perceptual sphere.[9]

   (28) The cat is here, we just need to find it. (locative)

   This is why a locative is compatible with a continuation that suggests that the speaker does not know where exactly the cat is. In contrast, a presentative is not compatible with such a continuation, as we see in 29.

   (29) *Here's the cat, we just need to find it. (presentative)

   Note that this restriction does not arise from the fronting of the predicate. Fronted *here* in locative clauses is compatible with the speaker not knowing the exact location, as we see in 30.

   (30) *Here* we could put the table (we just need to figure out where exactly), and over there we could put the chairs.

   Hence, this restriction on the interpretation of *here* is unique to presentatives, and is not found in locatives. This difference between presentatives and locatives can be seen particularly clearly in contrasts like the following.

   (31) Speaker A: I hear that you have guests visiting you.
   Speaker B:

a. My parents are here (for a few days). (locative)
b. #Here are my parents (for a few days). (presentative)

In locative clauses, the indexical *here* can be interpreted contextually, as referring to a location relevant to the speaker; for example, 31a might be interpreted as saying that the speaker's parents are in the same town where the speaker is. In presentatives, in contrast, the perceptual sphere of the speaker is the only possible interpretation for the location. This is why 31b is an awkward continuation of the dialogue that started with 'I hear that you have guests visiting you' (as it suggests that A is not aware that B's parents are right in front of their eyes). See Zanuttini 2017 for a parallel contrast in Italian.[10]

We will capture this difference by saying that the only locative element present in the structure of presentatives is the one that gives the location of the speaker; there is no locative element that denotes a location that encompasses the speaker, as there is in locative clauses. We will discuss this extensively in section 4 (in particular in 4.1).

7. **The temporal interpretation of presentatives is restricted** in ways that we do not see in locatives. In presentatives, the copula can generally only occur in the present tense.

(32) Presentatives
a. Here'*s* Daria.
b. *Here *has been* Daria.
c. *Here *will be* Daria.

The past tense is possible only in very restricted circumstances such as the Free Indirect Discourse (FID) style frequently found in novels.[11]

(33) Here she *was* again, she thought, stepping back to look at it… (Virginia Woolf *To the Lighthouse*, Ch.3)

Note, for example, that although presentatives in the present tense can be used to respond to a question about the location of an entity, past tense is not possible in these contexts, because such contexts clearly do not involve a FID reading.

(34) a. A: Where is the cat?
b. B: Here he is. (presentative)

(35) a. A: Where was the cat?
b. B: *Here he was. (presentative)

FID involves using past tense in a "narrative present" sense, to which we return below. In locatives, in contrast, the copula can have different morphological forms, and can be past tense without needing an FID context.

(36) Locatives

a. Daria'*s* here.

b. Daria *has been* here many times.

c. Daria *will be* here.

d. Daria *was* here.

Moreover, in presentatives the copula lacks certain interpretations that can be associated with the present tense in English, especially the habitual/generic interpretation. This is clearly shown in the following contrast.

(37) a. Daria is here every week. (locative)

b. *Here's Daria every week. (presentative)

(38) a. Daria is usually here. (locative)

b. *Here's Daria usually. (presentative)

(39) a. My bus comes here every day. (locative)

b. *Here comes my bus every day. (presentative)

This observation is also made in Lakoff 1987:471, where it is pointed out that presentatives are incompatible with the adverbial *from time to time*, which is only appropriate with generic time reference. Prado-Alonso 2016 makes a similar point with the adverb *occasionally*. These contrasts show that the interpretation of tense in presentatives is not that of the usual present. It is restricted to the time when the speaker is speaking. In our analysis, we will capture this property by assuming that the T of presentatives is anaphoric and gets its value from the functional head that denotes the time when the speaker is speaking. We will discuss and justify the use of anaphoric T in section 4 (in particular in 4.2).

8. **Presentatives do not show the definiteness effect.** This draws a sharp contrast between them and so-called 'existential clauses' (like *There's a book on the table*). Like presentatives, they also have *there* followed by a form of *be*, and many have forcefully argued that *there* in these sentences is a locative element (cf. Moro 1997a,b and much subsequent work; see also Cresti & Tortora 2000, Irwin 2012). Unlike presentatives,

though, they exhibit the definiteness effect, both in their existential and in their locative interpretation.[12] We see this in the contrast below.

(40) (Upon finding one's keys:) There are my keys, on the table. (presentative)

(41) (Describing what one saw:) *There were my keys, on the table. (existential clause)

In our analysis, this is not surprising: presentatives have a distinct structure from locative clauses, including so-called existential clauses introduced by *there*, so there is no reason to expect that the definiteness effect would apply to them as well. For example, Kayne (2020) suggests that the definiteness effect arises from *there* moving out of the DP in which originates. In our analysis of presentatives, *there* starts out in the left-periphery of the clause, hence does not undergo the movement step that would trigger the definiteness effect, either along the lines of Moro's or of Kayne's analysis.

Given these eight empirical differences, we do not analyze English presentatives as declarative clauses with fronting of a locative predicate. The differences are many, and they are vast, and go far beyond the semantic and morphosyntactic effects that movement is known to have. They also go well beyond what can be accounted for by assuming that presentatives are locatives supplemented with mirativity (whether that is understood as a sharp change in the speaker's epistemic state or not). Presentatives have syntactic and semantic properties that are distinct from locatives. We will argue that they are nevertheless built from independently motivated primitives, combined in the particular way that we detail in section 4 below.[13]

4. THE STRUCTURAL INGREDIENTS OF ENGLISH PRESENTATIVES. Our proposal is that presentatives are both ordinary and special. They are ordinary in the sense that their syntactic structure is built out of some of the same primitives that are also used to build up more familiar clauses. Yet they are special in that when these particular primitives are combined, the apparently special properties discussed throughout this paper are the result.

The structure that we propose for an English presentative like the one in 42 is given in 43. This structure contains two functional heads that encode the time and location of the speaker's utterance (c_T and c_L, respectively), a T head that is anaphoric (gets its temporal interpretation from c_T), and a light verb (v_{BE}).As discussed in section 4.2, this anaphoric T has unvalued φ-features which are valued via an Agree relation between T and the DP. These, we argue, are the key components of presentatives.

(42) Here's my daughter.

(43)



Before we proceed, we would like to point out that, according to our analysis, there need not be a predicate that combines with the subject in the syntax of English presentatives, similarly to what we see in locative clauses. (Alternatively, there could be a null locative predicate that does not contribute to the interpretation, as we mention in note 14.) However, the complement of v may vary cross-linguistically, as we discuss in more detail in section 6, so nothing in our analysis rules out the presence of a small clause or even a CP in presentatives in principle. What is crucial for us is that the properties of presentatives are not derived from the corresponding locative predication, for example through predicate fronting, topicalization, locative inversion or the like.

We hypothesize that the variation we see in the form of presentatives across languages depends on the kind of *v* they employ and how exactly the features of the higher heads are spelled out. We discuss the underpinnings of cross-linguistic variation further in section 6. We will devote the rest of this section to providing background on the key components of this structure, and justifying their inclusion in the analysis of presentatives. Next, in section 5, we will outline how the structure we propose accounts for a wide range of special properties that distinguish presentatives from other kinds of sentences.

4.1. TIME AND LOCATION OF THE UTTERANCE: C$_L$ AND C$_T$. We begin with what we see as one of the most central aspects of the analysis, the c$_{T_i}$ and c$_{L_i}$ heads, which encode the time and location of the speaker of the utterance.

BACKGROUND ON C$_L$ AND C$_T$. It has long been assumed that the time and location of (the speaker of) the utterance are linguistically represented, along with speaker, addressee, and world coordinates. But how? Ross 1970 argued that the speaker and addressee are represented in each root clause, along with an abstract performative verb (hence the label 'performative hypothesis'). This proposal generated substantial debate, and eventually the problems that were raised led to its largely being abandoned. In the years that followed that debate, many syntacticians and

semanticists not only avoided the abstract performative verb, but also assumed that the notions of speaker and addressee are not represented in the syntactic representation of a clause and that pronominal reference to the discourse participants is done purely in the semantics, as described in Kaplan 1989. In this view, the ways in which the speaker and addressee play a special role in semantics and pragmatics are not reflected in syntax.

Recently it has become clear that the idea that speaker and addressee are represented in the syntax should be reconsidered. Over the last two decades, a series of proposals have argued that the discourse participants are represented in the highest levels of the root clause's structure, though not as the arguments of a performative verb. Speas & Tenny 2003 argue that illocutionary force is configurationally encoded, and so their approach has been described as a neo-performative hypothesis. But most other works provide evidence for the representation of discourse participants in syntax without assuming that this structure plays a role in the assignment of force (Hill 2007b, Baker 2008, Zanuttini 2008, Collins & Postal 2012, Haegeman & Hill 2013, Slocum 2016, Zu 2015, 2018, Portner et al. 2019, a.o.).

At the same time, a growing body of research has also come to the conclusion that the temporal and spatial coordinates (of the utterance, or of the speaker) are syntactically represented in the left periphery of the clause. The current line of research goes back to Rizzi 1997, where it is proposed that the CP is not necessarily a single phrase headed by a single head, but rather a domain with a number of projections relating to discourse notions such as topic, focus, and illocutionary force. The original structure of the CP domain that Rizzi proposed is as follows.

(44) $[_{\text{ForceP}}$ Force $[_{\text{TopicP}}$ Topic $[_{\text{FocusP}}$ Focus $[_{\text{TopicP}}$ Topic $[_{\text{FinP}}$ Fin $[_{\text{TP}} \ldots$]]]]]]

Many subsequent works, by Rizzi and others, have refined this structure in ways that go far beyond our purposes (Benincà 2001, Aboh 2004, Benincà & Poletto 2004, Rizzi 2004, Frascarelli 2007, Frascarelli & Hinterhölzl 2007, Bianchi & Frascarelli 2010, Poletto & Zanuttini 2010, Zanuttini et al. 2012, Haegeman & Hill 2013, Haegeman 2014, Hill 2014). Here we wish to focus on two things, which will be relevant for our discussion.

First, an important part of Rizzi's original proposal was that, when the Topic and Focus heads are not used in a given clause, they are not in the structure at all. In such cases, Force and Fin would be structurally adjacent, and Rizzi proposed that they are "bundled" into one head. This one head is, then, the single "C" head that was familiar prior to Rizzi's proposal. This is important because it raises the question of what other heads might actually be "bundles" of smaller heads, a question that Sigurðsson took up in various works (see below), and will play a role in the analysis we present.

Second, Rizzi & Shlonsky 2006 (among other works) elaborated in more detail on the properties of FinP, and argued that it has two functions. On the one hand, it has a temporal function, and is involved with checking tense features on the T head. On the other hand, it is

involved in the special requirement, known as "Extended Projection Principle (EPP)" effects, that a finite clause must have a subject (see Chomsky 1981), and can have a locative feature (particularly motivated by locative inversion constructions). Building on this idea, Sigurðsson 2004b proposed that the Fin head is actually a bundle of two distinct heads, which he called S_T for "Speech Time" and S_L for "Speech Location".

Sigurðsson's 2004b S_T head encodes the temporal coordinates of the speech event, and undergoes matching relations with lower T heads to encode Reichenbachian temporal relations. In this work, the standard T head of TP encodes the Reichenbachian "reference time." Whenever this time is equal to the speech time, the resulting tense is present; whenever it precedes the speech time, the tense is past. (Importantly, what we see as "past tense morphology" is not always a reflection of this semantic past tense—see below on Sequence of Tense and Free Indirect Discourse.) Sigurðsson's 2004b S_L head encodes the locative coordinates of the speech event, and undergoes matching relations with lower DPs and adverbials or expletives such as *there*. These elements can be either [+here] or [–here]. Much in the spirit of Rizzi & Shlonsky 2006, such relations are argued to be the source of EPP effects, a proposal that is developed in further detail in Sigurðsson 2010 (see also Hinterhölzl 2019).

Giorgi 2010 argues at length that the speaker's temporal coordinates are encoded on C-heads as syntactically active features that undergo matching relations with subordinate and superordinate temporal heads. She argues that a head analogous to our c_T head is realized as *credo* in Italian sentences like 45.

(45) Credo Luisa abbia telefonato.
believe.1SG Luisa has.SBJV called
'Probably Luisa has called.' (Giorgi 2010:69)

Although *credo* is normally the 1st person singular present tense form of the verb 'believe', Giorgi (2010) argues that in sentences like 45, with a 1st person form and no overt complementizer, it is an epistemic C-head and that 45 is monoclausal. She provides a number of pieces of evidence for this, including the distribution of preverbal subjects in the absence of a complementizer, the availability of fronted topics and foci, and the distribution of speaker adverbs like *francamente* 'frankly', all of which support the claim that the material following *credo* does not have the behavior of an embedded clause. She repeatedly suggests that the speaker's locative coordinates are similarly encoded, but does not develop that aspect of her proposal in any detail.

In addition to the above proposals, a number of other linguists have more or less independently come to the conclusion that speech time and/or speech location are encoded in specific syntactic heads, to account for a wide variety of phenomena (Bianchi 2003, 2006, Giorgi 2010, Poletto & Zanuttini 2010, González i Planas 2014, Haddad 2014, Wiltschko 2014,

Biondo et al. 2018, Frascarelli & Jiménez-Fernández 2021). The formal details often differ, but the overall intuition is strikingly similar. Here we outline just a few examples, since we cannot discuss them individually in detail. Bianchi (2003) argues that the speech time is syntactically represented in the lowest C-head, Fin, to account for differences in the temporal interpretations of finite clauses and control clauses (see also Bianchi 2006). Wiltschko (2014) argues that either speech time or speech location can be encoded in specific heads in the "anchoring" layer of the clause, although in her proposal languages vary as to whether they use time or location (or something else) for this function. This is in contrast to Sigurðsson's works, where these heads are always present, but may be overtly reflected in some languages and not others; see especially Sigurðsson 2004a for explicit discussion of this assumption. Haddad 2014 argues that the subject in certain attitude dative constructions in Lebanese Arabic moves to the specifier of a head analogous to our c_T head, accounting for the observation that these constructions "reflect what the speaker knows about the subject at the speech time" (Haddad 2014:93). We take the body of work discussed in this section to independently support the existence of the heads that we label as c_T and c_L.

ROLE OF C_L AND C_T IN PRESENTATIVES. We acknowledge that it may be possible to develop an analysis of the properties of presentatives without assuming the existence of c_T and c_L heads; such an account would likely require a different explanation for many of the properties discussed below, and may or may not tie the presentatives to other, better-studied constructions in the way our account does. (We will indicate in our discussion below several places where an alternative, semantic or pragmatic account may be possible for a given property.) Since we take the body of work discussed in the previous subsection to support the existence of c_T and c_L heads, we develop an analysis of presentatives in which they play a key role. After all, the properties of presentatives connected to the speech time and location are some of their most salient aspects. The function of the construction is to direct the attention of the addressee to something within the perceptual sphere of the speaker at the time that the presentative is uttered, which obviously stems directly from the speaker's location and time. Moreover, the temporal interpretation is restricted to a true present tense—exactly the speech time.

What is unusual about these heads as they are used in presentatives is that they do not compute more complex relations with lower elements. Essentially, these are the same heads that are always found, in every clause; but in this case, the other elements that they would interact with are missing or are inert (that is, they do not contribute to the interpretation), which restricts the overall temporal and locative interpretations available. In Sigurðsson's terms, the speech location head never matches anything as "[–here]", and the speech time head never creates a past tense where the reference time precedes it.

Before moving on, we would like to highlight two things about our overall structure as they relate to the c_T and c_L heads. First, we will propose that, in English, the *here* (or *there*) morpheme in presentatives is not an ordinary, clause-internal adverbial or proform, but rather is either base generated adjoined to the c_L head, or is the direct realization of this head. Either way, the interpretation is either [+distal] or [−distal], but *within the perceptual sphere of the speaker*, the latter being the contribution of the c_L head independently of this [±distal] property. We could represent this as in 46.

(46)



To be clear, even when it is [+distal], meaning that it is not near the speaker, it is only distal relative to the range of the speaker's perceptual sphere, which of course contains the speaker's location.

Second, the general connection between tense semantics and tense morphology is not as straightforward as one might expect. The temporal interpretation of presentatives is identical with speech time. However, past tense morphology is still possible, as in Free Indirect Discourse contexts. We will discuss how this is possible in the next subsection.

4.2. THE SPECIAL T OF PRESENTATIVES: ANAPHORIC T. We now move on to the next part of the structure given above, the $T_{[-T]}$ head, where the [−T] feature indicates that this T head does not encode its own reference time, as we will discuss in detail presently. We approach the issue from two angles. First, we can ask if there is any reason to think that presentatives contain a T head at all. Second, assuming there is reason to think so, we can ask what kinds of properties it must have, and why.[14]

As for the first question, we believe that there are good reasons to assume that presentatives contain a T head. First of all, as noted above (see discussion surrounding 33), English does show morphological tense distinctions between present and past, and these distinctions look identical to what we see in ordinary clauses. This strongly suggests that there is a T head. Second, the light verb of presentatives agrees in φ-features with the DP, and this kind of agreement is standardly assumed to be anchored to φ-features on T. Our analysis also allows us to maintain the standard assumption that a φ-complete T is responsible for Case licensing nominative Case on the DP. Third, Italian presentatives, as discussed by Zanuttini (2017), license pronominal clitics, which are standardly thought to adjoin to T. Assuming that there is a T head in presentatives allows us not to have to posit some special syntax for clitics solely for presentative sentences.

Finally, there is a theory-internal reason in support of the presence of T. We have argued that presentatives contain some C-heads, and we can clearly see that they contain a DP and, we will argue, a light verb. However, it is not clear how these elements would combine syntactically without a T head. Presentatives have unusual properties, but we don't know of any cases where a C head combines directly with a vP or DP complement. Our structure, which contains a CP layer, a TP layer, and a vP layer, conforms to our usual expectations about clause structure; it is the features of these C, T, and v heads that give presentatives what appear to be their special properties. This argument is theory-internal, but given the other reasons to assume a TP, it is certainly an advantage of our proposal over an alternative with no TP layer.[15]

Assuming there is a TP layer, we can ask what properties T has. As we pointed out above, the T head does not encode an independent reference time that forms a present/past relation with the speech time. Instead, it would seem that, interpretively, if it introduces any time at all, it has to be identical to the superordinate speech time, represented for us by c_T. It may seem unusual to assume that there is a syntactic T head that does not introduce temporal semantics. But in fact, the existence of such a head is independently motivated. There are at least two cases in English syntax where the interpretation of a T head is identical to a time encoded higher in the structure: the T of infinitivals and the embedded T of Sequence-of-Tense (SOT) structures. We focus on the latter, which, we will see, offers a satisfying account of the case at hand.

In SOT structures, the verb of the subordinate clause has the morphological marking of past tense, but this marking does not situate the event in the past relative to the speech time. In 47, for example, the past tense on *was* does not situate the event of the fish being alive in the past. It is not enough that the fish is alive at any time prior to the speech time. Instead, the fish will be alive at the time when John buys it. It is only "past" because it is identical to the time of the main clause "saying" event, and that event happens to be past tense. That is, the past tense on *was* seems to be a manifestation of agreement with the past tense on the higher verb, *said*, not a past tense of its own.

(47) John said he would buy a fish that was still alive. (Ogihara 1989)

Many accounts of this phenomenon have been put forth in the syntactic and semantic literature. Partee (1973) was perhaps the first to suggest that tenses in natural languages might be best viewed as pronouns: like pronouns, they have indexical, anaphoric and bound variable uses. Kratzer (1998) pursues this intuition and suggests that English has two indexical tenses, present and past, and a third type of tense ('zero tense') that must be bound by a local antecedent – and that this zero tense is the tense involved in the clause with *was* in 47. The zero tense is anaphoric to the closest antecedent which, in Kratzer's discussion, is the tense of the next higher clause.

We build on the intuition that underlies these proposals (see also like Enç 1987, Stowell 1996, Zagona 2002, 2014, a.o.) and pursue the idea that English and other languages have a type of

T that is anaphoric and acquires its temporal value from a superordinate antecedent. It is this T head that is found in presentatives, but the antecedent in this case is the c_T head described in the previous subsection.

Recall that, despite the fact that the temporal interpretation of presentatives is true present tense, identical with speech time, past tense morphology is still possible in Free Indirect Discourse contexts. How does this work? Giorgi (2010) proposes that Free Indirect Discourse involves a kind of resetting of the speech event coordinates to the coordinates of the "internal source" — the mind whose experience we follow when we comprehend FID sentences. The past tense morphology reflects a T head being past with respect to the external speech time (the "real" speech time), while the interpretation is still simultaneous with the internal speech time. That is, it is past tense morphologically, but semantically, in its local context, it is still a true present tense.

Notice that this is parallel to SOT, where we see a morphological past tense. In SOT, the embedded event is simultaneous—true present—with respect to the superordinate event in the clause above it. The past tense morphology reflects the fact that this superordinate event, and therefore the embedded time as well, is past tense with respect to the higher, real speech time. We illustrate the parallelism in 48 below.

(48) **FID** [EXTERNAL TIME [$_{cP_T}$ c_T (=INTERNAL TIME) . . . [$_{TP}$ T . . .

PAST =

SOT [$_{cP_T}$ c_T (=INTERNAL TIME) [$_{vP}$ v (=EVENT TIME) . . . [$_{TP}$ T . . .

PAST =

In FID, the c_T head is PAST with respect to the external time, and it is this relation that causes the lower, identical T head to be realized as morphological past tense. (For more on the "external time" and its connection to CP heads, see Sigurðsson 2014, 2019 on what he refers to as context scanning.) In SOT, the v head is PAST with respect to the internal time (represented by the c_T head), and it is this relation that causes the lower, identical T head to be realized as morphological past tense. In both cases, the morphological past tense on T is a reflection of agreement with a higher past tense relation. The important point for our analysis is that in presentatives, this embedded temporal interpretation is still always true present, even if special contexts like FID can lead to a morphologically past tense form.[16]

4.3. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR THE LIGHT VERB (*v*). The next ingredient in the structure of presentatives is the light verb. The notion of light verb that we have in mind stems from two related ideas. The first is that what we normally think of as a lexical verb has two parts, a lexical root representing the conceptual meaning that makes it a content word rather than a function word, and a functional head representing the grammatical category and structural semantic properties (such as inner aspect, stative versus dynamic, etc.) that are potentially universal. For example, the verb *sing* in English consists of a universally available light verb denoting an activity, along with a lexical root that specifies a singing activity (as opposed to a dancing activity or any other kind of activity). This is a fundamental assumption in the theory of Distributed Morphology (Cuervo 2003, Folli & Harley 2004) but is widely found outside that theory as well (Hale & Keyser 1993, 2002, Den Dikken 2010, Harves & Kayne 2012). The second idea is that some verbs that have the syntactic distribution of lexical verbs are really more like function words, lacking lexical content that goes beyond the structural semantic properties just mentioned. These verbs are sometimes analyzed as the realization of the functional head just mentioned but without the lexical root. Here again, this idea is found within Distributed Morphology (Harley 2002, 2005, Folli & Harley 2007, 2013, Wood 2011, Sigurðsson & Wood 2021) but also outside of it (Lundin 2003, Den Dikken 2010).

The overt verbs that we find in English presentatives, *be*, *come*, and *go*, have all been independently proposed to be light verbs. Myler 2016, for example, argues that the overt verb *be* in English is the realization of a stative v head in the absence of an external argument (see also Cuervo 2003).[17] Bjorkman 2016 argues that *go* and *come* are both light verbs that realize a v head as well. Bjorkman 2016 focuses in particular on the fact that these two verbs alone participate in the so-called *go get* construction, illustrated in 49.

(49) a. I will *go get* a drink.
b. * I will leave/depart/exit get a drink.

(50) a. I expect her to *come visit* soon.
b. * I expect her to arrive/approach/start visit soon.

The *go get* construction involves the light verb followed by the infinitival form of a lexical verb, with no conjunction (*and*) or infinitive marker (*to*) intervening between the two, and has a number of intriguing properties. What is striking in the present context is that the light verb is restricted to *go* and *come*, exactly the same two verbs that are allowed (in addition to *be*) in presentative constructions.

Following Myler (2016), we assume that v_{BE} is essentially semantically expletive, serving in this case a purely syntactic function. The other two verbs that occur in this construction, namely *come* and *go*, are special in the English language in that they encode speaker perspective: *come*

indicates motion toward the location of the speaker, whereas *go* indicates motion away from, or originating with, the location of the speaker. This property also suggests that *come* and *go* are function words, or light verbs in our terminology. We assume that this layer of meaning (which is still in need of a more precise characterization) is encoded in v_{GO} and v_{COME} as a conventional implicature or a presupposition to the effect that there is (concrete or metaphorical) motion away from or toward the speaker.

From a theoretical point of view, the inclusion of a light verb in the analysis yields a structure where there is a vP layer that connects the overt DP to the higher structural layers; without it, we would have a structure where a T head takes a DP complement, which would be highly unusual to say the least. Empirically, the inclusion of a light verb in the structure is based on the restriction in English to the verbs *be*, *go*, and *come*.

4.4. SECTION SUMMARY. In this section we have argued that English presentatives have, minimally, the structure outlined in 42. We proposed that they have two functional heads that provide the temporal and locative coordinates of the speaker (c_L and c_T), and a T head that is anaphoric on c_T. The other functional head, *v*, is a light verb that connects the DP to the rest of the clause, and can come in one of several potential subtypes. (We will see in section 6 below that there is some reason to believe that the identity and properties of this light verb may vary across languages as well.)

Importantly, all of the primitives invoked in this structure have previously been proposed and, previous proposals aside, intuitively capture general facts about language. That is, there is independent reason to believe that (i) the speaker's time and location are encoded syntactically in the left periphery; (ii) tense can be syntactically present but be semantically anaphoric (expressing a time simultaneous to one provided in a higher structural position); (iii) certain light verbs form a closed class. When the heads that encode this information syntactically are combined, along with a DP, the result is a presentative.

5. CAPTURING THE PROPERTIES OF ENGLISH PRESENTATIVES. Having justified the ingredients of our analysis of presentatives, we now discuss how their properties are accounted for by the structure we propose.

5.1. BASIC PROPERTIES OF ENGLISH PRESENTATIVES. In the previous section, we proposed the following structure for English presentatives:

(51)



The first point to emphasize is that, in our analysis, the *here* (or *there*) morpheme in presentatives is not an ordinary, clause-internal adverbial or proform. Rather, *here* is either base generated adjoined to the c_L head, or is the direct realization of this head. There is no locative constituent that functions as a predicate and combines with the subject in the familiar subject-predicate relation, and in fact, there is no subject-predicate relation in this structure. This analysis allows us to capture at least three of the properties of presentatives brought up in section 3, which distinguish them from locatives:

1. *here* in presentatives denotes the location of the speaker (not a location that *includes* the location of the speaker, as in locative clauses). This follows from the fact that it is the overt realization of the head c_L;

2. presentatives do not always have a locative counterpart. This is because *here* starts out in c_L (it is not first merged as the predicate of a small clause and then fronted, which would lead us to expect a locative counterpart);

3. *here* in presentatives cannot be modified. This is due to the fact that it is a left-peripheral head, and does not project the kind of phrasal structure that licenses modifiers.

The second point to emphasize is that we analyze the copula as the realization of v in the absence of a transitive Voice head (Bjorkman 2011, Myler 2016). We assume that this v raises to T.[18] In our analysis, there is no lexical verb. The absence of a lexical verb accounts for the limited number of verbs in the construction: the only other two verbs possible are *come* and *go*. Both of these have special behavior elsewhere in the language, as mentioned above, and have been independently proposed by Bjorkman (2016) to be realizations of v in another part of the grammar of English (specifically in sentences like *come see this* or *go see that*). We assume that they are distinct subcategories of v, which we could label as v_{COME} and v_{GO}.

A third initial point to mention is that when the DP appears to the left of the copula (usually when it is a pronoun; see fn.13), the copula cannot occur in an otherwise-available contracted form.

(52) a. Here's my daughter.
b. Here she is.
c. * Here she's.

This is consistent with a general property of English auxiliaries, which is that they cannot appear in reduced form when they immediately precede a gap that results from movement or ellipsis. In the present case, we assume that the pronoun moves from the complement of v to the left of the auxiliary, leaving a gap.

(53)



Note that in other copular constructions, movement of a DP has this same effect.

(54) a. Anna's a natural leader.
b. I don't know what type of leader Anna is.
c. * I don't know what type of leader Anna's.

The contraction facts are therefore fully consistent with our proposal.[19]

Moving beyond these initial points, recall that we mentioned above that our structure does not contain a subject and a predicate that combine in the usual subject-predicate relation; it simply contains elements that convey information on the time and location of the speaker of the utterance, and a DP with its denotation—but no predicate that is being predicated of that DP. If this part of our proposal is correct, we are led to conclude that presentatives, unlike declarative

clauses, do not denote a proposition. In the next few subsections, we discuss how viewing presentatives as structures that do not contain the usual subject-predicate relation, and thus do not denote a proposition, allows us to capture many of their distinguishing properties.

5.2. RESTRICTIONS ON EMBEDDING. Presentatives cannot occur as the complement of a higher predicate. We see this clearly in the following examples, where the verbs *say* and *think* cannot take a presentative as a complement.

(55) Embedded Presentatives

a. *She said that here's your coffee.

b. *I think that here's Daria.

We might think that the impossibility of embeddding presentatives is due to the fact that *here* is fronted. But this cannot be the case, because locative clauses with fronted *here* can be embedded, as we see in 56. These examples might not be completely natural, but are certainly better than those with embedded presentatives:

(56) a. I had thought that here were the books and over there was the computer.

b. (I had thought that the water was dripping from the first floor, but) she said that *here* were most of the leaks, not on the first floor.

We propose that this contrast arises not because of the position of *here*, but because of a fundamental difference between locatives and presentatives: A locative clause is the kind of semantic object that can be the complement of a higher predicate, whereas a presentative is not.

Thinking about the semantics, a presentative does not have the kind of denotation that the higher predicate is looking for, as it does not denote a proposition. This might be because there is no subject combining with a predicate, if that part of our proposal is correct. But even if that part of our proposal is not correct, it would still be true because the meaning contributed by cP_L and cP_T is not an appropriate meaning for the higher predicate.[20]

Thinking about the syntax, we could say it is not the right kind of syntactic object to serve as complement of a higher predicate; for example, our c_T and c_L heads might be higher in the functional sequence than CP (like the cP of Portner et al. 2019 or the 'Speech Act' heads of Hill 2007b, 2014, Haegeman 2014, Haegeman & Hill 2013 and others, which draw on Speas & Tenny 2003), and thus not part of the structure selected by the higher predicate. Our account is compatible with this view, but does not require it, so it is also compatible with the view that speech time and location heads are internal to the CP and may in principle be embedded, as in Sigurðsson 2004b, 2014, 2016, Bianchi 2006, and Giorgi 2010.

In support of our proposal, we note that presentatives are degraded in quotations introduced by verbs like *assert* or *claim*, which combine with a structure that denotes a proposition, but

acceptable with verbs like *say*, *mutter*, or *shout*, which can combine with a range of structures, including some that uncontroversially do not denote a proposition.[21]

(57) a. * "Here's your coffee," she asserted/claimed.
b. "Here's your coffee," she said/muttered/shouted.

(58) a. * {"Wow,"/"Ouch,"} she asserted/claimed.
b. {"Wow,"/"Ouch,"} she said/muttered/shouted.

5.3. INCOMPATIBILITY WITH SENTENTIAL NEGATION. Presentatives are incompatible with sentential negation. In English, we see this in the impossibility of having *n't*.

(59) Presentatives
a. *Here isn't my bag.
b. *Here isn't a possible solution.
c. *Here doesn't come Jane.

In this they contrast with locatives, where sentential negation is straightforward in cases without predicate fronting and possible also in those with predicate fronting, as in 60c.

(60) Locatives
a. My bag wasn't here.
b. Jane doesn't come here.
c. Here isn't the best place to discuss such things.

In our view, this contrast stems from the fact that the marker of sentential negation in English expresses a functional Neg head that must combine semantically with a proposition. According to our proposal, there is no predicate in presentatives, and therefore there is no proposition and the sentential negative marker *n't* cannot occur.

5.4. COMPATIBILITY WITH CONSTITUENT NEGATION. Our claim that sentential negation is impossible in presentatives because they lack a predicate makes a clear prediction: presentatives should be able to contain other kinds of negation, which do not require a predicate. For example, constituent negation should be possible, because it does not require the presence of a predicate. This prediction is indeed borne out: the noun phrase can be negative in presentatives, when attention is brought to the lack of something, as illustrated in 61.

(61) a. (If looking for a spot with no dust:) Here's no dust.
b. (If looking for a place without noise:) Here's no noise at all.
c. Here is a room with no one in it.

d. Here's no surprise: Whitey Bulger was a big Trump fan.[22]

e. Here's no polite request but a demand by the younger son to have what fell to him.[23]

f. Here's nothing more or less than a euphoric three-minute New Orleans funk romp from one of the city's long-running bands.[24]

We can also see this in the following clear contrast.

(62) a. *Here doesn't come Jane, but Sarah.

b. Here comes not Jane, but Sarah.

Moreover, sentential negation should be possible if it is within a clause contained within a presentative, because such a clause contains a predicate. This prediction is also borne out. In English, we see that a gerund can be negated.

(63) a. Here's Jamie not answering the phone once again.

b. There's John not following the guidelines we had given him.

Facts like these are one reason why we do not adopt the suggestion, made by a reviewer, that presentatives actually do contain a predicate, but are embedded in material that makes the predicate look inaccessible. If this were the case, then we would still expect sentential negation to be possible, just like it is possible in gerunds. Note likewise that in Italian, where presentatives may contain a finite clause, the predicate of the embedded finite clause can be negated.

(64) Ecco che non risponde al telefono, come al solito.
ecco that neg answers to-the telefono as at-the usual
'Here he/she is not answering the phone, as usual.'

(65) Ecco che Gianni non segue le direttive che gli abbiamo dato.
ecco that John neg follows the guidelines that him have given
'Here's John not following the guidelines we have given him.'

This shows that sentential negation can occur inside a presentative structure, but only if it is embedded inside a substructure that has a predicate. The highest, most basic part of the structure has no predicate, and so that part of the structure is incompatible with sentential negation.

These observations are at odds with the claims of existing analyses connected with the availability of negation. Thoms et al. 2019:437 claim that sentential negation is ruled out because "the mirative reports on directly perceptible evidence". But this does not account for the sharp contrast between sentences like those in 66 and those in 67, which should be equally possible to base on directly perceptible evidence.

(66) Presentatives with sentential negation

a. * Here isn't any dust.

b. * Here isn't Jamie answering the phone once again.

(67) Presentatives with constituent negation

a. Here is no dust.

b. Here's Jamie not answering the phone once again.

In general, the absence of something can be just as perceptible as the presence of something (and can be just as surprising), so there is no reason that a mirative intepretation should rule out negative sentences. Prado-Alonso 2016:71 provides a similar explanation, claiming that presentatives cannot be negated because negation would "deny the existence of the subject" and that "it would be meaningless to present a location if the existence" of the subject is denied. This also does not account for the distinction between 66 and 67: there is no reason that 66 could not have the same meaning as 67, and in general, we do not think it is meaningless to present the location of something where an entity is missing. Kay & Michaelis 2016 take another approach, and assume that in fact negation is grammatical, but simply rare. They say that they "are inclined to attribute their paucity [i.e., the paucity of negative presentatives] to the illocutionary function of the construction rather than to a syntactic constraint" (Kay & Michaelis 2016:19). Kay & Michaelis's explanation might well be correct for the relative paucity of acceptable presentatives with negative quantifiers such as 67, but like the other existing proposals, it does not account for the sharp intuitive difference between 66 and 67. We in fact agree with Lakoff's (1987) original claim that the constraint against negation is syntactic (even if the syntactic framework we assume is quite different from the one he was arguing for).

John Beavers points out to us that examples like 61d–f and 67a raise the question of how generalized quantifiers are interpreted in presentatives, given that generalized quantifiers are standardly treated as functions from sets of individuals to truth values, and yet we argue that presentatives are non-propositional. While the semantics of quantifiers is beyond the scope of this study, we think that the quantifiers in presentatives are referential; they might modify silent material or undergo a semantic mechanism such as type-shifting or coercion to achieve this effect. 61d does not mean that there is no surprise, it means that there *is* a fact that is *not* a surprise (the fact is then named). 61e does not mean that the set of polite requests is empty, it means that there *is* a thing (a demand) which is *not* a polite request. 61f refers directly to the "funk romp". 67a refers not to the non-existence of dust, but to the existence of a place where there is no dust. This claim does not change the argument above, because the examples still present, for example, a place where an entity does not exist. And it is in fact entirely consistent with the absence of a syntactic slot for sentential negation, because the standard treatment of negative quantifiers with sentential scope going back at least to

Haegeman & Zanuttini 1991 is that they must enter into a direct syntactic dependency with a Neg head (see van Craenenbroeck & Temmerman 2017 for a recent version of this idea). Our analysis accounts for the absence of a truly sentential interpretation of negative quantifiers, because there is no Neg head that can license such an interpretation. An account that does not make use of a functional Neg head could still account for these facts, as long as it is acknowledged that a sentential interpretation of negative quantifiers requires a semantic proposition, and that presentatives do not denote a semantic proposition.

5.5. NEGATION IN *because*-CLAUSES. Although presentatives resist most kinds of syntactic embedding, Lakoff (1987) noted that they can be embedded under certain kinds of *because*-clauses.

(68) We should stop now, because here is our food.

Lakoff 1987 shows that this exception is not limited to *because*—conjunctions such as *but* and subordinators such as *except*, *since* and *although* behave the same way—and it not limited to presentatives: other clause types that tend to resist embedding, including exclamatives, rhetorical wh-questions, and even some imperatives, can also be embedded under *because*-clauses of this kind. Lakoff (1987:476) refers to the cases at hand as "Speech Act Constructions" and argues that "Only speech act constructions that (directly or indirectly) convey statements can occur in performative subordinate clauses." He gives the following example of an embedded imperative.

(69) I'm staying because consider which girl pinched me.

He argues that what makes this embedding possible is not that the imperative denotes a proposition (imperatives have been argued to be properties, semantically—see Portner 2016), but that "It directs the hearer to think about the answer and assumes that if the hearer does so, he will reach a specific conclusion that the speaker already has in mind. It is a roundabout, but nonetheless conventionalized, way of conveying a statement which is never overtly mentioned" (Lakoff 1987:477). It goes beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on these ideas, but for our purposes, it is clear that Lakoff's generalization does not require that the complements of subordinators of this kind denote propositions.

What has not been noticed, as far as we know, is that there is an interaction with negation semantics in cases like this that is relevant to the analysis of presentatives. As illustrated in 70, *because*-clauses are potentially ambiguous with respect to the scope of sentential negation. In 70a, the *because*-clause is outside the scope of sentential negation; it can be paraphrased as "Because the latest complaint is here, you won't be happy." In contrast, in 70b, the *because*-clause is within (and is in fact targeted by) the scope of matrix negation; 70b can be paraphrased as "You will be happy not because the latest complaint is here, but . . . "

(70) a. You won't be happy, because the latest complaint is here, and it's a mean one.

b. You won't be happy because the latest complaint is here, you'll be happy because it is the last one.

= 'You will be happy, *not because the latest complaint is here*, but because it is the last one.'

This second reading is not available with presentatives, as illustrated in 71.

(71) a. You won't be happy, because here's the latest complaint, and it's a mean one.

b. * You won't be happy because here's the latest complaint, you'll be happy because it is the last one.

= *'You will be happy, *not because here's the latest complaint*, but because it is the last one.'

The reason is that the low reading involves negating the *because*-clause directly, which requires that the *because*-clause contains a proposition. Since presentatives do not form propositions, they cannot be negated, and the low reading is not available for them.

5.6. NO NEW DISCOURSE REFERENTS. One characteristic property of presentatives that was pointed out in Zanuttini 2017 is that the entity denoted by the noun phrase must be a member of a set that has been previously evoked or is salient in the context.[25] This is a defining characteristic of presentatives: they are not felicitous when they introduce an entity that is totally new or unexpected. For example, imagine that you are giving a lecture in a classroom and, out of the blue, a mouse scurries into the room; if there was no previous mention of mice or critters and no expectation or warning that they might appear, the presentative in 72a is not felicitous. In such cases, when the entity is truly new in the context, an existential clause with a locative interpretation is appropriate, rather than a presentative, as shown in 72b.

(72) a. #Here's a mouse. (presentative)

b. There's a mouse. (existential)

The example in 72a would be felicitous if we had been talking about mice, or even just critters that scurry in general. Similarly, if we are in a context where we are not expecting anyone to arrive, and there is no previous mention of people coming, or disturbances in general, the presentative in 73a is not felicitous. In these contexts, an existential sentence, as in 73b, would be appropriate.

(73) a. # Here's someone knocking at the door. (presentative)

b. There's someone knocking at the door. (existential)

73a would be felicitous if, for example, it had already been mentioned that there are frequent interruptions. Finally, consider a context where the speaker arrives at home, and is surprised to find that there is a police officer waiting at the door. The speaker could not felicitously use a presentative in this context, but once again, would instead use a locative or an existential sentence.[26]

(74) a. # Oh my goodness! Here is a police officer! (presentative)
b. Oh my goodness! A police officer is here! (locative)
c. Oh my goodness! There is a police officer here! (existential)

74a would be felicitous—even if the speaker is surprised—if the speaker had been talking about the ubiquity of government officials, about needing help, etc. These examples thus illustrate the property that presentatives are only felicitous if the entity is expected given the discourse context.

The same felicity condition holds for presentatives that contain a clausal constituent: the event denoted by the clause must have been previously mentioned or be expected given the discourse context. For example, the presentatives in 75 are only felicitous if there has been previous mention, or there is an expectation, that either Jason or someone else might sing.

(75) a. Here's Jason singing a song. (English)
b. Evo/eto/eno Petar peva. (Serbian)
evo/eto/eno Peter sings
c. Ecco Jason che canta una canzone (Italian).
ecco Jason that sings a song
'Here's Jason singing a song.'

The noun phrase or clause that occurs in presentatives does not necessarily have to refer to an entity or event explicitly mentioned in the discourse: they must have been previously mentioned or else be inferrable from the context (see Zanuttini 2017 for a similar observation for Italian presentatives). For example, speaker and addressee might both know that one of them has misplaced their keys, and might utter a presentative like 'Here are my keys!' in a situation where the keys have not been recently mentioned. For the utterance to be felicitous, though, that shared knowledge is essential: if a speaker simply happens to find a pair of keys that are not somehow salient, the presentative is not felicitous (or requires accommodation to become felicitous). This suggests that the notion of 'discourse-old' relevant for presentatives is one that includes information that can be inferred, as in Birner 2006. Thinking about the taxonomy of topics provided in Frascarelli & Hinterhölzl 2007, the noun phrase is a Familiar/Given Topic (or G-Topic), one whose function is that of retrieving information already present in the Common Ground; in terms of Cruschina 2012:80-81, it is a 'referential topic'.

The absence of predication in the structure accounts for this aspect of presentatives, if we assume the proposal of Irwin 2012, who argues at length that the mechanism for the establishment of new discourse referents has two conditions.

(76) Conditions for new discourse referent establishment

i. Asymmetrical relationship (predication) between two phrases

ii. Existential closure (∃C) at the vP (Irwin 2012:184)

Given this, if the structure of presentatives contained a locative predicate with the presented entity as the subject, we would expect them to be able to freely introduce new discourse referents, contrary to fact. Given our structure, and Irwin's proposal on what it takes to introduce new referents, we correctly expect that new discourse referents cannot be freely introduced by presentatives. The referents must, as we noted above, be previously mentioned or inferred from the discourse context.

The requirement that the entity must not be a newly introduced entity in the discourse also arguably underlies yet another observation about presentatives: they are not appropriate responses to questions like 'Who is here?', but can be an appropriate response to a question about the location of an entity, like 'Where is John?'. The reason is that presentatives encode the presence of an entity in the immediate perceptual sphere of the speaker, and this information is clearly relevant to the question of the location of the entity. Other responses relating to the speaker's perception are also appropriate.

(77) Where is John?

a. Here he is!

b. I found him!

c. I see him!

In contrast, since a presentative does not actually contain a proposition having to do with a subject being at a location, it does not really answer a question like 'Who is here?' Other responses relating to the speaker's perception are equally inappropriate.

(78) Who is here?

a. # Here is John!

b. # I found John!

c. # I see John!

These responses are inappropriate because the speaker has only said that they have perceived an entity. At best, these answers come across as incomplete, as if the speaker is not sure if the entity

in question is who the person asking the question had in mind (as in, "I see John—is that who you mean?").

5.7. THE EFFECT OF PRESENTATIVES ON THE DISCOURSE. If presentatives do not denote a proposition, then what is the nature of their semantic representation, and what effect do they have on the discourse? In this section, we will not provide a fully-developed formal analysis of how presentatives update the discourse, but will simply put forward a set of ideas that grow out of the syntactic analysis we have proposed in section 4.

The analysis we proposed suggests that the syntax provides the semantics with a triple consisting of the speech time, the speech location, and an entity. This is effectively like pointing to an entity, such as a cat, and saying the name of that entity.

(79) (Look!) A cat!

The main difference is that, in our proposal, presentatives syntactically encode the "here and now" nature of this kind of speech act with the c_T and c_L heads, which in English are realized as *here* (and possibly *is*) (but can be realized in other ways in other languages, as discussed in section 6). We suggest that the effect of presentatives (similarly to that of utterances like 79) is to make that entity the most salient entity in the discourse. Note that we take the salience effect to be a consequence of the "here and now" semantics and pragmatics of presentatives; the salience effect itself is not directly encoded in the syntax.

Let us take the definition of salience provided in Roberts 2011:16.

(80) **Salience** is a partial order of the elements of DR (the set of Discourse Referents), determined by the degree to which those entities would be immediately in the attentional field of anyone cooperatively paying attention to that context.

The most important factor determining overall salience, according to Roberts 2011, is perceptual salience, although relative recency is also a factor (so that entities mentioned more recently will tend to be more salient than entities mentioned less recently). Presentatives directly encode and thus draw the addressee's attention to the presence of an entity in the perceptual sphere of the speaker, and uttering a presentative makes it the most recently mentioned entity. It is relatively straightforward to conclude that the effect of a presentative is to make an entity into the most salient entity in a given discourse context. As we said above, this salience effect is a separate, secondary effect of using a presentative, much like the effect that uttering 79 would have; it is not part of the compositional meaning of presentatives.

While it is not the purpose of this article to develop a full model of the effects that presentatives have on discourse structure, we would like to make two observations that support our idea.

1. **Interlocutor must acknowledge the entity**. First, a natural conversational follow-up after a presentative requires the interlocutor to say something that is relevant to the entity, or do something about it. In other words, natural continuations build on the presence of that entity in the perceptual sphere of the discourse participants, as in 81.

   (81) Here's the cat. Would you like to pet him?

   Continuations that do not build on the presence of the entity are not natural with presentatives, though they're just fine with locatives, as we see in the contrast in 82.

   (82) a. #Here's the cat. Would you like an allergy pill? (presentative)
   b. The cat is here. Would you like an allergy pill? (locative)

   This is because presentatives draw attention to an entity, and the next natural conversational move is to talk about that entity. Not to do so would be to effectively ignore what the speaker just said. Notice that similar non-propositional utterances along the lines of 79 have the same kind of effect.

   (83) Look, the cat!
   a. Would you like to pet him?
   b. #Would you like an allergy pill?

   In fact, as we note in section 6 below, in some languages, presentatives are derived from verbal forms that mean 'look', as for example in French *voici*, from *voire* 'look' and *ici* 'here'.

2. **The "here and now" effect**. Recall the contrasts in 29–31 above, repeated below.

   (84) a. *Here's the cat, we just need to find it. (presentative)
   b. The cat is here, we just need to find it. (locative)

   (85) Speaker A: I hear that you have guests visiting you.
   Speaker B:
   a. #Yes, here are my parents (for a few days). (presentative)
   b. Yes, my parents are here (for a few days). (locative)

   84a and 85a are both marked because, as we deduce from what Speaker A said, the entities under discussion (the cat, the parents) are not in the perceptual sphere of the speaker. However, presentatives convey that the entities they introduce are in the speaker's "here

and now," the most salient entities in the discourse context. This is at odds with the actual context, where the cat or the parents are in fact not in the perceptual sphere of the speaker (and are thus certainly not the most salient entity in the discourse context—any other perceptible object would be more salient).

We take these observations to support the idea that presentatives have a particular discourse effect that is distinct from the effect of uttering a proposition. Rather than assert the truth of a proposition, presentatives identify an entity in the perceptual sphere of the speaker and in so doing, make that entity into the most salient entity in the discourse. While a formal analysis of this discourse effect is outside the scope of this paper (which is concerned primarily with the syntax of presentatives), we believe that these observations support our proposal that the structure of presentatives does not contain a subject-predicate relation, and thus does not contain a proposition whose truth can be asserted in a discourse context.

5.8. SUMMARY. In this section, we have discussed how our structure derives a wide variety of the special properties of presentatives. First, we observed that our structure directly accounts for the basic properties of presentatives: that they denote the location of the speaker, but do not have true locative counterparts. We then provided support for our claim that presentatives do not contain a predication, and thus do not denote a proposition. This accounts for restrictions on embedding, the impossibility of negation, the scopal behavior of *because*-clauses, their incompatibility with certain quotative environments, the fact that the entity cannot be discourse new, and the fact that the interlocutor must explicitly acknowledge the entity. In the final section of this article (section 6), we present an initial overview of some of the ways in which the ingredients of the analysis of English presentatives we have discussed manifest themselves cross-linguistically. The discussion provides some initial cross-linguistic support for our approach, and raises some questions that can serve as a framework for future investigations of presentatives in other languages.

6. THE INGREDIENTS OF CROSS-LINGUISTIC VARIATION. This paper is mainly about English presentatives: we have described their properties, contrasted them with locative clauses, and made a proposal about their syntactic structure. But it is also about presentatives more generally: what we have observed and have been able to read about presentatives in other languages leads us to think that they are built using essentially the same building blocks. So, we see this paper as an exercise in identifying the building blocks, or the key ingredients, of presentatives. To the extent that other languages show evidence of some of those same building blocks, it provides support for our view that they are a fundamental part of how presentatives are constructed syntactically.

Suppose that presentatives across languages are indeed built with essentially the same

ingredients. The following question arises: *Is it possible to derive the attested cross-linguistic variation from the building blocks that we have identified?* We view this question as a call to study the syntax and semantics of presentatives in different languages in great detail, so that our hypothesis on which elements constitute the key ingredients can be tested and, if necessary, revised. What we expect to see is that morpho-syntactic variation in presentatives across languages stems from different ways of combining and realizing the features of the functional heads c_T, c_L, $T_{[-T]}$ and *v*. All we can do for now is share our thoughts on how what we see – in the tip of the iceberg of presentatives across languages that is visible to us – can be derived from the basic components that we have proposed.

To begin, recall that we have hypothesized that presentatives involve deictic features that are adjoined to (or the realization of) the functional heads that encode the time and location of the speaker of the utterance (c_T and c_L) in the left periphery of the clause. In English, these are realized as *here* and *there* (almost certainly because other, more standard uses of *here* and *there* contain these same features, along with other features that make them appropriate predicates). Cross-linguistic variation concerning which element we see (whether it's a locative or a demonstrative, and what kind) can be the result of which features cluster and which heads are being spelled out. If these deictic elements are realizations of the functional heads c_T and c_L, we expect that they will exhibit different properties from their counterparts in declarative clauses, just as we have observed for *here* in English presentatives.

For example, the three morphemes that characterize presentatives in Serbian, *evo, eto* or *eno* indicate proximity to the speaker, distance from the speaker, and further distance from the speaker, respectively. This supports the idea that they realize deictic features along the lines we propose. However, they are not the same as the locative adverbs *ovde* 'here', *tu* 'there', and *tamo* or *onde* 'over there'; only the latter can be used as locative predicates in a declarative clause, as in 86.

(86) Cipele su mi *ovde*, ispod stola. (Serbian)
shoes are to-me here under table
'My shoes are under the table.'

They are also not the same as the demonstratives corresponding to 'this', 'that' and 'that one over there' which are *ova, ta, ona* for the feminine forms, *ovaj, taj, onaj* for the masculine forms, and *ovo, to, ono* for the neuter forms. Nevertheless, they do seem to share with such demonstratives the *-t-*, *-v-*, and *-n-* morphemes, marking the deictic distinctions, which suggests that the forms used in presentatives have some of the same features. Moreover, the morphemes that occur in presentatives, *evo, eto* or *eno*, can co-occur with the locative adverbs as modifiers or reinforcers.

(87) a. *Evo ovde* su mi cipele.
right here are my shoes

b. *Eto tu* su mi cipele.
right there are my shoes

c. *Eno tamo* su mi cipele.
right over there are my shoes

This again suggests that the features of the morphemes used in presentatives overlap or are in some way connected with the deictic features of demonstratives.

Similarly, we mentioned above that Turkish presentatives use *işte*, which has been described as a connective. Interestingly, Göksel & Kerslake (2005:455) also point out that *işte* often occurs with demonstratives, "and is used to link some previously mentioned item to the speaker's present statement" and that "the cohesive link provided by *işte* is often to the visual environment of the speech situation." This description not only reinforces the connection of presentatives to deictics and demonstratives, but also bears a strong similarity to our own description of presentatives in English.

Next, consider another ingredient in our analysis, the presence of a light verb that connects the DP syntactically to the rest of the structure. We have seen above that *v* in English presentatives can be realized only by a small set of light verbs: *be*, *come* and *go*. However, it is plausible to imagine that different languages may make use of different light verbs, which would make some properties of their presentatives differ from English as a result. For example, we noted in section 2 that French presentatives contain morphologically the same root as a verb of perception, *voi* 'see'. Given the semantics and pragmatics of presentatives (which center on the existence of an entity within the perceptual sphere of the speaker), a perception light verb would be a good candidate for an alternative way of building presentatives. Indeed, there is independent support for the existence of a perception light verb. Wurmbrand (2001:216), for example, argues that perception verbs are semi-functional elements, instances of the functional little v head above the lexical verb. Similarly, Cinque (2004:76) argues that there is a functional Perception head (above the Causative but below the Voice head) that accounts for the special syntactic properties of perception verbs. We will see next that this proposal may explain certain properties of Italian presentatives as well.

Finally, we noted in section 2 that some languages use special particles in presentatives that do not bear any morphological resemblance to other elements in the language. This is the case of *ecco*, for example, the special particle of Italian presentatives. (The particle *na* in Romanian and Greek, as described in Hill 2014:164–166, seems to bear some similarity to Italian *ecco* in relevant respects.) Building on Zanuttini (2017) we could view it as the portmanteau spellout of the pieces of syntactic structure that refer to the time and location of the speaker—that is, as the spell-out anaphoric T ($T_{[-T]}$), c_T and c_L.[27]

The properties of Italian presentatives bring us to another point of crosslinguistic variation,

the lexical content of presentatives—the part that in our analysis is the complement of *v*. While in English we find mostly noun phrases (including gerunds), Italian allows a wider range of syntactic constituents in the position of the noun phrase. Drawing from Zanuttini 2017, the full range can be seen in the following examples.

(88) a. Ecco Liliane. (noun phrase)
'Here's Liliane.'

b. Ecco Liliane contenta. (small clause)
ecco Liliane happy
'Here's Liliane happy.'

c. Ecco che Liliane scrive un altro articolo. (finite CP)
ecco that Liliane writes an other article
'Here's Liliane writing another article.'

d. Ecco Liliane che scrive un altro articolo. (pseudo-relative; cf. Cinque 1995)
ecco Liliane that writes an other article
'Here's Liliane writing another article.'

e. Ecco arrivare Liliane. (infinitival clause; cf. Casalicchio 2013)
ecco to.arrive Liliane
'Here's Liliane arriving.'

Strikingly, this is the same range of complements that can be selected by perception verbs. That is, an Italian verb like *vedere* 'to see' or *sentire* 'to hear' can take as a complement a DP, a small clause, a finite clause, a pseudo-relative and an infinitival clause. Given what we observed above about the plausibility of building presentatives with a perception light verb, we suggest that, in Italian presentatives, c_T and c_L combine with anaphoric T, as in English, which in turn combines with a *v* that has the same selectional properties as a perception verb, which we label as v_{PERC}.

(89)



As mentioned above, there is independent support for the existence of a perception light verb, in general and in Italian, so if this suggestion is on the right track, then like English presentatives, Italian presentatives are built only with independently justified primitives of grammar. They vary only in the specific choice of light verb, and in the way that the left-peripheral heads of presentatives are realized morphologically.

The observations in this section certainly do not exhaust the range of possibilities for how languages may build presentatives syntactically and realize them morphologically. As we said above, in depth studies of different languages will be necessary to better understand the range of ingredients that can be used to build presentatives. Nevertheless, we think that our proposal for English provides a useful framework for thinking about how presentatives might be built generally and a starting point for investigating other languages in more depth. Our initial survey, although cursory, seems to indicate that the basic ingredients we propose for English—the deictic features, left peripheral heads, and light verbs—do indeed recur in other languages, in ways that future research will be able to illuminate further.

7. CONCLUSION. We have investigated the properties of presentatives with the goal of discovering their main ingredients, that is, the basic syntactic components that make a clause a presentative. We have proposed a novel approach to presentatives, within the framework of the Minimalist Program, building on syntactic elements (functional heads) that have an independent status in the grammar and have been independently proposed by other researchers, working on other phenomena. The specific heads that we invoked in our analysis include c_L, which encodes the location of the speech event, and c_T, which encodes the time of the speech event. These are connected to a DP through a light verb (v) and an anaphoric T head.

Languages may differ in how these heads are manifested morphologically, in a way that explains the range of elements we find in presentatives: locatives, demonstratives, light verbs, and invariant particles that signal the presence of precisely this combination of heads. Assuming that these primitives are widely available across languages, this leads to the expectation that presentatives will be fairly wide-spread cross-linguistically, possibly even constituting their own minor clause type, a possibility that can be explored by anyone who aims to understand the syntax of these sentences, regardless of framework.

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NOTES

[1]A growing body of literature has rejected the assumption that the sentence is the primary structural unit of syntax and has proposed syntactic structures for material that is "higher" than the sentence (cf. Rizzi 1997, Sigurðsson 2010, Baker 2008, Hill 2007a,b, Zanuttini 2008, Hill 2013, 2014, Bianchi & Frascarelli 2010, Miyagawa 2012, Zanuttini et al. 2012, Haegeman & Hill 2013, Haegeman 2014, Heim et al. 2014, 2016, Wiltschko & Heim 2016, Yang & Wiltschko 2016, Wiltschko 2017a,b, Portner et al. 2019, Woods 2021). See Tyler 2015 for a useful overview of the literature and issues involved.

[2]In the Serbian example in 6d, *te* is the clitic variant of the second person pronoun *tebe*.

[3]For presentatives in Modern Hebrew, see Bar-Asher Siegal 2022.

[4]Kandel 2015 provides an extensive discussion of presentatives in Italian, which includes a comparison with presentatives in English. Her work reports the results of an experiment she conducted that probes the locative interpretation of Italian presentatives and finds a bias in the interpretation in favor of the coordinates of the speaker.

[5]We assume that when a speaker is talking to him-/herself, the speaker is also the addressee; see Holmberg 2010 for discussion of self-talk.

[6] The functional heads that our analysis employs, which encode the time and location of the speaker, have been argued to be present across clause types (except for a special class of directive clauses, cf. Pak et al. 2022). In this sense, they are not construction-specific elements.

[7]This is also mentioned in Thoms et al. 2019, who argue that it is a result of *here* moving like a clitic to a head position, their mirative C head, which prevents it from taking phrasal modification. In other varieties that they discuss, they propose that *here* is the direct pronunciation/realization of this head, which is closer to our analysis, although the identity and properties of the head in our analysis are quite different.

[8]A reviewer points out that the meaning of the presentative could be a metaphorical extension of the meaning of the locative. Such a metaphorical extension is possible in both types of clauses, but is more acceptable in presentatives because they draw attention to the 'immediacy of the stimulus'. Under this view, the reviewer concludes, these data do not argue against a derivational account. This comment highlights what we are trying to capture: the *here* of presentatives (which points to the perceptual sphere of the speaker) is not the same as the *here* of locatives. We express this difference by saying that it is not the same *here* that undergoes movement. We acknowledge

that one could find a different way to express that difference.

[9]Thoms et al. 2019:424 make a similar observation, but attribute it to the claim that presentatives require the speaker to have just made a 'discovery'. As mentioned above, we do not believe that this is a genuine constraint in presentatives, and we do not think that that is what is at issue in examples like 29.

[10]Lakoff 1987:471 also notes that *here* works differently in a declarative and in a presentative (his examples contrast *Harry comes here* and *Here comes Harry*). For him, in both sentence types *here* designates the location of the speaker, but in presentatives it also puts the entity denoted by the noun phrase "in a trajectory aimed toward the speaker." We think that this contrast has to do with the temporal interpretation rather than the interpretation of *here*; in both cases, *come* implies a trajectory toward the speaker, but in presentatives, the "true present tense" interpretation requires that movement on that trajectory is ongoing while the speaker is speaking.

[11]Most of the literature observes that past tense is possible, but the restriction to FID contexts is not mentioned. Thoms et al. 2019 claim that past tense is possible "as long as the discovery is anchored to the event time", which is more permissive than the attested data support. Green 1982:129–130 says that presentatives "[tend] to have no past tense forms" but that past tense is "not, strictly speaking, ungrammatical". Lakoff 1987 comes the closest to our observation, when he claims that past tense is only possible with a "narrative focus" construction, which seems to overlap with the notion of FID that we have in mind.

[12]As far as we know, this has not been addressed in the literature as a specific property of presentatives, although it is implicit in the discussion in Lakoff 1987 and Kay & Michaelis 2016, where exceptions to the definiteness effect with existentials are discussed, but nothing of the sort is mentioned in the discussion of presentatives. It is striking, however, that in Lakoff's long list of differences between existentials and presentatives (which he calls 'deictics'), he does not include anything resembling the definiteness effect.

[13]One initially striking property of presentatives, which turns out not to be exclusive to them, is that the DP referring to the entity being presented can either precede the verb, as in *Here she is*, or follow it, as in *Here is my daughter*. The former ordering is found most frequently with pronouns, and the latter most frequently with non-pronominal DPs, although non-pronouns can in fact occur in either position in some circumstances (see Thoms et al. 2019:426 for discussion and examples). We do not discuss this further, in part because this kind of alternation is not a unique property of presentatives: it is found in other constructions, including locative inversion and particle fronting (as in *Away she goes*) (see Lakoff 1987:503 for this point). We follow

Thoms et al. 2019 in assuming that the DP may move to SpecTP in certain circumstances (see the tree in 53) or be left in situ to the right of the verb. Nothing in our proposal hinges on this assumption, however, and no previous analysis that we are aware of has provided any sort of deep explanation for this fact, so we do not discuss it further.

[14]Given the analysis of anaphoric T that we pursue, we could also consider the possibility that there is a silent anaphoric locative predicate in the structure of presentatives, which would make presentatives conform structurally to other clauses that contain a subject and a predicate. Unlike with anaphoric T, however, we do not know of any clear independent evidence for the existence of such a predicate, or any compelling evidence that they are part of the structure of presentatives.

[15]A reviewer suggests an alternative analysis where instead of T, there is an Agr(eement) node that does what our T head does, but has no tense semantics. We think that the empirical and theoretical reasons above are enough to justify a T head—especially since the agreement-bearing node does show morphological tense distinctions—and that the Agr alternative would constitute a more substantial departure from our assumptions about extended projections, a departure that would require further justification. However, as far as we can see, if one were to assume the presence of Agr rather than T, most of the other aspects of our analysis could remain intact. We mention this as a possibility and set it aside for consideration in future research.

[16]This understanding of FID is supported by considerations from Italian, where both FID and SOT are represented not by the morphological past tense ordinarily used in matrix clauses, but by the imperfective, which Giorgi 2010 argues is a morphological reflection of the absence of tense, rather than a specific kind of tense or aspect.

[17]Actually, more accurately, what Myler 2016 proposes is that *be* is the realization of a stative v head in the presence of an intransitive Voice head that does not assign/license accusative case on direct objects. The same head, in the context of a transitive, accusative case assigning Voice head is realized in English as *have*.

[18]Nothing in our analysis, however, hinges specifically on this verb raising, so our proposal is also compatible with the possibility that v raises to T and further to c_T. If so, then when the (typically pronominal) DP precedes the verb, we would assume that it moves to SpeccP_T.

[19]Thoms et al. 2019:437 show that varieties of English in Scots allow sentences like 52. They argue that these cases involve an intrinsically silent locative predicate, an idea which is not in principle incompatible with our analysis (see note 14). However, a full analysis of the Scots facts is beyond the scope of our paper.

[20]Lakoff (1987:495) might be expressing a similar idea when he explains the unembeddability of imperatives by mentioning that "...only propositions, events or states are expressed by sentential complements." Portner et al. (2019:section 4) are certainly expressing a similar idea when they argue that the cP they propose – headed by a functional element that conveys information on the relation between speaker and addressee – cannot be the complement of a higher predicate, because of the type of meaning that it expresses.

[21]The use of quotes here is inspired by Grimshaw (2019), who studies the relationship between the illocutionary force of a sentence inside a quote and the verb introducing that quote.

[22] https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/06/10/here-surprise-whitey-bulger-was-big-trump-fan/W6aAaJxI

[23] http://www.southwoodsbc.org/sermons/the-prodigal-son/

[24] http://www.clarioncallmedia.com/blog/2018/12/14/new-galactic-song-featured-in-the-new-york-times-playl

[25]Using different terminology, Porhiel 2012:442, cited in Kandel 2015, makes a similar observation: the "presented referent must first and foremost exist [or be believed to exist] before being introduced into the extra-linguistic context." This is distinct from claims found elsewhere in the literature, such as in Prado-Alonso 2016, where the emphasis is on the entity being newly introduced into the discourse, where it is in some sense new information, without mentioning whether the existence of the entity must already be salient in the discourse.

[26]We note in passing that the account in Thoms et al. 2019 might lead one to expect that the 74a example would be perfect, since the surprise of the speaker would certainly seem to qualify as mirative in their sense, and clearly involves are sharp change in epistemic state as well as a discovery.

[27]We could present this as a 'span', in the sense of Svenonius 2016. The basic idea is that sequences of syntactic heads (in a head-complement relation) can be specified directly to be realized by certain pronunciations at PF:

(i) $\textit{ecco} \leftrightarrow \langle \mathrm{T}_{[-T]}, \mathrm{c}_T, \mathrm{c}_L \rangle$

We could just as easily say that *ecco* is the realization of c_T in the context of $\mathrm{T}_{[-T]}$ and c_L, or that these three heads undergo an operation referred to in the theory of Distributed Morphology as Fusion (Halle & Marantz 1994, Chung 2009), placing all of their features onto one head, and then realizing that head as *ecco*. All of these are compatible with our analysis, and in principle amount to the same thing: *ecco* is a PF form that signals the presence of exactly these three heads.