Fictional Reality
Kyle Blumberg, Ben Holguin
October 2024
 

This paper defends a theory of fictional truth. According to this theory, there is a fact of the matter concerning the number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes’s head, and likewise for any other meaningful question one could ask about what’s true in a work of fiction. We argue that a theory of this form is needed to account for the patterns in our judgments about attitude reports that embed fictional claims. We contrast our view with one of the dominant approaches to fictional truth, which originates with David Lewis. Along the way we explore the relationship between fiction, counterfactuals, and vagueness.
Format: [ pdf ]
Reference: lingbuzz/008529
(please use that when you cite this article)
Published in: The Philosophical Review
keywords: fictional claims, modals, conditionals, indeterminacy, semantics
Downloaded:337 times

 

[ edit this article | back to article list ]