

Rational Phonology

A naysayer's guide to some phonological notions

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GLOWing Lecture

[Video here](#)

Strategy and goals

- Present conventional wisdom on some point of phonology

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- Offer an outlandish and idiosyncratic alternative

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 - ▶ Competing frameworks are incommensurable—stuck with me
- Show unity of linguistics—mostly by citing Chomsky

Outline

- 1 Phonetics and Phonology
- 2 UG can be small
 - Justifying features
 - Underspecification
 - Feature combinatorics
- 3 Ontologies vs epistemic toolkits
- 4 Assimilation and household pets
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- 6 Satisfying long-distance relationships without tiers
- 7 It is more constrained to have no constraints than to have constraints
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Two perspectives

Commonsense: phonetics comes before phonology

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*My own subject, **Phonetics**, is one which is useless by itself, while at the same time it **is the foundation** of all study of language, whether theoretical or practical.*

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
‘The Metaphysics of Coarticulation,’ Hammarberg 1976

phonology** is logically and epistemologically **prior to phonetics

Words and the Poverty of the Stimulus (PoS)

Howard Lasnik (2000:3)


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Howard is not being radical enough

Poverty of the stimulus is everywhere

- Phonological patterns
 - ▶ alternations, intonation, stress
- Syllables
- Segments
- Features
- Rules

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 - **Rationalism beats empiricism**

Abstractness is not just in language

Pylyshyn 1984


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
- Equivalence classes are not stimulus bound
- An infinite range of physical arrays lead to Necker Cube percept

Stimulus independence in vision—(and for language)




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Stimulus independence in vision—(and for language)



There are no necessary or sufficient **physical** conditions for the definition of a Necker cube ...**or a syllable or a /t/ or an /æ/ or an NP or a subject**

Rationalism and the segment

For linguists and humans (Hammarberg, 1976, p. 354)

- **Linguist:** the concept of the segment, which is indispensable to phonetics and phonology, is a creature of the paradigm, not of the raw data
- **Human:** [I]t should be perfectly obvious by now that segments do not exist outside the human mind.

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- Compare my *keep* and my *coop*

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- Can't talk about ‘rounded [k]’ or ‘unrounded [k]’ w/o category [k]

Chomsky meets Scrooge¹: [ba], humbug!

¹*A Christmas Carol* by Charles Dickens

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Cognoscitive powers give us symbols inside language

- “No one is so deluded as to believe that there is a mind-independent object corresponding to the internal syllable [ba], some construction from motion of molecules perhaps, which is selected when I say [ba] and when you hear it” (Chomsky 2015, p.126)

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and outside

- “No entity in human experience can be adequately defined as the mechanical sum or product of its physical properties.” Sapir (1933)

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What's the generalization?

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 - ★ Howard's “big leap” also applies from noise to feature

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and it’s UG that decides what kids can learn

- Contrary to commonsense and curricula, you can't do phonetics without phonology.

Rational phonology view

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 - ☺ To this I say 'aye'.

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 - Underspecification
 - Feature combinatorics
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Justifying features

(The?) 8 Turkish vowels

singular	meaning
ip	rope
öç	vengeance
gül	rose
ek	junction
kıl	body hair
sap	stalk
uç	edge
son	end

Features are symbols that get transduced




Figure: Ezgi pronouncing the eight Turkish surface vowels.

Turkish vowels page. Photos by Sabina Matyiku.

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$$/i/ = \left\{ \begin{array}{c} -\text{BACK} \\ -\text{ROUND} \\ +\text{HIGH} \\ \vdots \end{array} \right\} \quad /u/ = \left\{ \begin{array}{c} +\text{BACK} \\ +\text{ROUND} \\ +\text{HIGH} \\ \vdots \end{array} \right\}$$

Turkish singular / plural pairs

singular	plural	meaning
dev	devler	giant
kek	kekler	cake
cep	cepler	pocket
çek	çekler	check
ters	tersler	contrary
can	canlar	soul
tarz	tarzlar	type
kap	kaplar	recipient
saç	saçlar	hair
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 - ~ “The vowel of the plural suffix is set to the value of the vowel of the preceding syllable”

More Turkish singular / plural pairs

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öç	öçler	vengeance
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Vowel Harmony II: The vowel of the suffix is identical to the preceding vowel w.r.t. the feature BACK.

- i, e, ü, ö are -BACK (IPA: i, e, y, œ)
- u, o, ı, a are +BACK (IPA: u, o, ʊ, a)

What have we learned?

- Discovery 1! Phonology can compute identity!

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What have we learned?

- Discovery 1! Phonology can compute identity!
- Discovery 2! Segments are not the atoms of computation, valued features are.
- The innate feature set determines what the patterns/equivalence classes are—not the acoustics and physiology.


Underspecification: A 9th vowel for Turkish?


- *He went to the park.* FALLING INTONATION
- *He went to the park?* RISING INTONATION
 - ▶ What is stored? Something that is never heard!

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
Kids NEVER hear [A], but they store that vowel!





Exactly How Much Life Is on Earth?

According to a recent calculation by a team of biologists and geologists, there are a more living cells on Earth — a million trillion trillion, or 10^{30} in math notation, a 1 followed by 30 zeros — than there are stars in the universe or grains of sand on our planet.



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These numbers are kids' stuff!

Segments

- UG provides $\mathbf{F} = \{F_1, F_2, \dots, F_n\}$ and $\{+, -\}$

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Combinatorics of underspecification

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That's already a thousand times more than the number of grains of sand on earth

In praise of underspecification

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- **Underspecification is elegant, like collapsing of MERGE and MOVE**

The corollary—Small UG is plausible

‘Approaching UG from below’ (Chomsky, 2007)

the less attributed to genetic information (in our case, the topic of UG) for determining the development of an organism, the more feasible the study of its evolution

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A conceptual argument for underspecification

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- Underspecification comes for free—
 - ▶ **just don’t stipulate that segments need to be fully specified**

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Conventional wisdom

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 - ☹ I say 'nay' to this.

An important distinction

- The discipline of phonology (What I do.)

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- Phonological grammars. (What my I-phonology is.)

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[brʔ] vs. [bɛʔ]

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Assimilation and household pets



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Not this.

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Instead:

‘Language as a natural object’ (Chomsky, 2000a, 122)

...to abstract from the welter of descriptive complexity certain general principles governing computation that would allow the rules of a particular language to be given in very simple forms

Simple rule I

Copy/Assimilate/Harmony *apparently* is a thing

- $e \rightarrow \tilde{e} / __ n$
- Search and Copy:
 - ▶ “vowel looks at segment to immediate right, if it finds +NASAL it *copies* that feature”

Simple rule II

Search no copy

- $e \rightarrow i / __ n$
- Search but NOT Copy:
 - ▶ “vowel searches to immediate right, if it finds +NASAL the vowel becomes +HIGH”

Simple rule III

Search and change

- $e \rightarrow X / __n$
- Search and Change:
 - ▶ “vowel searches to immediate right, if it finds +NASAL something happens to the vowel”

Assimilation is not a(n important) thing

environment \neq change

What you look for (check for a following nasal)

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What happens (nasalize, raise, whatever)

Terrestrial mammals and household pets

- *elephants, rabbits, wolves,...* and *goldfish, turtles, dogs,...*

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Chomsky (2000b, 8): carve nature at its joints

*[P&P] rejected the concept of rule and grammatical construction entirely: there are no rules for forming **relative clauses** in Hindi, verb phrases in Swahili, **passives** in Japanese, and so on. The familiar grammatical constructions are taken to be taxonomic artifacts, useful for informal description perhaps but with no theoretical standing. They have something like the status of “terrestrial mammal” or “household pet”.*

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- ‘**assimilation**’, ‘vowel harmony’, ‘opaqueness’ and ‘adjacency’ in phonology parallel
- ‘grammatical constructions’ like ‘passive’ or ‘relative clause’ in syntax
- and our job is to see beyond these “**taxonomic artifacts**”

Rational phonology view

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- Assimilation requires different tools from other processes

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Segment mapping diagrams (SMDs)

Underlying Representation: UR

a

A

e

Surface Representation: SR

a

e


after +B_K

after -B_K

- These SMDs are part of our **epistemic toolkit**—they are not objects in the theory.

Schematic form of a/A/e pattern)

- $\phi \neq \psi \neq \Delta$



Fairly complete model of segmental changes (FCMSC)

Deconstructing \rightarrow : Two basic operations

a. unify

add s.t.



b. subtract

delete s.t.



- **Unification**-based rules *add* a feature to a segment/set
- Set **subtraction**-based rules *delete* a feature from a segment/set


The goal of linguistic theory

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'Normal' neutralization


Final devoicing of d → t in Russian



- /d/ is +VOICED coronal stop
- /t/ is -VOICED coronal stop

Two-step SMD for final devoicing of d in Russian

An old trick (J. Harris, B. Poser, P. Siptár) of 2-step feature changing:
 $/d/ \rightarrow D \rightarrow [t]$



- /d/ is +VOICED coronal stop
- /t/ is -VOICED coronal stop
- /D/ is a coronal stop unspecified for VOICE


Reciprocal neutralization in Hungarian

Both nouns show up with *t* and *d*


Noun	In N	From N	To N		
ku:t	ku:dban	ku:tto:l	ku:tnak	'well'	/ku:t/
ka:d	ka:dban	ka:tto:l	ka:dnak	'tub'	/ka:d/

(Simp.) Hungarian Reciprocal Neutralization

Reciprocal neutralization SMD:




Revised reciprocal neutralization SMD



$$\text{Subtraction: } [\text{-SON}] - \{ \alpha \text{VOIC} \} / \text{---} \begin{bmatrix} \text{-SON} \\ \text{-}\alpha \text{VOIC} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{Unification: } [\text{-SON}] \sqcup \{ \alpha \text{VOIC} \} / \text{---} \begin{bmatrix} \text{-SON} \\ \alpha \text{VOIC} \end{bmatrix}$$

Combinatorics strike again



Phenomena get more complex, yet model remains simple.


- *As concepts and principles become simpler, argument and inference tend to become more complex—a consequence that is naturally very much to be welcomed.*[Chomsky 1982, p.3]

Hungarian with ‘exceptional’ *v*


- *v* is a target of devoicing: *óvtam* /vt/ \rightsquigarrow [ft]
- *v* does **not** trigger voicing: *pitvar* /tv/ \nrightarrow [dv]

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
Derived surface underspecification



Does this exist?

- Benz and Volenec (2023) point out that this expresses “debuccalization”, the loss of place of articulation contrasts in a given environment


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
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
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
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- **No stipulation that segments be complete at SR**

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



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



What justifies positing $|\psi\rangle$?

Feature-changing absolute neutralization of ϕ and ψ with Hungarian parallel





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


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


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


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


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Duh! The essence of an element is not to be inferred only from its appearance, but also from its effect on other elements.

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- Derived surface underspecification

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- **Absolute neutralization**

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- *etc. all from the same simple model of unification and subtraction*

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- **Imagine a world without plastics!**

- “abstract from the welter”

Rational Phonology View

- “abstract from the welter”
- make useful grammars

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 - ☺ To this I say ‘aye’.

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- 2 UG can be small
 - Justifying features
 - Underspecification
 - Feature combinatorics
- 3 Ontologies vs epistemic toolkits
- 4 Assimilation and household pets
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Lang1: (Kind of) Purely local/adjacent nasal assimilation (e.g. Lamba)

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no transparent consonants *or vowels*, they're all opaque

Informal analogy

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 - Lanterns/grammars don't care about stumbling/ambiguity
 - ▶ ...or anything else

Languages have no purpose—just like life

It ain't why, why, why. It just is.
— Van Morrison




Confessio Grammatici (Halle, 1975)

Since language is not, in its essence, a means for transmitting [cognitive] information—though no one denies that we constantly use language for this very purpose—then it is hardly surprising to find in languages much ambiguity and redundancy, as well as other properties that are obviously undesirable in a good communication code.

Impossible Triangle...but possible visual representation



Escher Staircase...but possible visual representation



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 - ▶ NOBANANA: No sentence contains a banana.
 - ▶ Universally valid constraint.
- Soft constraints reflect markedness prejudices. Why generate and filter (like "Move- α , then filter")? Just build the (licit) structures, as in Minimalism.

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 - ☺ To this I say 'aye'.

Outline

- 1 Phonetics and Phonology
- 2 UG can be small
 - Justifying features
 - Underspecification
 - Feature combinatorics
- 3 Ontologies vs epistemic toolkits
- 4 Assimilation and household pets
- 5 Abstracting from the welter
- 6 Satisfying long-distance relationships without tiers
- 7 It is more constrained to have no constraints than to have constraints
- 8 Poverty of the stimulus in phonology**
- 9 Conclusions

Conventional wisdom

- There is no Argument from the Poverty of the Stimulus in Phonology

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The origin of speech (2008: 41)

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- Do Shona kids hear all 10^{33} forms of a verb they can parse and generate if need be? (David Odden, p.c.)

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- *features cannot be innately defined, but must be learned*
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- *the predictions of [Emergent Grammar] fit the data better than do the predictions of UG.*

'Universal grammar and syntax/phonology parallelisms' (2006)

Phonological objects and relations are internalisable: there is no poverty of the stimulus argument in phonology. No phonological knowledge is given by UG.

Evolutionary Phonology

Within the domain of sounds, there is no poverty of the stimulus. [I offer] general arguments against the “poverty of stimulus” in phonology, ...[there is no evidence that] regular phonological alternations cannot be acquired on the basis of generalizations gleaned directly from auditory input.

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- Obviously you need more than auditory input to get alternations—you need meaning.
- Auditory input is not linguistic input.

Empirical base

English regular plural

SR	[mæts]	[klɪfs]	[hɛdz]	[bʊʃɪz]	[mæsɪz]	[wɪzɪz]
Gloss	'mats'	'cliffs'	'heads'	'bushes'	'masses'	'whizzes'

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
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- [ɪz] in *bushes* has an extra vowel

Amodal completion

(a)



(b)




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
(c)



(d)



Amodal completion



- Your visual system infers extra finger meat, even though you know it's crazy to do so
- Imagine explaining this as “repair” by the visual system
- “View is obstructed, so let’s make a representation of an impossibly long finger”

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
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 - ▶ (set of sets of valued features)
- Natural classes are defined by generalized intersections

Formation of natural class via generalized intersection

$$\bigcap \{p, t, k, f, \theta\} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} - \text{NAS} \\ - \text{SON} \\ - \text{LAT} \\ - \text{DEL} \\ - \text{VOI} \end{array} \right\}$$

Natural class expressed intensionally (superset version)

$$\left\{ y : y \supseteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} - \text{NAS} \\ - \text{SON} \\ - \text{LAT} \\ - \text{DEL} \\ - \text{VOI} \end{array} \right\} \right\}$$

Natural class expressed intensionally (subset version)

$$\left\{ y : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} - \text{NAS} \\ - \text{SON} \\ - \text{LAT} \\ - \text{DEL} \\ - \text{VOI} \end{array} \right\} \subseteq y \right\}$$

Natural class and subsets

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} - \text{NAS} \\ - \text{SON} \\ - \text{LAT} \\ - \text{DEL} \\ - \text{VOI} \end{array} \right\} \subseteq \begin{array}{c} \text{p} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} - \text{COR} \\ - \text{STRID} \\ - \text{NAS} \\ + \text{LAB} \\ - \text{SON} \\ - \text{LAT} \\ - \text{DEL} \\ - \text{CON} \\ + \text{ANT} \\ - \text{VOI} \end{array} \right\} \end{array}$$

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 - ▶ Is this PoS?
- We now have a mechanism for predicting whether 'generalization' will occur

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Positive view

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- **Not able to count or use linear order**

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 - ▶ **Set up one rule for all triggering segments**

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- Our scope/limits prevent us from *not* devoicing after [x]
- Doing so is beyond the limits of UG—humans are incapable of *not* using natural classes

English nouns with each alternant of the regular plural suffix

a. [-s]	b. [-z]	c. [-ɪz]
cup	cub, head, rug	bus
mat	farm, son, song	bush
rack	car, hill	match
cliff	hive	whiz
myth	bow, bee, clue	garage
	pickle, burger	judge

natural class
coronal stridents

$$\bigcap \{s, \int, t^f, z, \exists, d^3\} =$$

$$\bigcap \left\{ \begin{array}{l} s \\ \int \\ t^f \\ z \\ \exists \\ d^3 \end{array} \right\}$$

$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ COR} \\ + \text{ STRID} \\ - \text{ NAS} \\ - \text{ LAB} \\ - \text{ SON} \\ - \text{ LAT} \\ - \text{ DEL} \\ + \text{ CON} \\ + \text{ ANT} \\ - \text{ VOI} \end{array} \right]$	$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ COR} \\ + \text{ STRID} \\ - \text{ NAS} \\ - \text{ LAB} \\ - \text{ SON} \\ - \text{ LAT} \\ - \text{ DEL} \\ + \text{ CON} \\ - \text{ ANT} \\ - \text{ VOI} \end{array} \right]$	$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ COR} \\ + \text{ STRID} \\ - \text{ NAS} \\ - \text{ LAB} \\ - \text{ SON} \\ - \text{ LAT} \\ + \text{ DEL} \\ - \text{ CON} \\ - \text{ ANT} \\ - \text{ VOI} \end{array} \right]$	$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ COR} \\ + \text{ STRID} \\ - \text{ NAS} \\ - \text{ LAB} \\ - \text{ SON} \\ - \text{ LAT} \\ - \text{ DEL} \\ + \text{ CON} \\ + \text{ ANT} \\ + \text{ VOI} \end{array} \right]$	$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ COR} \\ + \text{ STRID} \\ - \text{ NAS} \\ - \text{ LAB} \\ - \text{ SON} \\ - \text{ LAT} \\ - \text{ DEL} \\ + \text{ CON} \\ - \text{ ANT} \\ + \text{ VOI} \end{array} \right]$	$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ COR} \\ + \text{ STRID} \\ - \text{ NAS} \\ - \text{ LAB} \\ - \text{ SON} \\ - \text{ LAT} \\ + \text{ DEL} \\ - \text{ CON} \\ - \text{ ANT} \\ + \text{ VOI} \end{array} \right]$
--	--	--	--	--	--

$$= \text{Let's say } \left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ COR} \\ + \text{ STRID} \\ (\dots) \end{array} \right]$$

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	not natural class	natural class:
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PROBLEM!

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Consider /s/ (and /ʃ/)

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▶ /mæs-z/ → /mæsi:z/

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 - ▶ Rule does not affect [z] in /mæsɪz/ since /s/ and /z/ are not adjacent
 - ▶ **Circumstances have changed! But the (intensional) rule applies to a natural class.**

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- **POVERTY OF THE STIMULUS**

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UR	/mæt-z/	/klɪf-z/	/hɛd-z/	/bʊʃ-z/	/mæs-z/	/wɪz-z/
SR	[mæts]	[klɪfs]	[hɛdz]	[bʊʃɪz]	[mæsɪz]	[wɪzɪz]
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- Vowel insertion between coronal stridents and -z

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- Intensional formulation of devoicing rule targets /z/ before p,t,k,f,θ,s,ʃ
 - ▶ but the rule is bled in some forms

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- The ‘data’ says that devoicing is not triggered by s,ʃ

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
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- Kids *can't* encode the 'patterns in the surface data' or the 'auditory input'
 - ▶ They can't be little empiricists



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
Masking in phonology 1: stimulus

- The stimulus for devoicing
- NOT a natural class
- “voiceless segments that are non-strident OR non-coronal”
- Phonological UG does not provide OR




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/s,ʃ,tʃ/ are “masked” by bleeding rule ordering

Masking in phonology 3:

- What's acquired for devoicing rule?

voiceless
p,t,k,f,s,(x),θ,ʃ,tʃ



Despite PoS

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(Lasnik)

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 - ▶ ‘Rules are ordered’
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- ☺ To this I say ‘aye’!

Outline

- 1 Phonetics and Phonology
- 2 UG can be small
 - Justifying features
 - Underspecification
 - Feature combinatorics
- 3 Ontologies vs epistemic toolkits
- 4 Assimilation and household pets
- 5 Abstracting from the welter
- 6 Satisfying long-distance relationships without tiers
- 7 It is more constrained to have no constraints than to have constraints
- 8 Poverty of the stimulus in phonology
- 9 **Conclusions**

Of course there is more

- formalizing insertion, deletion and metathesis
- syllable structure
- stress

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- Linguistic reasoning applies across modules

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