Review

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María Sandra Peña-Cervel and Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez. (2022). *Figuring out figuration: A Cognitive Linguistic account.* John Benjamins. https://doi.org/10.1075/ftl.14

> **NOTE**: This is an expanded version of a review I did for LINGUIST (https://linguistlist.org/issues/34.1566/); or, more accurately, the LINGUIST review is a reduction of this one. I wrote this very long review because *Figuring out figuration* raises a great many issues about the place of rhetorical figures in linguistics, especially for the broad Cognitive Linguistics framework. My plan was always to respect LINGUIST's word count limit and trim my draft way back, which I did. But I didn't lose the feeling that much of what I said about figuration could still be valuable to linguists, should they be interested in listening, and lingbuzz provides that opportunity. I did, by the way, send this full review to the authors. They expressed an interest in responding to my observations, which I would very much have appreciated. But they were too busy to do so. After five months, they still could not find the time, so I have gone ahead with this upload (2/10/23). If anyone wants to pursue or dispute anything in this review, certainly including María Sandra Peña-Cervel and Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, please don't hesitate to get in touch: raha@uwaterloo.
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> Here follows the unexpurgated review of *Figuring out figuration*.

Summary

Figuring out figuration attempts a comprehensive cognitive and pragmatic account of "traditional figures of speech" by combining linguistic argumentation with extensive but myopic literature reviews, offering new definitions for each of a small core set of tropes, outlining dependency relations among them, focussing on their collocations, and charting their communicative consequences, all very firmly embedded in the Cognitive Linguistics framework. It is a valuable contribution to the immense body of scholarship on the figurative dimensions of language, but it does not come anywhere near to providing the "unified theory of figurative language" (259) to which it aspires. While they slightly expand the purview of figuration common in contemporary linguistics, María Sandra Peña-Cervel and Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez's efforts still leave that purview scandalously narrow in light of the ways that rhetorical figures structure human communication, and while it is more ecumenical in its research base, dipping modestly into the literary and rhetorical traditions, this book continues to neglect or diminish major contributions to understanding figurative phenomena.

The book's virtues are substantial. It is a solid compendium of Cognitive Linguistics instruments in the context of figuration, including Frames, Idealized Cognitive Models, Image Schemata, and Blending Theory, with notable supporting insights brought in from Conversational Analysis, Discourse Analysis, Pragmatic subfields (especially Relevance Theory), and, albeit with a major drop off at this point, also Rhetorical and Literary Studies. It very thoroughly reviews the cognitive and pragmatic literature for a few prominent figures, sifting through that scholarship for methods, findings, and opportunities to integrate superficially competing positions or theories into a coherent framework. It places a high premium on cognitive operations and situational inferencing, and the book is especially important for the way it emphasizes the combinatorics of figurative phenomena and for the efforts it makes to integrate figurative phenomena with grammatical constructions. While it can move dizzyingly back and forth among claims and observations in a way that might be unnecessarily complex for beginners and does not always land on clear positions, it is impossible even for experts to read *Figuring out figuration* without gaining a better understanding of figurative phenomena. Sometimes, however, that understanding runs at cross-purposes to the authors' claims.

The book's liabilities are equally substantial but cannot be hung entirely around the necks of the authors, who are positively radical in their receptivity to other research traditions and admirably ambitious in their attempts to expand figurative research. Rather, those liabilities are endemic to Cognitive Linguistics, which has its roots in Lakoff and Johnson's justly but lamentably influential *Metaphors we live* by (1980). It is justly influential because of the systematic way in which the authors bring linguistic rigour to the cognitive implications of figurative phenomena. It is lamentably influential because of the way Lakoff and Johnson misrepresent the millennia-long rhetorical and literary traditions that first identified and investigated figurative phenomena. Their palpable disdain for those traditions strongly but wrongly implies that such phenomena are confined to a tiny handful of tropes, foreclosing major research opportunities in linguistics. They also unfortunately misapply the labels for those tropes, leading to decades of distorted and insular research in the very rich domain of figuration. Coming out of that programme, *Figuring out figuration* is therefore full of false claims and confusions about earlier research and is riddled with omissions. One hugely important trope for language and thought is ignored for instance, antithesis, and one clearly cognitive, extensively investigated class of figures, which rhetoricians call "schemes," is completely overlooked. Again, this perspective characterizes the larger framework in which *Figuring out figuration* is embedded, rather than this particular book, which tries rather earnestly to buck these trends. But since the *lingbuzz* community is full of scholars developing that framework this review is a good place to voice these complaints. Perhaps some of you will begin much needed linguistic research into figurative spaces that books like this one continue to render invisible to linguists.

In what follows, I want to be careful to give Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza credit for their figurative ambitions and for their successes when they achieve those ambitions. But there is much fault to find with their book as well, coming from an inability to shake the party line of

Cognitive Linguistics. When they get something right, therefore, or just when I am describing some aspect of their argumentation neutrally, I will use their names. But I move systematically to figuration myself in order to avoid blaming them personally for the many insufficiencies and inaccuracies of *Figuring out figuration* that simply reflect the Cognitive Linguistics programme. So, when I catalogue the book's failures, I abstract away from Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza with a species-for-individual synecdoche, referring to them *the authors*, or a product-for-producer metonymy, and just target *the book* directly.

Chapter-by-chapter

Chapter 1, as you would expect, is the "Introduction," providing an efficient overview of the book's aims and methods: to build a comprehensive, unified theory of figuration within the Cognitive Linguistics programme and demonstrate its productivity with respect to metaphor, metonymy, hyperbole, irony, and related "secondary figures" (3). They provide a familiar but valuable illustration of how completely figurative phenomena pervade language and how effortlessly speakers make inferences about meaning that by pass strict denotation, with examples like *sad novel* (the novel is not feeling down; it induces sadness in its readers) and *stupid face* (a face is not a thinking entity; it is part of a person who does so stupidly).

Chapter 2, "Figurative thought and language: An overview of approaches," purports to offer a comprehensive survey of figurative literature but is largely confined to linguistic work of the last few decades; that is, post Lakoff and Johnson (1980), a period they call "The metaphor revolution" (though see Nerlich & Clarke 2001 and Booth 1978 for accounts of earlier metaphor revolutions). Other fields and periods are either omitted entirely or absurdly truncated and misrepresented. Within the literature they do consider, focussing largely on metaphor, they discuss the so-called literal / figural divide, surveying semantic, referentialist, descriptivist, relational, pragmatic, neuroscientific, and cognitive perspectives on metaphor, frequently noting both the value and the limitations of each perspective. Relevance Theory and Blending Theory get particular attention and some psycholinguistic research (on processing cost) is reviewed.

Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza are to be commended for including a section entitled "The Rhetoric Tradition" (9-15), but they apparently believe that tradition to have ended in the first century CE; most egregiously, the authors entirely ignore the sixteenth-through-eighteenth centuries, when figurative research was burgeoning (see especially Christensen 2013; Joseph 2013/1947, 1962). We do get to hear a little bit about Cicero, Aristotle, Quintilian, and the important anonymous treatise, *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* but the discussion is badly mangled and draws only on secondary scholars (none of the ancients are referenced directly). For instance, the *ad Herennium* is called "perhaps the most exhaustive [account of metaphor] in the rhetoric tradition" (14). Not. Even. Close. (They attribute the claim to Hawkes 1972, 13, who does say something similar to this, but only with respect to the Roman period). As for Aristotle, he is alleged to have believed "that metaphor, serving an ornamental function, should be reserved for

poetry" (11). In fact, Aristotle's opening example in the *Poetics* is "Here stands my ship" as quotidian a metaphor as one might imagine (57). Levin's influential (1982) essay is one of many that argue Aristotle's primary concerns are cognitive and epistemological, not ornamental. Giambattista Vico, incredibly significant for the 'conceptual metapho' notion, gets one passing mention that ludicrously lumps him in with 'the romantics.' Vico, by the way, held a chair in rhetoric at the University of Naples, where rhetoric is still studied, as it also is at, for instance, Carnegie Melon, the University of California at Berkely, Boston University and the University of Pittsburgh, to name only a few prominent universities in a single country. Look around the institutions in your own country and you will find many more. The study of rhetoric did not end in the first century CE.

The culmination of this chapter is a classificatory arrangement for "figures of speech," partially motivated by what they see (rightly!) as the undue exclusion in linguistics of figures other than metaphor and metonymy. But the arrangement is woefully insufficient for the book's ambitions. The authors directly invoke a little over twenty figures, sometimes appending a phrase like "and related figures," with the entire book mentioning well under fifty figures, some of them rather questionable. The rhetorical tradition has a vastly larger inventory. Burton (2016), for instance, defines over 400 figures. The chapter is also insufficient in terms of the cognitive factors it considers. Of particular importance for figurative phenomena are theories of cognitive fluency, which receive no attention in the book.

The authors call this arrangement a *taxonomy*, but that term only applies in the loosest possible way, at least if we think in terms of chemistry, biology, geology, or even philately, which offer clear classifications according to widely realized general principles. This arrangement is comparatively lumpy (see Figure 1; it was originally proposed in Ruiz de Mendoza 2020a, without graphic representation). For one thing, it looks at best to be three parallel categorizations, one for 'interdomain relationships,' one for 'shared features,' and one for 'denotational versus attitudinal meaning effects.' But the categorizations are also half-baked. Convertibility, for instance, only applies to one figure, prolepsis, which is also a distinct outlier with respect to the other figures in Figure 1.[1] Type-token is badly handled. Types are classes of entities (cars, cats, creeps) and tokens concrete entities that realize a given class (like the car in your driveway, the cat at your feet, or [fill in the blank of some creep you know]). So, for instance, metaphor is a type of linguistic expression defined as a cross-domain mapping of features, and (3) is a metaphor token which maps some features of the gigantic, flaming, gaseous ball holding our solar system together to a particular fictional fourteen-year-old girl.

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[1] Prolepsis is generally defined as an argumentative move in which the arguer forecasts and refutes a possible counter-argument before it might be raised by an opponent, but see Mehlenbacher 2023 for many variations.

Figure 1: Ruiz de Mendoza's classification of figurative language (*Figuring Out Figuration*, p. 47)

Figure 2: Marie Dubremetz's "Periodic Table of the Figures of Speech" (https://thevisualcommunicationguy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Infographic_PeriodicTableFiguresOfSpeech3.jpg; greater detail can be seen by following the link)

3. What light through yonder window breaks? / It is the east, and Juliet is the sun.
4. Arise, fair sun, and kill the envious moon, / Who is already sick and pale with grief .
   (both utterances from Shakespeare [1597], *Romeo and Juliet* 2.2)

Meanwhile (4) is a token of a subtype of metaphor known as *anthropomorphism*, where the relevant domains are human and non-human, signalled by giving the gaseous ball an ability to understand language and commit murder, and also by assigning emotions, envy and grief, to a massive, rocky terran satellite, the moon. In *Figuring out figuration*, however *token* is used for the sub-type relation, such that anthropomorphism would be a token of metaphor. The "figures" named in Figure 1 are also a rather questionable assortment (more on them later).

All of the factors in this arrangement are relevant in some way to figurative phenomena, and several of them are highly significant for at least some figures, but collectively they don't bring much in the way of coherence to figurative phenomena. It is instructive to contrast Dubremetz's (2014) "Periodic Table" of figures (Figure 2). While it is far from the final word on categorizing figures and is also far from comprehensive, it does organize the figures according to fundamental and extensively explored characteristics, and it observes the absolutely essential division between semantic (or conceptual) figures and formal (or material) figures; that is, between tropes and schemes.

The arrangement expressed in Figure 1 does serve two useful purposes, however. It is in the first place a blueprint for the integrated cognitive-pragmatic approach the rest of the book follows. In the second place, it plots out several cognitive and pragmatic factors implicated in the processing of the book's few main figures: (i) the nature of interdomain relationships (e.g., metaphor implicates a cross-domain, source-target relationship; metonymy implicates a within-domain, source-target relationship); (ii) the presence of shared features among figures (indicating, for instance, that meiosis and litotes are subtypes ["tokens"] of understatement while metaphor and simile overlap significantly without a strict hyponymy); and (iii) the role of denotational (semantic) and attitudinal (pragmatic) orientations (e.g. metaphor and metonymy are oriented denotationally, because semantic incongruity is central in their construal, while context is secondary; irony and meiosis are attitudinal figures because referential and intentional context are central to their construal and the semantics rarely show any incongruity).

Chapter 3, "Foundations of cognitive modeling," outlines some significant cognitive behaviours involved in producing and understanding language, including a taxonomy of cognitive models (Figure 3), and this time the term *taxonomy* is appropriate. Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza lay out a branching structure with clearly independent nodes. Models can be SITUATIONAL or NON-SITUATIONAL. That is, they might involve typified scenarios or scripts, like buying a car or going to the dentist; or they might leverage entities and relations abstracted from any patterned

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Figure 3: Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza's taxonomy of situational and non-situational cognitive models (*Figuring out figuration*, p. 61)

situation. Non-situationally, for instance, one might say "My dentist is sadistic," which draws directly on the denotations of *dentist* and *sadistic*, on the syntax of copular predication, and so on. In these terms, a dentist is simply a professional whose job is to maintain the health and appearance of teeth, and this particular dentist is adjectivally framed as gleefully inflicting pain. But situationally 'dentist' is a role in a script involving bureaucratic and clinical settings, surgery, specific kinds of actions, additional role players, such as receptionists, hygienists, patients, and so on. In situational terms one might envision the following exchange, as do the authors:

3. A.   Were you stressed about your dental work?
    B.   I read all the magazines while in the waiting room. (61)

B's response here activates a dental-visit script because it implicates waiting rooms and magazines, so that A, on the assumption that reading a bunch of magazines is relevant to their question, infers that B was indeed stressed, full of nervous energy, attempting to distract themselves, and so on; rather than, say, that they had to wait a very long time to see the dentist, which may also be true but does not respond cooperatively to A's question. Situational models, in short, are overwhelmingly pragmatic because they implicate context.

Non-situational models align according to a number of further binary divisions in Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza's taxonomy. There are SCALAR models (involving increases and decreases along some scale of value; the expression, "big, bigger, biggest" goes up a quantity scale, "small, smaller, smallest" goes down) and NON-SCALAR models. Non-scalar models divide into EVENTIVE (involving action) and NON-EVENTIVE (involving static relations); "My dentist yanked a molar" is eventive, "My dentist is sadistic" is non-eventive. Eventive models, in turn, bifurcate into CAUSAL and NON-CAUSAL models; "My dentist yanked a molar" is causal (because my dentist caused me to no longer have that molar in my head). "My dentist operated" is non-causal (because an event transpired but no change of condition is identified). Non-eventive models split into RELATIONAL models ("My dentist has a terrifying drill," which activates the relation of possession) and NON-RELATIONAL models ("My dentist is sadistic"). The final binary division is between relational cognitive models which might be either controlled or not. The authors illustrate CONTROLLED cognitive models with "The enemy destroyed the city" and NON-CONTROLLED cognitive models with "The hurricane destroyed the city" (Figure 3), presumably because enemies have agency, instruments, goals, and the like, while hurricanes do not. All of the categories they identify are important to their overall framework, but these last two examples start to reveal some fracture lines in their taxonomy. Why, one wants to know, are these examples not eventive and causal? They both describe events. They both evoke forces that cause destruction. My own intuitions, following the logic of these divisions, would be for examples like "My dentist has a terrifying drill" and "My dentist has a terrifying wart." Both are non-eventive, and involve dentist/object relations, but one focalizes an instrument my dentist controls, the other focalizes an unfortunate growth over which they have no control.

These models are only the beginning of the many categorizations in this chapter. Conceptualizations sponsored by these models, for instance, come in different levels (PRIMARY, LOW, and HIGH) connected to issues of abstraction and genericity. Situational models might result in DESCRIPTIVE, ATTITUDINAL, or REGULATORY scenarios. And so on. In aggregate, the many factors Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza introduce, distinguish, and combine can seem excessive, and in the final analysis, their framework is far from tidy. But these factors provide resources for very nuanced accounts of how figurative phenomena function linguistically. If we take only the first major division, for instance, situational and non-situational cognitive models, a non-situational model would be evoked by someone calling their dentist a *grill doctor*. That phrase leverages a grill-in-automobile:teeth-in-face visual analogy which activates a resemblance between an automotive grill (the source) and a mouth full of teeth (the target). Those similarities characterize a cross-domain semantic incongruity (grills belong to the automotive domain, doctors ply their trade in the human domain). In situational terms, on the other hand, one might say "I have an appointment with a pair of pliers," which requires contextual supplements of some kind (e.g., the information that I have a rotten tooth), and evokes a scenario involving a booking, a specific date, an office visit, and so on, giving us a metonymical pliers (source) for dentist (target) reference transfer.

Non-situational models are important most directly for semantic figures (i.e. *tropes*). Situational models are more directly relevant for pragmatic figures (traditionally called *figures of thought*), but the *pliers* example shows how the semantic figure, metonymy, can require pragmatic factors to do its referential job.

Figuration is barely mentioned in chapter 3. I'm not sure if the motivation for this largely non-figurative chapter is to make the following point, or if this is just a side effect of their approach, but it does serve to reinforce an absolutely fundamental idea in figurative studies: that figuration is the product of basic cognitive orientations and social processes, not something that requires specialized abilities or talents. This view is not the recent innovation that many linguists apparently believe, however. It is a fundamental axiom of virtually all theories of figuration, certainly including the ancient ones. The widespread misconception that theories predating Lakoff and Johnson (1980) *do* require some special faculty or gift is an unfortunate hinderance to linguists taking seriously the contributions that rhetoricians and literary scholars have made toward figuring out figuration.

As far back as one goes in the scholarship on figuration one finds the bedrock assumption that figures are linguistic outcroppings of basic mental structures deployed to satisfy basic social functions. Human minds (perhaps mammalian minds or even vertebrate minds) are analogical. They perceive, process, categorize, and reason on the basis of similarities they encounter or envision. Metaphor is what you get when you add language to such a mind (along with simile, allegory, conceit, personification, …). Human minds, and many other sorts of minds, also orient toward identity. They perceive, process, categorize, and reason on the basis of multiple temporo-spatial occurrences of the same phenomena. Figures of repetition in all domains

(rhyme, homoioptoton, antimetabole, synonymia, …) are what you get when you add language to such a mind.[2]

Chapters 4 – 6 are dedicated to specific figure complexes: 4 to metaphor, metonymy, and related analogical or correlational figures; 5 to hyperbole and related scalar figures; 6 to irony and related oppositional figures.

Chapter 4, "Metaphor and metonymy revisited," inevitably begins with Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and their so-called Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The name is unfortunate since Lakoff and Johnson's framework is centred not on metaphors but on vestigial cross-domain lexical arrays that were presumably sponsored historically by a metaphor or simile that blossomed into a fuller set of analogic correspondences for social or experiential reasons. The early rhetorical tradition called these analogic extensions *allegories.* Quintilian, for instance, as venerable a representative of that tradition as one could imagine, cites examples like 'fighting hand to hand,' 'going for the throat,' and 'drawing blood' as allegorical expressions that commonly describe argumentation for the Romans (*Institutio oratoria* 8.6.51), exactly in line with what Lakoff and Johnson call the ARGUMENT IS WAR' conceptual metaphor' (1980, 4-5).

Chapter 4 continues the trend of being jam-packed with concepts and categorizations. Again, they are all worth the attention of anyone investigating the sociocognitive aspects of figurative phenomena, but let's focus only on the four most important, by which Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza define and distinguish their two master tropes. The basic claim in this chapter (and throughout) is that cross-domain CORRELATION and RESEMBLANCE are the cognitive operations responsible for metaphor, while metonymy manifests within-domain EXPANSION and REDUCTION. Resemblance as definitive for metaphor goes back as far as the trope has been investigated. Figuring the warrior Achilles in the phrase "the lion rushed on," for instance, depends on leveraging a resemblance between the domain of animals and the domain of men (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1406b); similarly to a lion, this phrasing tells us, Achilles is powerful, ferocious, predatory, and so on.

Correlation with respect to metaphor is, from a rhetorical perspective, an artefact of Lakoff and Johnson's approach. One might say "Friday will be huge!" for instance, which is held to manifest the 'conceptual metaphor' IMPORTANT IS BIG; or "Friday will be massive!" manifesting IMPORTANT IS HEAVY (Yu, Yu, and Lee 2017). This kind of association, of properties with values, is correlation not resemblance in Lakoff & Johnson's view because although there are

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[2] Figural terminology can be arcane, as well as very inconsistent, and much of it is unknown in linguistics, so I'll try to gloss the terms as we go, should you be interested. Synonymia is surely self-evident, a repetition of *signatum* with different *signantia*. Homoiopton is a repetition of sublexical morphemes (as in "quicker and slicker"). Rhyme is word-final syllable repetition (again "quicker and slicker"). Antimetabole you will get tired of before the end of this review, but it's a species of lexical repetition in which words reverse ("Barney is quicker but not slicker. Fred is quicker but not slicker." Please note, however, as we will take up later, the terminology of the rhetorical tradition is in a state of serious disrepair, so these patterns can be found with different labels.

systematic resemblances being activated, importance and bigness and weight are properties, not domains; hence, there can be no cross-domain resemblance (109). As Lakoff and Johnson put it, "correlations are not similarities" (151). No, they aren't. But *correlation* is another one of their unfortunate terms. We might easily call these mappings "correspondences," for instance. I have a nose. I imagine you do as well. One might say my nose is an eggplant and yours is a button. One might suggest, in other words, that my nose is big and your nose is small, by invoking the relative sizes of eggplants, buttons, and noses. My nose, one has implied, corresponds to the bigness of an eggplant (relative to average noses). Yours corresponds to the smallness of a button (relative to average noses). Back to Lakoff and Johnson now.

One would expect them at this point, having decided that there is no resemblance at work, to declare that IMPORTANT IS BIG is not in fact a metaphor at all, nor IMPORTANT IS HEAVY, and so on (some downstream linguists do come close to this position; e.g., Kövecses 2013). They are reluctant on this front, however, no doubt because something metaphorical does seem to be at work here. That something is resemblance.

The size and weight dimensions associated with importance are correspondences, just like the sizes of noses to eggplants or buttons. Lakoff and Johnson, that is, are right to see linguistic expressions reflecting the IMPORTANT IS BIG notion as revealing substantial dimensions of thought and to see a connection to metaphoricity. They are also right to want to hive such phenomena off from their prototypical 'conceptual metaphors,' like ARGUMENT IS WAR and TIME IS MONEY. But if, as has been definitional for millennia, metaphors are cross-domain resemblance expressions, it is a category error to call thought patterns like IMPORTANT IS BIG a metaphor. IMPORTANT IS BIG is *not* a metaphor, 'conceptual' or otherwise. (One last complaint about their terminology: *all* metaphors are conceptual, *all tropes* are conceptual; so their celebrated label is vacuously redundant.) What *is* going on, then?

Metaphor is going on, just not the way they think it is. The metaphor at work, a genuine cross-domain resemblance, activating these size- and weight-correspondences to importance activate, is a remarkably basic and pervasive resemblance activation long known as *reification*. *Reification* is the process of figuring an abstract notion as a material object. (Lakoff and Johnson call this process a 'substance metaphor' 1980, 26). Reification is profoundly low in granularity, but once reification kicks in—once Friday, a recurrent duration of time, is figured as a material object and put into the same general category as noses—any qualities that characterize objects can be put into play. Size and weight have perhaps the lowest possible granularity for objects. All material objects have both size and weight. So it follows that size and/or weight are the most immediate and pervasive material attributes we use to frame abstractions. Simple increase-of-x-to-increase-of-y, decrease of-x-to-decrease-of-y correspondences would also seem more natural framings than, say, the opposite.

But material attributes that increase or decrease extend well beyond size and weight, of course. "Friday will be splendid!," we might say, or "Friday will be sublime!" or "Friday will be extreme!" So then, should we account for these expressions by saying that they manifest, respectively,

IMPORTANT IS BRIGHT, IMPORTANT IS HIGH, and IMPORTANT IS FAR AWAY 'conceptual metaphors'? What seems more obvious than an explanation hanging on an inventory of IMPORTANT IS X 'conceptual metaphors' is just that some kind of notable shift away from some drab basic condition signals a corresponding shift in value to the speaker. Hence, we also get more local expressions, like "Friday will be awesome / slammin' / radical / sick …!" Even expressions like "Friday will be tiny / infinitesimal / miniscule …!" are conceivable. In any case the reification-leads- to-correspondence-expressions position is more flexible than an IMPORTANT IS X catalogue of 'conceptual metaphors'.

In short, there is nothing particular about size and weight for such expressions beyond their material ubiquity. All objects have both. The correspondences themselves are not metaphors. They just point to metaphors, in the same way that the size differences between eggplants and noses or buttons and noses point to communicative function of those metaphors. All metaphors evoke correspondences. What the Cognitive Linguistics community calls "correlation metaphors" are not metaphors. They are descriptions of basic correspondences that follow from reification. Reification is the relevant metaphor.

There is another way in which the term "correlation metaphor" is unfortunate, too, beyond its basic wrongness. It is unfortunate for the way it confuses metaphor and metonymy, leading to some pointless debates (surveyed, but then also perpetuated, by Kövecses 2013). Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza are right to argue that "metaphor and metonymy are quite separate phenomena" (106), and, as Dancygier and Sweetser (2014) establish convincingly, "metonymy is about relationships of correlation" (5). "The pen is mightier than the sword" does its metonymical job because pens correlate with eloquence and diplomacy, swords with belligerence and warfare. Pens and swords are representative instruments of diplomacy and warfare. "The police murdered George Floyd" does its job because the institution correlates with the officer who committed the crime. "The pot boiled" does its job because the water that actually boiled correlates with the pot that contains it. Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza, after perpetuating the Lakoff-Johnson 'correlation metaphor' position, perhaps to avoid the confusions that that position engenders, prefer to discuss metonymy not directly in terms of correlation, but rather in two modes of correlation, expansion and reduction.

They classify metonymies by way of two opposite orientations: source-in-target metonymies, which rely on expansion, and target-in-source metonymies which rely on reduction. Pen and sword metonymies are source-in-target metonymies because they 'reduce' the target to some component correlated with the target; pen for diplomacy (via language), sword for warfare (via weaponry). Police and pot metonymies are target-in-source metonymies because some component factor is 'expanded' to encompass the source.

This chapter (that is, chapter 4, "Metaphor and metonymy revisited," if I have lost you) is also notable because it substantially draws several other "figures" into the discussion. Broadening the scope of figuration in Cognitive Linguistics is a hallmark of Ruiz de Mendoza's career and for better or for worse, despite his secondary authorship here, the framework of this book is

overwhelmingly Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez's. *Figuring out figuration*, the authors note explicitly, "develop[s] further the insights found in the works by Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators" (49).[3] But, as my scare quotes around the word *figure* are meant to indicate, his efforts at expansion are often patchy and confused. Not all of the phenomena the book labels as figures, for instance, are in fact figures. Nor, unfortunately, does the book reveal very much rigor in its treatment of the phenomena labelled *figurative*. Here are the labels it gives for figures in this section: *allegory*, *analogy*, *anthimeria*, *anthropomorphism*, *antonomasia*, *hypallage*, *kenning*, *merism, paragon*, *proverbs*, *simile*, *synecdoche*, *synesthesia,* and *zoomorphism*. It's a complete hodge-podge. We will return to confusion, patchiness, and absence of rigour in the identification of figures a little later.

Chapter 5, "Hyperbole," marks one of the book's major achievements. It focusses on a set of "figures" sponsored by our neurocognitive affinity for perceiving, categorizing, and reasoning along scalar clines; an affinity, in fact, that bears directly on reification correspondences of the sort we have just been considering. So long as the differences are perceptible to us, directly or by instrumentation, we understand phenomena in terms of their differences in height, width, length, velocity, and so on. Some of our friends and neighbours are bigger than others, taller, faster, more agile, stronger or weaker. Some are funnier than others, more or less attractive, more or less wealthy. Name a dimension and we apply it in scalar terms. Reification correspondences lean heavily on such differences.

Hyperbole pushes any given scale out of the bounds of basic accuracy. "I'm so hungry I could eat a horse," one might say, or "That Tom Ford blazer is to die for;" or one might type something like "a;lsdkjfa;lsdkgjs" on a keyboard, which I have recently learned means 'I'm so excited / angry / speechless by this thing that all I can do is slam my hands / head / body against the keyboard.' As these examples show, hyperbole is a *mode of figuration*, not a specific figure. "Eat a horse" is chiefly metonymical, focalizing a large edible thing, too large for any individual to eat at one sitting. "To die for" is chiefly metaphorical, focalizing a scenario that likens the speaker to a patriotic soldier willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of their kith and kin. "A;lsdkjfa;lsdkgjs" is a kind of metaplasm, a suite of figures of phonological or orthographic derangement, but it functions performatively. The meanings conveyed by the first two work primarily by semantic incongruity, but a;lsdkjfa;lsdkgjs one depends much more fully on context.

This chapter gives a reasonable history of some treatments of hyperbolic phenomena in rhetoric, psycholinguistics, and pragmatics. The rhetorical account is quite notably responsible compared to the way the rhetorical tradition is neglected and mangled in some of the other chapters. (It's something of a mystery that the authors could find rhetorical research on hyperbole valuable, even complimenting it (181), but still perpetuate misconceptions about

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[3] The bibliography includes forty-five entries authored by Ruiz de Mendoza, the majority of them as either sole or primary author.

rhetorical research on metaphor, metonymy, and irony, not to mention the wealth of other figures that linguists ignore.) Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza rightly and convincingly argue for a sociocognitive account of hyperbole; in particular, that hyperbolic phenomena can only be fully understood "in terms of strengthening and mitigat[ing] operations on scalar concepts" (184); that's the cognitive part. There are figures that follow a semantic cline upwards from the referential phenomenon (*overstatement*, *hyperbole*, and *auxesis*), and figures that cline in the opposite direction (*understatement*, *meiosis*, and *litotes*). But hyperbole is not primarily semantic, in the way that tropes like metaphor and metonymy are semantic, leveraging incongruity, because it relies more fully on context; that's the socio- part. Hyperbole leverages a "mismatch with reality," Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza write. It is "disproportionate" in its description of the world (183). The incongruity is not found in the internal semantics, but in a propositional mismatch with reality.

Quite oddly, however, the authors characterize hyperbole as a 'cross-domain mapping' (56, 179), a move that introduces some slippage for the word *domain*. What they are calling *domains* here are not, say, human warfare and animal predation, or human warfare and human argumentation—that is, the kind of semantic distinctions that rhetoricians and linguists usually mean when they use *cross-domain* about figurative phenomena. The book's crossed domains in this account are "a hypothetical or imaginary situation … and a real-world situation" (198). That is, for them fiction, counter-factuals, predictions, guesses, and so on, are different domains from the real world. That is no doubt true, but it involves something of an equivocation on *domain* from how it is used in treatments of metaphor and other analogical figures.

The book builds an extensive but utterly unconvincing argument for the treatment of hyperbole as a cross-domain phenomenon around this exchange they pull from the Corpus of Contemporary American English:

> Rivera: Cindy, how long have you and Joey been married?

> Ms. Adams: Since the Stone Age for God's sake. For 40 years. (198)

The hyperbole here of course is 'since the stone age,' because it signals an unreal amount of time for the duration of a marriage. The authors claim the hyperbole firstly evokes a marriage scenario which has a 'real' instantiation and an imaginary one. The marriage-scenario script involves the following actions:

> at least two people meeting each other for the first time, getting to know each other, becoming involved in a love relationship, and making the decision of legally becoming a couple with a view to spending the rest of their lives together, as specified in their marriage vows (198).

In the real instantiation, Cindy (Ms. Adams) and the man who became her husband met, got to know each other, and so on; all of this happened forty years ago. In the imaginary instantiation,

Cindy and the man who became her husband met, got to know each other, etc., etc., but all this happened in the stone age. All of these details are irrelevant for the hyperbole.

If any script is relevant to the hyperbole, it would be the being-married scenario (sleeping together, breakfasting together, vacationing together, an optional embedded parenting script, and so on; the activities that might occupy the queried time span). But scenarios are beside the point. Rivera simply asks a question about the duration of Cindy and Joey's marriage and Cindy answers it by referencing an unrealistic temporal landmark, one metonymous for 'a very long time ago.' Perhaps Rivera briefly day dreams about Cindy and Joey in Flintstone terms, but that is in no way integral to the hyperbole. It would have been equally hyperbolic to say "three thousand years ago." Moreover, the same stone-age answer might be given to the question "How long have you had that limp?" or "When did you buy that house?" or "How long since you tasted fresh lemonade?" Scenarios are incidental to the answer and irrelevant to the nature of hyperbole. The question is about the duration between now and the change of state from unmarried to married. The answer locates a change of state in the past. More particularly, there is no domain change in the sense that *domain* has in treatments of metaphor. The semantic domains of both question and answer are time and marriage. To say that a fictional duration is a different domain from a real duration (or even a fictional marriage from a real marriage) is to distort the notion of *domain* as it is understood in figuration.[4]

Chapter 6, "Irony," charts a group of "figures" associated with irony. The labels the book uses for these "figures" are *antiphrasis*, *sarcasm*, *banter*, *satire*, and *prolepsis*; it also draws into the ironic ambit, from a somewhat different angle, the figurative phenomena it calls *paradox* and *oxymoron*. Irony has received considerable attention from pragmatics scholars, rightly so. Similar to hyperbole, irony is a communicative mode rather than a figure, *per se*. One might say "beautiful weather today, wot?" in the midst of a howling gale, a simple proposition directly contrary to the speaker's beliefs (that the weather is ghastly), a figure commonly known as antiphrasis. Or, one might say "This is the best weather ever," a hyperbolic antiphrasis; or "This weather is just a tad unpleasant," an understatement; "This weather is a glorious kiss from Mother Nature," a metaphor; "This weather is like a glorious kiss from Mother Nature," a simile; and so on. Any figure might be used ironically, not just the canonical figures of irony; as well as all sorts of simpler denotative propositions ('lovely weather;' 'brilliant day;' fabulous afternoon').

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[4] In cases where scenarios *are* relevant, a notion out of modal logic that has been adapted in cognitive poetics would be far more applicable than semantic domains—namely, the theory of possible worlds (e.g., Ryan 1991, Raghunath 2020). Some of the traditional 'figures of thought' might benefit from such a treatment—prolepsis, for instance, which projects (and then answers) a hypothetical objection to some argument, or prosopopoeia, in which the rhetor adopts another's persona ("If mother were here, she would say 'mind your own business and stop gossiping'").

Irony has two distinctive characteristics that establish it as a mode rather than as a figure. Just like hyperbole, the denotation of irony is out of alignment with the beliefs of the speaker, so that the hearer needs a theory of mind which (1) recognizes that the speaker's intentions are distinct from (often opposed to) the entrenched code of the speaker's expressions, and (2) recognizes there is a dimension of play to this misalignment, that the speaker does not seek to mislead the hearer, just to participate in some degree of whimsy. Unlike hyperbole, however, irony 'victimizes' some aspect of reality, often another person. The best work on irony is by rhetorician and literary critic, Wayne C. Booth, the simply titled *Rhetoric of irony*, which is cited briefly in *Figuring out figuration*. As Booth puts it, ironic utterances "cannot be understood without rejecting what they seem to say" (1974, 1), and some people fail to make such a rejection, being victimized by irony's language game. The brutal forms of irony insult and attack under the veil of compliments or support. The term *sarcasm*, which labels a common ironic mode among adolescents (and a word often generalized for any ironic remark), has a revealing etymology. It comes from the Gk *sarkazein,* to 'tear away flesh.'

With hum-drum ironies like "beautiful weather today, wot?" in an ugly gale, no one, or practically no one, falls victim. But the potentiality always exists. In sophisticated ironies, like Jonathan Swift's *modest proposal*, in which a British aristocratic persona earnestly and rationally proposes that the impoverished Irish can lessen their plight by selling their children for food, the victimization is almost the whole point. Readers, originally the British public, move through the argument until it dawns on them what is actually being proposed, say, when they encounter this phrase: "A young healthy child well nursed is, at a year old, a most delicious nourishing and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled" (Swift 2015/1729, 21). Minimally, the persona (who is poised between the author and the reader) is victimized here for not realizing he is a monster, but the argument implicates all of British society for the exploitative indifference they show to the Irish "problem."

Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza follow the same pattern here as in their two previous chapters, working through the literature, including various theories of pretense, mock deception, and echoing, various 'historical uses' of irony (Socratic, rhetorical, satirical, dramatic, and metafictional), and so on, to endorse, but never actually articulate, a 'synthetic' account of irony, one that bridges superficially competing pragmatic accounts.

Chapter 7, "Conclusion," is an efficient, summative account of the book, but considerably over-values the understanding of figures on display throughout.

Figures and constructions

Beyond its thorough, if not entirely felicitous, discussion of hyperbole, chapter 5 is valuable for bringing in constructions, a highly neglected area in the treatment of figuration. Many, many constructions are highly figured. Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza highlight the X IS NOT Y BUT Z construction, exemplified by expressions like

3. She is not a woman, but an angel! (202)
4. A celibate of such spotless chastity is not a human being, but God indeed. (202)
5. Plato would say that he who knows not this is not a Man, but a Beast. (204)

The discussion is helpful but also very underdetermined as an argument for the inter-penetration of figures and constructions. It is helpful because all of Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza's data exemplify hyperbole and leverage our cognitive affinity for scalar conceptualizing, and because the analysis is rich and nuanced, exploring the interaction between the construction, the figure, and the affinity.

It is less than ideal, however, because the construction is not itself hyperbolic, or even inherently scalar—in the way that, say, the LET ALONE construction (Fillmore, Kay, & O'Connor 1988) is essentially scalar, in which the second item is necessarily higher up some scale. The X IS NOT Y BUT Z construction is just a simple corrective, as easily neutral as scalar, as in

6. She is not a pediatrician, but a podiatrist!
7. Felix is not German but Swiss.

It may be that there is some propensity for X IS NOT Y BUT Z to be deployed in hyperboles (the authors call it a "hyperbole-intensifying pattern," 201, but see also 206), though even that is not clear. This section appears to rely more heavily on corpus research than most of the book (4, 188), but we don't get any relevant statistics. Still, there is no shortage of constructions that incorporate figuration. Most conspicuous in its absence from the book is Turner's (1991, 199ff) fundamentally metaphoric XYZ construction, illustrated by a proverbial colligation like 8 and a literary expression like 9:

8. Money is the root of all evil.
9. Vanity is the quicksand of reason.

But a broader understanding of figuration would make the interpenetration of figures and constructions far more undeniable. For instance, the well-known THE X-ER THE Y-ER construction (Fillmore, Kay, & O'Connor 1988) very frequently incorporates the figure homoioptoton, the co-occurrence of the same morpheme on different stems (here, comparative {-er}). Importantly, the incorporation is not incidental. Homoioptoton aligns two words / concepts in terms of a rather narrow sememe (in this case, the increase of some attribute or value). The INTENSIFICATORY ATTRIBUTIVE REPETITION constructions (Pullum & Huddleston 2002: 561) for adjectives (10) and premodifying adverbs (11) exemplify epizeuxis (immediate lexical repetition); again, the figure is not incidental to the meaning. Epizeuxis realizes the iconicity of quantity: more distance for 10 as a function of repeating *long*; more desire for 11 as a function of iterating *really*.

10. It was a long, long way down.
11. I really, really, really don't want you to go.

An increase of distance or desire is an intensification of distance or desire.

Coming from the figurative end, one might certainly define some figures as constructions, with simile as perhaps the most obvious, a comparative structure that requires the comparanda come from different semantic domains (Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 138-148). Litotes (the double negation figure, as in "Betty is not unreasonable" and "I don't disbelieve Barney") also has a clear lexicosyntactic form and corresponding meaning (the negatives neither cancel nor augment one another; rather, they mitigate the primary semantics).The Antonym Construction (Jones et al., 2006) heavily implicates the trope, antithesis. There is also the curious observation by a reviewer of the LET ALONE essay, which Fillmore, Kay, and O'Connor paraphrase in a footnote as follows:

> One reviewer suggested [there might be] a more general 'paired parallel phrases' construction [that supercedes THE X-ER THE Y-ER construction], as exemplified by the proverbs [A] *Cold hands, warm heart*; [B] *Scratch a Russian, find a Tartar*; [C] *Garbage in, garbage out*; etc. The more general construction could presumably be said to encode the implicational relationship between the two parallel phrases, thus providing an account of the implicational semantics in examples like *The more the merrier*. (Fillmore, Kay, and O'Connor 1988, 507n4)[5]

Neither Fillmore and his colleagues nor the reviewer, it would seem, were familiar enough with the rhetorical tradition to recognize "this more general paired parallel phrase construction" (507n4) as exhibiting two supralexical figures, isocolon (parallel prosody) and parison (parallel syntactic structure), whose formal alignment implicates a conceptual alignment (Tu 2019, 32); that is, the figures "encode [an] implicational relationship" between the relevant phrases and clauses. Fillmore, Kay, and O'Connor describe THE X-ER THE Y-ER construction as being "used for expressing a correlation" (506). That relationship is largely conveyed by homoioptoton but often enhanced and amplified by parallelism, which is why expressions like "The bigger they are, the harder they fall" are more prototypical of THE X-ER THE Y-ER construction than expressions like "The more carefully you do your work, the easier it will get" (Fillmore, Kay, and O'Connor 1988, 506), which forgoes both material alignments, of the parallelism figures and of the homoioptoton. (Also worth noting while we're here is that two of these proverbs, which I have labelled [A] and [C] also exhibit the extraordinarily important and neglected trope, antithesis,

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[5] See also Jones et al.'s (2012, 124) apparently independent observation that "Since parallelism involves a certain kind of form associated with a certain kind of meaning, it should also be treated as a construction." Note, too, that they separate "grammatical parallelism" and "prosodic parallelism" (124)--i.e., parison and isocolon--as well as identifying something they call "phonemic parallelism," which they exemplify with rhyme, but presumably also includes consonance (including alliteration), and assonance.

which rhetoric has historically closely associated with parallelism; [A] also exhibits epanaphora, phrase-initial repetition.)

But the interpenetration goes much deeper than a simple monotonic mapping. One of Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza's most important observations is that figures combine, but they barely scratch the surface of this phenomenon. Take this construction, for instance:

12. There is an old saying that "you can take a boy out of the country, but you can't take the country out of a boy." (Morgan 1919, 12)
13. You can take the girl out of the trailer park, but you can't take the trailer park out of the girl. (Hilderbrand 2011, np)
14. It was found easier to take the evacuee out of the slum than to take the slum out of the evacuee. (Waller 1940:30)
15. It was much easier to take Kuhn out of Harvard than Harvard out of Kuhn. (Fuller2001, 387)
16. [Y]ou can take the boy out of apartheid but you can not take the apartheid out of the boy! (domestic 2022)

These examples, utterly swarming with figures, are of the A-OUT-OF-B, NOT B-OUT-OF-A construction (Harris 2022). Most obviously for trope-centric cognitive linguists perhaps are the two analogical phenomena in the second clauses: *the country*, *the trailer park*, *the woods*, *the slum*, and *apartheid* are all reified into objects that can be manipulated (i.e., are 'ontological metaphors'), while *a boy*, *the girl*, *the evacuee*, and *the boy* are all figured as containers (i.e., manifest the PEOPLE ARE CONTAINERS 'conceptual metaphor') from which those objects can in principle be removed but which the construction says cannot be done. Apartheid is also reified into a container in the first clause of (16). But for most everyone else, the reverse repetitions (the figure is antimetabole), the clause-initial repetitions of *you can / can't take* (epanaphora), and medial repetitions of *out of* (mesodiplosis) may be somewhat more obvious. Constructions do not just have form, of course. They are form/meaning alliances, and the meaning of A-OUT-OF-B is clearly that the relevant institutional or geographical ethos is incorrigible for the relevant class of individuals. This is true even for 16 which actually targets an individual, Elon Musk. It appeared on Twitter shortly after his take-over of the platform saw a 500% increase in the n-word, along with misogyny, anti-LGBTQ slurs, and other forms of hate rhetoric (Ray & Anyanwu 2022). "The boy" in 16 is both a whole-for-part synecdoche and a constituent in the allusion to the prototypical A-OUT-OF-B *boy/country//country/boy* construct. Indeed, while the construction is overwhelmingly phrased generically, it is very often tagged to an individual. In 12, for instance, which comes from a memoir, the author is commenting on himself, and 13 is used by one character to insult another in a novel.

This construction is notably productive, as 12 - 14, and the self-conscious allusiveness of 16, illustrate. The earliest instance I have found (and I am no corpus expert) is 12, over a hundred

years old, but it is already flagged there as "an old saying," and 16 illustrates the construction's currency. Nor is 16 alone:

17. You can take the boy out of the apartheid country, but you can't take the apartheid country out of the boy (Golub 2022)
18. You can take the boy out of apartheid South Africa but you can't take the apartheid attitude out of the boy. (Christ 2022)
19. Elon is proof that you can take the boy out of apartheid, but you can't take the apartheid out of the boy. (Mayo 2023)
20. You can take the boy out of Apartheid South Africa, but you can't take Apartheid South Africa out of the boy. (Twix 2023)

I don't know what the criteria are for *viral*, but Musk-sponsored variations on the A-OUT-OF-B construction are, at any rate, *popular*. Again, I am no corpus guru, but I hand-counted 100 tweets that included variations of 15, often verbatim reproductions, before contenting myself that I had enough productivity data (11 April 2023 Twitter search on "out of" "apartheid" and "boy;" filtered by *Latest*, the tweets ran back from 8 April 2023 to 20 December 2022). So far as I can tell, none of the tweets reference each other or cite any source for their usage. They just adopt this expression as a kind of maxim about Musk and the state of Twitter. The variations also exhibit some interesting themes. Examples 17, 18, 20, for instance, show a fidelity to the more common A-OUT-OF-B constructs by sidestepping the apartheid-for-South-Africa metonymy apparent in 16 by adding *country* (17) or naming the country explicitly (18, 20), and 18 partially explicates the meaning of the construction by specifying 'attitude,' while 19 eliminates any reliance on context for *the boy* by naming Musk.[6]

Figurative collocation

The A-OUT-OF-B construction also illustrates very clearly, much more clearly than any data in *Figuring out figuration*, one of Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza's central and most important claims: that figures work together. What is especially important about the figuration of A-OUT-OF-B is not just the simple presence of several figures, but that the figures combine to effect the meaning of the construction (again, that the relevant institutionally or geographically engendered ethos is incorrigible for the relevant class of individuals). Particularly crucial are the reverse repetition (antimetabole) within the same syntactic structure (parison), which reverses the semantic roles (the relevant terms have opposite TRAJECTOR and LANDMARK assignments in

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[6] The expression in 13 apparently has apparently become proverbial as well. While Google-search numbers are not especially reliable, a string search on "You can take the girl out of the trailer park, but you can't take the trailer park out of the girl" (12 April, 2023) reports About 2,330 hits, including TikTok videos, subreddits, Pinterest posts, and so on.

the two clauses), the medial repetition (mesodiplosis), which maintains the semantics of the TRAJECTOR/LANDMARK relation, and the negation (antithesis) which precludes the second TRAJECTOR/LANDMARK relation. Antimetabole, parison, and mesodiplosis, which do much of the combinatoric heavy lifting, are all schemes, material figures, like rhyme, alliteration, and homoioptoton, figures largely of repetition and arrangement.

Tropes of course also combine, frequently entangling with, and blurring into, one another, which has sponsored much of the metonymy/metaphor debate and some of the basic confusions of Cognitive Linguistics (such as distinguishing a metaphor or simile from its linguistic residues; or, in Reddy's 1993/1979, 299, terms, distinguishing metaphor from metaphorism). In an essay that would reward any linguist, "The Four Master Tropes" (which are metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony; though, see Harris 2019), Kenneth Burke notes that the four tropes merge into each other. "Give a man but one of them," he says, "tell him to exploit its possibilities, and if he is thorough in doing so, he will come upon the other three" (1941, 421). Take the mundanely unsavoury example of a man calling another man "a pussy" as an accusation of weakness or softness, a term with a complex figurative provenance. It is rooted in a resemblance metaphor (an animal for a female organ), but passes through a part-for-whole synecdoche (organ for sex) to become another resemblance metaphor, one that hinges on antonymy (feminine-gender-for-masculine-gender), thereby implicating antithesis. The insult does not accuse its target of being an organ but of being a woman, activating features of fragility alleged to be definitive of women, opposite to what he should be in the given circumstances, manly and therefore strong. Phonaesthemes are also central to the insult, and therefore onomatopoeia ('phonological iconicity') plays a role. The consonants of "pussy" are voiceless, include frication, and its vowels are high, featuring the widespread marker of smallness/cuteness, word-final /i/. Compare another vulgarity utlizing the same organ, "c*nt," which is lower, darker, and harder phonologically. When a man insults another man with that term, which has a similar figurative derivation to "pussy" (synecdoche and metaphor), it is for viciousness, not weakness.

Burke's title, by the way, "Four Master Tropes," references a long tradition in rhetoric that had a profound but now utterly forgotten impact on linguistics. Metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony were largely adopted into linguistics by Christian Reisig, in his (1839) *Vorlesungen über lateinische Sprachwissenschaft*. Reisig adopted the stance that Lakoff and Johnson later replicated, consigning all previous research into figures as merely aesthetic. See Nerlich (1992) for Reisig's influence.

So, tropes combine, but the combinations are considerably less easy to track or even notice, which make schemes an inexplicable oversight in linguistics, especially in the era of Construction Grammar; also, in the era of Cognitive Linguistics. Repetition and position, for instance, are every bit as fundamentally cognitive as resemblance or correlation.

"The fact that metaphor and metonymy are not mere rhetorical or literary devices," Ruiz de Mendoza says in an earlier article, "should have led cognitive linguists to wonder about the

possibility of other figures of speech enjoying similar status" (2020b, 471). Yes. Indeed. But it is regrettable that he and Peña-Cervel don't follow the implications of this position somewhat further in *Figuring out figuration*. For instance, one of the most common, best-known, and pervasive figures in language is rhyme, in everything from nursery rhymes to proverbs and word-formation processes to dementia resilience. It goes unmentioned. Alliteration shows up a couple of times in the book, but only as an example of something other scholars might discuss. But rhyme and alliteration, and other phonological figures, with special mention to isocolon, are inarguably cognitive, effecting salience and impressing memory (Rubin 1995, 2009; Benczes, 2019). There is even evidence that these euphonic figures positively affect perceptions of accuracy and credibility (McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 1999, 2000; Kara-Yakoubian et al. 2022); indeed, that 'aesthetic' dimensions of language in general have a cognitive fluency effect that positively biases judgements of truth and credibility. This effect, Kara-Yakoubian and her colleagues note, "is supported across a multitude of studies." It "extends beyond self-report measures of subjective experiences and is observed via facial electromyography as well, demonstrating that easily processed stimuli increase activity in the zygomaticus major (i.e., the muscle associated with smiling) … even psychophysiologically fluent processing facilitates positive affective responses" (2022, 152). "When an object is easy to perceive," Schwartz says in his wide-ranging review of the psychoaesthetic literature, "people evaluate it as more beautiful than when it is difficult to perceive; similarly, when a statement is easy to process, people are more likely to accept it as true than when it is difficult to process" (2018, 25). Kara-Yakoubian's research specifically focussed on antimetaboles, which we saw playing a role in the A-OUT-OF-B constructions. Her study finds "antimetabolic statements being judged as both more true and more beautiful … compared to semantically equivalent nonantimetabolic statements" (2022, 152).

Antimetabole may seem like an esoteric figure, but it is not at all uncommon. *Figuring out figuration* actually features many of them itself, incidentally, for instance when it "distinguish[es] the situation of source-in-target metonymy from that of target-in-source metonymy" (122), or notes that "CATEGORY FOR MEMBER and MEMBER FOR CATEGORY are but subcases of the higher-level metonymies GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC and SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC" (169). Ruiz de Mendoza even first authored a paper entitled "Constructing Discourse and Discourse Constructions" (Ruiz de Mendoza & Gómez 2014). The latter instance is at least partially 'playful,' meant to be cute or intriguing, while the former examples are driven more directly by communicative iconicity. One might, for instance, say "category and member can each stand for the other, and when they do they are, respectively, subcases of generic and specific standing for each other." But the contrast between the 'each other' framing and the 'X for Y / Y for X' framing illustrates Schwartz's point as clearly as one might hope; the latter certainly seems more natural. Notice, too, that the 'X for Y / Y for X' construction follows the A-OUT-OF-B playbook: the antimetabole flips the relevant terms within the same syntactic structure (parison) around the same mediating word (mesodiplosis) so that the terms swap syntactic and semantic roles in the same semantic relationship.

Some Confusions And Omissions

It is frankly difficult for a rhetorician to read any literature on figuration coming out of Cognitive Linguistics and related fields without choking on how stunted and mangled it is, shrinking the extensive landscape of figures to a small handful of semantic figures and distending those few figures into unrecognizably thin conceptions. We keep thinking, twenty, thirty, now over forty years on, that Lakoff and Johnson's scorn for the millennial long traditions in rhetoric and literary studies might someday wear off, might eventually erode. Maybe the best way to see this volume is a hairline crack in that ignorance. But given the amount of confusion and the number of omissions, there is a very long way yet to go.

Take this claim, for instance, ritualistic versions of which have been virtually obligatory in every discussion of figuration in linguistics for the past four decades: "Cognitive Linguistics has challenged generally unquestioned assumptions such as the ornamental nature of figurative language or the clear-cut distinction between literal and figurative language" (35). That, I'm afraid, is fantasy. It is nearly impossible to find these alleged 'assumptions' unquestioned in the rhetorical and literary traditions. Every significant scholar in these traditions has either probed or dismissed such positions, starting with Aristotle. Indeed, it is rather *linguists* who have been most susceptible to these misconceptions, especially during the 20th century heyday of generative modelling. But the projection of these errors onto rhetoricians and literary scholars has allowed Cognitive Linguists to ignore two millennia of research.

In contrast to most Cognitive Linguists, Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza *do* recognize some sparks of merit here and there in the rhetorical and literary traditions of figuration. The history of that work in their book, however, is brief and badly mauled. It is seven pages long and entirely dependent on secondary readings; often, even the secondary readings are poorly digested. For instance, the authors state that "awareness [of] metaphor as part of the language we use has been present since much earlier times [than 5th c BCE] (Leezenberg, 2001, p. 15)." This is undoubtedly true. Earlier cultures, including those outside the Greco-Roman trajectory that they highlight, likely had quite sophisticated theories of language. But the fact remains that there is scant evidence of such an awareness. More to the point, their source (Leezenberg) does not make this claim at all.[7] He merely observes in the cited passage that the *use* of metaphor precedes this period, which should be so indisputable as to not even require evidence; as far back as recorded language goes, there is evidence of figuration (though not just metaphor and metonymy; figures of lexical, morphological, and phonological repetition are equally pervasive). The book's handling of the term *anaphora* represents another order of negligence. The term has been used since antiquity for lexical repetition at the beginning of proximal phrases or clauses, as in 21 (with *she's*) and 22 (*each*):

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[7] In fact, they even get the citation to Leezenberg (2001) wrong, listing the publication details in this bizarre manner: "Oxford: Elsevier" (279).

21. She's ripe, she's ramshackle, but she's ours. She's yours when I'm done. (Wagamese 2014:3)
22. Each argument is in a θ-position and each θ-position is occupied by an argument[.] (Chomsky 1986:155)[8]

As one might expect in a book about figuration, that is how this book uses it, mentioning it to exemplify the category of schemes (45), which it does indeed exemplify. But then there is a later section entitled, "Metonymy and anaphora" (142-146), where the term now has the meaning that *anaphora* took on in contemporary linguistics, designating pronominal reference.[9] The index then lists both usages together (291). With a tiny amount of care, the authors need only to have used one of the many synonyms for rhetorical anaphora to avoid this confusion (in my own work, I call the pattern *epanaphora*). Apparently the authors just plucked the term from their source (Leech 1969) without reading that source (see, for instance, pp. 80-85, where *anaphora* is defined, illustrated, and repeatedly referenced), or even pausing to consider what it meant there.

More egregious than these blunders, however, in a book that wants to figure out figuration and to include "The Rhetoric Tradition" (9-15), is the incredible ignorance of that tradition. Henry Peachum's *Garden of eloquence*, for instance, charts sixteen kinds of metaphors, many of them prefiguring "the cross-level recategorization in terms of the Great Chain of Being" (201) that this book extensively explores (see also Lakoff and Turner 1989). Peachum also gives a similar chart for metonymy, including such categories as effect for cause and cause for effect, inventor for the thing invented, possessor for the thing possessed, and container for the thing contained. And Peachum's *Garden* has the great virtue of also being available online, through *The Perseus Digital Library*. *Figuring out figuration* does not mention Peachum. Other notable omissions include Hugh Blair, César Chesneau Dumarsais, Pierre Fontanier, Philip Melancthon, Joannes Susenbrotus, and Gertrude Buck, whose (1899) *The metaphor: A study in the psychology of rhetoric* not only builds on the figurative traditions of pre-Modernist linguistics but also develops a fascinating (if flawed) embodied, neurolinguistic theory of metaphor. Contemporary sources,

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[8] You have, I am sure, noticed by this point that 22 is both (1) an antimetabole, with *argument* and *ϑ-position* repeating in reverse and (2) indicates a reciprocality very similar our other examples in this essay.

[9] There is etymological logic for this. The *phora* component is the same as in meta*phor*, 'to carry' and the *ana* component is a polysemous unit for 'up, in place or time, back, again, anew.' The figure carries the same words forward, repeating them, at the beginning of phrases or clauses. Pronominal reference carries a reference forward from discourse or context; *ana* perhaps suggesting the presence of an antecedent. I haven't done a full philological audit of usages, but well into the 19th century, even in grammars, *anaphora* was used for the figure of clause-initial lexical repetition (e.g., Fowler 1873, 675). Some very brief scouting suggests that it may have come into linguistics by way of Jespersen, who proposes explicitly in 1914 "to apply the word *anaphoric* to *one* (or any other word) if it refers to some word already mentioned" (247-248); see also Bloomfield (1914, 89 et passim), who deploys *anaphora/anaphoric* as though this usage was already well established.

like Lanham (1991), Plett (2010), Dupriez (1984, 1991), Lausberg (1990, 1998), and Christiansen (2013) are either utterly ignored (Plett, Christiansen) or just passed over obliviously (Dupriez is cited inconsequentially and Lausberg appears to be cited only second hand). Mark Turner's "Figure," an essay with a title that could not be more relevant by a major theorist in the Cognitive Linguistic tradition, is unaccountably overlooked. Turner's essay both maps out the figurative landscape for Cognitive Linguists with rare depth and sophistication, and charts some close parallels between the tradition of rhetorical figures and the current theory of grammatical constructions. "The justifications for construction grammar," Turner writes, "are essentially identical to those for the original classical rhetorical program of analyzing figures" (1997, 56; see also 2018, 357). It is worth noting that Turner developed his understanding of the richness of figuration beyond metaphor through his discussions with Jeanne Fahnestock, whose (1999, 2011) books should be essential reading for anyone hoping to figure out figuration, and whose (2005) "Rhetoric in the Age of Cognitive Science" would be a helpful supplement to Cognitive Linguistics more broadly. Gideon Burton's (2016) remarkable website, *Silva rhetoricae*, is another hugely useful resource, though it needs to be used with systematic caution.

Returning to the oversights of *Figuring out figuration*, the authors cite Muecke (1970) and Booth (1974) on irony, but only to acknowledge their existence, revealing no awareness of their content. They then go on to explore pragmatic theories of irony built around solidarity, sociocultural context, and inferential operations, as if such matters would never occur to a literary or rhetorical scholar. Sigh. Booth's *entire book* is about the bonding function of irony that follows from a reader/hearer understanding of the ironist's intention. His introductory chapter, for instance, ends with a personal anecdote about a French cement worker who was lightly mocking him and his family for being tourists. The worker pointed extravagantly at some famous tourist sites nearby and read out their names from perfectly obvious signs. Rather than taking offense, Booth returned some irony by pointing at himself and his family and extravagantly labelling them as "Americans." The chapter concludes:

> [The worker's] laughter told me that he now knew that I knew that he knew that I … The circle of inferences was closed, and we knew each other in ways that only extended conversation could otherwise have revealed. Total strangers, we had just performed an intricate intellectual dance together, and we knew that we were somehow akin. (Booth 1974, 31).

Figures and "figures"

The book's collection of 'secondary figures' is a shambles. Here is the list I culled of the labels it uses, though I may have missed a few: allegory, analogy, anthimeria, antiphrasis, anthropomorphism, antonomasia, banter, hypallage, kenning, merism, paradox, paragon, prolepsis, proverb, oxymoron, sarcasm, satire, simile, synecdoche, synesthesia, and

zoomorphism.[10] This list may already seem excessive to linguists used to thinking of figuration as metaphor and a few of its close friends, who may already be thinking of hyperbole and even irony as exotic, non-linguistic figures, let alone antimetabole and parison. But it is a very short list, and a very muddled one.

There are, for one thing, a few genres mixed in. Banter is a speech genre, satire is a literary genre, analogy is an argumentation genre. All of them—which is the way genres work—have two notable features. First, they have more specific and local variants, sometimes called sub-genres. For instance, the dozens, trash talking, and Isahan are cultural subtypes of banter. Secondly, they frequently embed into, or combine with, other genres. George Orwell's *Animal farm*, for instance, is both a satire and a beast fable. Allegory is an interesting case in that it is used for both a rhetorical figure (roughly what is often called 'an extended metaphor,' though it can also leverage similes or more specific analogic figures, like personification and zoomorphism), and of a literary genre (narratives with abstractions analogized as characters and settings). *Figuring out figuration* garbles this distinction by calling allegory a figure, but discussing it as a genre (the book's chief examples are Plato's 'allegory of the cave' and one of Aesop's fables). *Analogy*, of course, also generalizes as a cognitive operation and reasoning strategy. As such, it is useful as a term for all resemblance-based tropes (metaphor, simile, personification, and so on).

The book's account of the figure it calls "merism" provides another lesson in its tenuous grasp on figuration outside a few treasured tropes. The authors introduce it without definition or citation and exemplify it with the phrases "rich and poor," "young and old," "kind and cruel," "near and far," and so on; so, we have an X AND Y syntactic frame where the variables represent antonyms of each other. A common name for the X AND Y pattern in the rhetorical tradition is *syntheton* (defined as "when two words are joined by a conjunction, as when we say 'end and aim,' 'time and tide,' 'rank and fortune'"—Ruffin 1920, 438; see also Burton's 2016 definition). Another term associated with the X AND Y pattern is *hendiadys*, often defined as combining two nouns with a conjunction to express something more naturally handled by the adjectival modification of a noun (so "'On iron and bit he champed' for 'on the iron bit he champed'"—Day, in Christiansen 2013, 208). Note, by the way, how a figure like hendiadys, which pairs a specific form with a specific function, illustrates the kind of overlaps one can find in the tradition of rhetorical figures with Construction Grammar.

The book's term largely, and its exemplary pattern vaguely, aligns with the figure known more commonly in the rhetorical tradition as "merismus," a figure of thought in which information from one phrase is unpacked and distributed into others (a prominent synonym is *distributio*), as in "He alienated both his brothers, one by his uncouth behavior, the other by his meanness"

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[10] This is a list only of the figures for which they purport to offer some account, excluding figures like anaphora, alliteration, and chiasmus, which they mention only in passing,

(Erasmus, in Christiansen 2013, 273). The communicative function of merism is to invoke extremes in a domain, our authors say, in order to represent "the whole of it" (173). In fact, that function is served by the Coordinated Antonymy suite of constructions—including constructions like BOTH X AND Y and X AND Y ALIKE, along with plain old vanilla X AND Y— which signal "exhaustiveness of the scale involved" (Jones et al. 2012, 106). That suite leverages antithesis, a trope every bit as underpinned by general cognitive mechanisms as metaphor and metonymy. The very ubiquity of antonymy in language reflects the intimate relation of antithesis to cognition.

One of the endemic flaws of rhetorical figure research is to treat figurative phenomena as the manifestation of a single figure, a flaw that *Figuring out figuration* shows important signs of resisting but fails to do here. Following out the logic of this resistance for expressions like 'rich and poor,' in conjunction with the suite of Coordinated Antonymy constructions, would explain them as collocations of syntheton, merism(us) and antithesis.[11] If anyone should be wary of a one-figure-fits-all solution, it should be Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza, who talk recurrently about combinations of figures (that is, tropes) with each other and with constructions, and combinations of cognitive models and operations.

Other confusions in the book's inventory of figures include synesthesia, paragon, proverb, and kenning. Synesthesia is the psychological phenomenon of 'blending' sensual modalities, perhaps present in all of us to some degree but best understood as a "clinically recognized condition" (Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 60) that characterizes a relatively small number of people's experiences, people who see aromas, taste colours, hear images, and otherwise perceive in a kind of crossing of sensual modalities. A paragon is an object or entity that is held to exemplify virtues specific to its kind. A paradox is a conception that implicates contradictory or highly incompatible notions. A proverb is a brief, culturally known hortative or heuristic idiomatic expression. All of these phenomena do impinge upon figuration in some way, but they aren't figures, properly understood.

Some metaphors are categorized as synaesthesic (e.g., Kritsch 1962), and some theories suggest all metaphors are fundamentally synaesthesic (e.g., Ramachandran and Hubbard 2001). But to say synesthesia is itself 'a figure' is odd at best. The notion of paragon has been explored in a fascinating paper by Brdar and Brdar-Szabó which Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza cite. The paper, "When Zidane is not simply Zidane, and Bill Gates is not just Bill Gates," charts out a figurative construction they don't name but is exemplified by XYZ constructs like the following (where Zidane, a paragon in one domain, is used to describe Morrison as a paragon in another domain):

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[11] See Peña Cervel (2022) for a much more extensive treatment of "merism," where the research provenance is largely biblical scholarship, with a side order of literary studies.

23. Toni Morrison … is the Zidane of language.
24. He has been called '*the Bill Gates of Africa*.' (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007, 126)

Brdar and Brdar-Szabó identify the relevant names here, quite rightly, as paragons, and they call paragons "metonymic model[s]," not figures. Nor, to the best of my knowledge, in the vast terminological jungle of figurative labels, has anyone used *paragon* as a name for a figure (but don't quote me; it's a *big* jungle). The book, however, just adds *paragon* to the heap of terms it calls "figures."

As for proverb, here are a few, just quickly pulled out of my own personal inventory:

25. Easy come, easy go.
26. No use crying over spilt milk.
27. An apple a day keeps the doctor away.
28. A stitch in time saves nine.
29. The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence.

These are thoroughly figured expressions, as are most typified pieces of language, especially prefabricated structures. In 25-29—again, a brief, top-of-my-noggin list, not something curated to make any points—we can see epanaphora, mesodiplosis, rhyme, alliteration, assonance, parison, isocolon, and antithesis. They also include synecdochic dimensions (*an apple* stands for healthy diet), metonymic dimensions (*a stitch* stands for any small productive action) and metaphoric dimensions (the wall represents any barrier, usually abstract; and, more generally, longing for greener grass resembles whatever envious or discontented circumstances to which it is applied; crying over spilt milk resembles sadness over whatever regrets to which it is applied). Proverbs are simply memorable (because figured!) fixed expressions that are enlisted to help navigate personal or social situations (Burke, 1938). Now, it's true in this case that *proverb* is sometimes used as the name for a figure, along with other terms for elegant epitomizing expressions (*adage*, *maxim*, *gnome*). But there is nothing distinctive about their collective patterning, as there is for metaphor, metonymy, rhyme, assonance, epanaphora, antimetabole, and so on. Rather, they draw on a pool of material and conceptual figures (schemes and tropes).

Kenning presents similar issues to *proverb*, but of a more local sort. It is the name for a stylistic instrument common to Old Norse and Old English poetry, a metaphoric compound used recurrently, motivated in part metrically, to signal some object or occurrence opaquely: *whale-road* for the ocean, *battle-sweat* for blood, *sea-steed* for ship. It's not a figure. It's a formulaic deployment of a figure, metaphor; a figurative lexical construction.

It is perhaps time to let *Figuring out figuration* off the hook a bit for its terminological and conceptual shoddiness with respect to figures; in fact, to let *linguists* off the hook a bit for their terminological laxity and spotty figurative coverage; even, to excuse some of their scorn.

Rhetoricians and literary scholars are certainly blameworthy here. They have generated—over two and a half millennia, across multiple professional communities (poets, priests, politicians, lawyers), cultures, and languages, implicating several intellectual traditions (grammar, logic, psychology, philosophy of mind)—a congeries of nomenclature, a dog's breakfast of labels. There are synonyms, plesionyms, hypernyms and hyponyms of bewildering inconsistency. Take, say, *antonomasia*, which the book introduces and glosses as "replacing a noun by a reworded appellative" (167); so, for instance, "the Bard of Avon" to refer to William Shakespeare. Among the other terms for this maneuver we find *epithet*, *periphrasis*, *pronominatio*, and *the surname*. Meanwhile, although *antonomasia* is sometimes used to label that maneuver, at other times it is used more specifically for the use of a proper noun associated with certain qualities to refer to someone else, either sincerely or ironically ("He is the Einstein of the Lego world;" what Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007 call a *paragon*); sometimes the proper noun might be used to describe some property or artefact ("His speech was full of Churchill"); often, it refers to all of the above.

I have mentioned antimetabole quite a bit, defining it as reverse lexical repetition, but reverse lexical repetition also goes by the name *chiasmus* much of the time. Then again, *chiamus* is sometimes used in distinction from *antimetabole*, to indicate either another kind of reverse repetition, semantic or syntactic, or to indicate a super-category of reverse repetitions of which antimetabole is a subtype. Other synonyms and plesionyms from the tradition caught up in the figurative phenomenon of reverse repetition include *antimetalepsis*, *commutatio* and *the counterchange*. Moreover, any one of these terms might be exemplified by such instances as the following:

30. It is better to trust in the Rock of Ages, than to know the age of the rocks. (Bryan 1922, 93)
31. McCawley is sincere in holding that linguists will learn from a huge range of topics in logic. Logicians as well will have much to learn from linguistics by reading this book. (Linsky 1999,123)
32. [T]ous pour un, un pour tous. ('All for one, one for all.') (Dumas 1849:129, et passim)

What's wrong with 30? The repeating elements are not the same words. *Rock of Ages* is a proper noun while *age* and *rocks* are independent count nouns. How about 31? We get a repetition of stems (*logic* and *linguist*) but with different suffixes, so again we don't have the same words. And 32? Nothing at all, except the way it is frequently used by rhetoricians and literary scholars: as exemplifying antimetabole alone. If you've been taking notes, you'll recognize the mesodiplosis (medial repetition) and probably parison (syntactic-structure repetition; AKA, syntactic parallelism) and isocolon (prosodic repetition; AKA, prosodic parallelism). 32 also features anadiplosis (repetition at the end of one phrase or clause and the beginning of the subsequent phrase or clause), though that is less important to its overall communicative function; namely, to convey a reciprocality of obligation between the individual

and the group. The point is that there are similarities and differences among the rhetorical patterns that have been routinely collapsed but also inconsistently labelled; worse, the rhetorical effect or communicative function of 32 and other such frequently curated expressions is almost always attributed solely to the antimetabole (chiasmus, counterchange, …) alone. As we have seen it is the collocation of antimetabole, mesodiplosis, and parison that is responsible for communicating reciprocality.

The rhetorical terminology of figuration, in short, is a mess. So, not without foundation are linguists' suspicions that rhetoric is a soft and unserious field, nor their belief in the triviality of its collection of figures—though linguists might want to pause before throwing too many stones, pause to consider what the literature of *their* field would look like if it included all the productions of grammar mavens, general semanticists, linguistic chauvinists, and other assorted language pundits; or what their theories of, say, syntax look like to someone who just wants to know the 'truth.' Is syntax a matter of dependency relations or constituency relations, item-and-arrangement rules or storehouses of constructions; is it driven by form or by function; does it reflect principles of general cognition or a language-specific endowment; is it entangled with thought or autonomous; …?

All disciplinary uncertainties aside, here's the thing: the terminological disarray of rhetorical figuration should mean that anyone attempting to be precise about figurative phenomena—such as authors of a book entitled *Figuring out figuration*—does not just plunk down *antonomasia* or *merism* or *chiasmus* as if it had the precision of *electron* or *formaldehyde*. In fact, this is a rather immediate area where linguists, scholars who look closely at patterns in language and attempt to characterize them with precision, might be expected to help renovate our understanding of these pervasive cognitive and linguistic phenomena. Linguists could very productively contribute to sorting out 'true' figures from the many patterns that have been called figures at one time or another, or to establishing clean criteria for distinguishing categories of figures, identifying edge cases, sorting out collocations, and so on. A major part of that would be moving towards a stable terminology. This book, unfortunately, does rather the opposite, perpetuating confusions, as with *banter* and *proverb*, overlooking collocations, as with *kenning* and *merism*, and making the terminology messier yet, as with *synasthesia* and *paragon*.

Again, it's not entirely the authors' fault, but boy do they miss an opportunity. With all their very fine-grained attempts at precision and categorization in the area of cognitive modelling and their canonical tropes, they just bungle their treatment of 'secondary figures.'

Conclusion

So, what does this book offer linguists, rhetoricians, literary scholars, and others who care about the intersection of cognition and language as manifest in figurative phenomena? Well, clearly, something quite different for different communities. Non-linguists will quickly realize this book was not written with them in mind, but with patience and forbearance, they can learn a great deal about the Cognitive Linguistics picture of its two figurative preoccupations,

metaphor and metonymy, primarily in their 'conceptual' versions. These notions have long propagated out into literary studies and are mainstays of the Cognitive Poetics family of theories and the Cognitive Humanities more generally (e.g., Freeman 2012, Garrett 2016, Stockwell 2020), but much of that work is anchored in Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and early related work, like Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Turner (1996). The detailed examination of the ongoing primary literature that Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza provide, and the intricacy with which they deploy cognitive modelling, have much benefit for such scholars. The robust accounts of hyperbole and irony, along with an overview of relevant pragmatic instruments are also of considerable value.

For linguists, too, the literature reviews, the integration of cognitive models, the accounts of hyperbole and irony, and the integration of pragmatic approaches to figuration are also valuable. But it is Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza advocacy of broader notions of figuration that perhaps has the greatest potential. Their complaint about the narrowness of figurative scholarship in linguistics (43) is hard for a rhetorician to read without a sense of irony—very much like their own example of situational irony, a marriage counselor whose marriage fails (244)—but the legitimacy of that complaint is unmistakeable. They show the way forward ably with respect to irony and hyperbole. Their focus on our neurocognitive disposition for scalar perception, categorization, reasoning, and figuration is an important addition to understanding what Raymond Gibbs, Jr., called *The poetics of mind* (1994), as is their insistence on the collocation of figurative phenomena. And their integration of figuration with grammatical constructions is an immensely important move.

This value is compromised by a muddled account of "figures" beyond metaphor, metonymy, irony, and hyperbole, as well as very spotty treatments of rhetorical and literary scholarship. But in the face of decades of wilful ignorance, Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza are virtually revolutionary in their embrace of other figures and their willingness to read a little outside the Cognitive Linguistics canon. They push the linguistics of figuration further than anyone else in the Cognitive Linguistics framework. Dancygier and Sweetser's 2014 well-known book with the capacious title of *Figurative Language* is a highly instructive comparison. It is excellent within its extraordinarily narrow confines, but doesn't even begin to imagine that the word *figurative* extends beyond a very, very few tropes. A more recent, and in some ways more accurate indicator of this myopia—one that Peña-Cervel (2022, 229) cites as a flagbearer for the new figurative openness of Cognitive Linguistics—is the edited collection, *Figurative meaning construction in thought and language* (Baicchi 2020). The book is crammed to the gunwales with navel-gazing variations on (ho-hum) metaphor and metonymy, albeit with a light dusting of hyperbole, irony, and synecdoche, and a brief featured role for simile. A chapter on intensification constructions doesn't even mention reduplication, let alone the INTENSIFICATORY

ATTRIBUTIVE REPETITION constructions, let alone epizeuxis.[12] If Baicchi (2020) is the avant garde of figurative expansion in Cognitive Linguistics, one can only say "Hallelujah!" to Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza's *Figuring out figuration*.

There is, in sum, both danger and opportunity for linguists in Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza's *Figuring out figuration*. The opportunity is in the glimpses of a broader vista on figurative phenomena in language they provide, and in the charting of some newer directions into that vista. The danger is in the confused and broken "figures" littering that vista. One can't take that litter as any more than a few vague clues of what can reward linguistic attention. But the opportunities for a fuller understanding of language and the mind to be gained through the investigation of figurative phenomena are boundless, especially after some desperately needed housekeeping in the terminology and categorization of rhetorical figures. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) was a new beginning, but it was only a beginning, and figurative linguistics never got very far from the starting line. Linguists are wandering around, fascinated to distraction over a few of the prettiest flowers. They know those flowers, and that patch of ground, really, really well. But it's long past time for them to move on. For all its limitations, *Figuring out figuration* can help get figurative linguistics going again, and Construction Grammarians should be interested in leading the charge. A few more tropes and whole fields of schemes await.

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[12] There is also an egregious name-mangling in the introduction (which has the promising but misleading title, "Figurativeness all the way down"). In a brief nod outside the linguistic literature, Ivor Armstrong Richards shows up as *Ian Richards* (Baicchi 2020, 2, 10). He published as *I.A. Richards*, so perhaps we can blame auto-text for the mangling, but the fact that it wasn't caught is noteworthy. For anyone truly familiar with the tradition of rhetorical figures, it would be the equivalent of a naming error like *Ralph Langacker* or *Carl Fillmore*.

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