Metaphysics First or Language First: The Notion of a Single Object
Friederike Moltmann
April 2024 

This paper argues that the notion of a single object or 'being one' does not require worldly or perceived conditions of integrity and even less so concept-relative atomicity. It generally is based on conditions of integrity of some sort, but not strictly so. It rather is imposed through the use of count categories in natural language and thus makes a case for linguistic idealism.

Format:	[ pdf ]
Reference:	lingbuzz/007983 (please use that when you cite this article)
Published in:	Final version to appear in R. Gaskin: The Question of Idealism, Oxford UP
keywords:	mass-count distinction, unity, chomsky, idealism, semantics
previous versions:	v3 [March 2024] v2 [March 2024] v1 [March 2024]
Downloaded:	538 times

 

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