

On *very*-intensified superlatives¹

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Abstract. Most theories of *very* treat it as a degree modifier whose distribution is restricted to positive-form APs. Against this view, Goncharov (2024) has argued that *very* has a much wider distribution, highlighting cases like *the very beginning*, *the very same*, and *the very man* and arguing for a unified analysis. While Goncharov (2024) represents a major step towards understanding *very*, there is another use of *very* that, though it has been noted in passing, has not been closely scrutinized: *very*'s use in superlatives (*very best*). In this paper, I examine *very*-intensified superlatives more closely to gain a fuller understanding of *very*. I start by arguing that *very*'s use in superlatives should be unified with its other uses; then, I turn to the question of what a unified, degree-based theory of *very* would have to look like. Ultimately, I pursue a new theory of *very* built on (a) a new approach to comparison classes; and (b) Fitzgibbons et al.'s (2008) claim that *-est*, like the positive morpheme, invokes a standard-degree.

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1. Introduction

Existing theories of degree constructions typically treat the English *very* as an archetypal modifier of gradable adjectives (Wheeler, 1972; Klein, 1980; von Stechow, 1984; Kennedy and McNally, 2005). Focusing on cases like (1), these theories claim that *very* is a standard-booster: while *Sarah is tall* is true iff Sarah's height meets the contextual height-standard, (1) is true iff Sarah's height meets an even higher standard. On these theories, *very* in (1) requires a gradable adjective like *tall* as an argument; corresponding to this theoretical claim, many have assumed that *very* in (1) can only modify gradable adjectives, contrasting *very* with other intensifiers that, they say, have a wider distribution (e.g. McNabb, 2012, Beltrama and Bochnak, 2015).

- (1) Sarah is very tall.

Although *very* has a reputation for being an intensifier that can only modify positive-form adjectives (a "true degree modifier," as McNabb, 2012 puts it), Goncharov (2024) has recently argued that *very* has a wider distribution than previously thought, highlighting the existence of cases where *very* appears not in a positive-form AP but rather in a construction with a temporal or spatial noun (2a), in a DP with *same* (2b), or in an "emphatic definite description" (2c).

- (2) a. The very beginning/end/front/back
b. Sarah and Bill read the very same book.
c. Sophie is talking to the very man we saw yesterday.

As Goncharov (2024) notes, the cases in (2) are compatible both with a view where *very* has a wider distribution than previously thought and with a view where *very* in (2) and *very* in (1) are distinct, homophonous lexical items; to argue against the latter possibility, Goncharov (2024) shows that numerous intensifiers cross-linguistically, such as the Russian *samyj* and

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the Lithuanian *pàts*, have all of the uses that the English *very* does. This suggests that the “non-canonical” uses of *very* in (2) are not English-specific quirks but rather exemplify a cross-linguistically available intensification strategy. Accordingly, Goncharov (2024) argues that any theory of *very* should provide a unified analysis of (1) and (2).

Although Goncharov (2024) represents an important step towards a fuller understanding of *very*, there is a use of *very* beyond the uses in (1)-(2) that—though its existence has been noted in passing (Bylinina and Sudo, 2015; Goncharov, 2024; Alstott, 2025)—has not been closely scrutinized: namely, *very*’s use in superlatives. On top of the examples in (3), the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008–) contains hits for a variety of *very*-intensified superlatives, including synthetic ones (4) and analytic ones (5), suggesting that the occurrence of *very* with superlatives is fully productive (*pace* Bylinina and Sudo, 2015; Goncharov, 2024).²

- (3) a. The very best/worst day of my life
- b. Jim is one of the tallest students but not the very tallest one.
- (4) a. That was one of the longest plate appearances of the year, but that was not the very longest plate appearance... (Source: FanGraphs)
- b. *Game of Thrones* is among the very biggest shows on TV. (Hollywood Reporter)
- (5) a. Democrats, likely caucus-goers, rated the war in Iraq as the very most important issue on a long list of issues... (Source: NPR)
- b. She tried the very most difficult pieces in the coloratura canon. (Source: NPR)

No theory known to me has put forth a formal or informal hypothesis about the role of *very* in (3)-(5); Goncharov (2024), for instance, notes the existence of *very*-intensified superlatives but does not attempt to extend her analysis of (1) and (2) to these cases, stating that she is unsure of *very*’s role in superlatives and leaving *very*-intensified superlatives to future research.

In this paper, I investigate *very*-intensified superlatives more closely in the hope of gaining further insight into the intensification strategy exemplified by *very*. I start by addressing the question of whether *very* in (3)-(5) is the same as *very* in (1)-(2), presenting two arguments in favor of a unified analysis and against an analysis where *very* in (3)-(5) has a different lexical entry than *very* in (1)-(2). The first argument for a unified analysis, which is implicit in Goncharov’s (2024) brief discussion of *very*-intensified superlatives, is cross-linguistic: *samyj* and *pàts*, the Russian and Lithuanian analogues of *very*, can also occur with superlatives. This suggests that the use of *very* in (3)-(5) is not an accident of English but a core feature of the intensification strategy exemplified by *very*, *samyj*, and *pàts*. My second argument for a unified analysis, which is novel, rests on the observation that while the truth-conditional role of *very* in singular superlatives is hard to pin down, *very* in plural superlatives has the truth-conditional role of a standard-booster. The fact that *very* is a standard-booster in plural superlatives as well as in other constructions, I argue, lends credence to a unified analysis of (3)-(5) and (1)-(2).

After arguing that a theory of (1) and (2) should extend to *very*-intensified superlatives, I turn to the question of what a unified, degree-based theory of *very* would have to look like. To start, I show that we cannot generate a *very*-intensified superlative by pairing the classic degree-based theory of *very* (von Stechow, 1984; Kennedy and McNally, 2005, etc.) with a standard entry

²*Very* can also modify *first/last*; I assume that *first/last* are superlatives (Alstott, 2025).

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for *-est* (Heim, 1999). In other words, the classic approach to (1) in degree semantics, when paired with a standard *-est*, runs into a compositional issue in a DP with *very* and *-est* together.

After showing the tension between the classic degree-based theory of *very* and the standard approach to superlatives, I pursue a new degree-based theory of *very* that allows us to keep the standard approach to superlatives intact. The theory in question is built on (a) a new theory of comparison classes; (b) Fitzgibbons et al.'s (2008) claim that *-est*, just like the positive morpheme *pos*, invokes a standard-degree. The theory, which relies heavily on standard-boosting, straightforwardly captures cases where *very* modifies positive forms and superlatives, and it correctly predicts the ban on *very* in comparatives (#*John is very taller than Bill*); furthermore, I show that my theory can provide a preliminary account of the cases in (2) if we make some particular structural assumptions and posit an indirect degree-based component in these cases.

In addition to the degree-based theory of *very* advanced here—which deviates markedly from past theories of *very*, including Goncharov's—there is an alternate strategy for dealing with *very*-intensified superlatives that one could pursue: the strategy of trying to extend Goncharov's (2024) non-degree-based theory of (1)-(2) to superlatives. I do not assess the viability of this strategy in this short paper; Goncharov (2024) appeared after my SuB presentation and was developed independently of the current theory, and thus I have not yet engaged in a detailed comparison of the two proposals. However, comparison of my degree-based theory and Goncharov's non-degree-based theory is an important avenue for future research. In fact, Goncharov (2024) herself highlights the need to articulate a unified degree-based theory of *very* and compare it to her proposal. This paper articulates just such a unified degree-based theory, opening the door to fruitful comparison between degree-based and non-degree-based approaches.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 argues in favor of a unified analysis of *very*-intensified superlatives and other uses of *very*. Section 3 shows that a compositional issue arises in *very*-intensified superlatives if we pair the classic theory of *very* in degree semantics with the standard theory of *-est*. Section 4 presents the basic idea behind a new degree-based theory of *very* that allows us to keep the standard approach to superlatives intact. Section 5 shows how my theory captures the use of *very* with positive forms and superlatives, while section 6 discusses how my theory can be extended to the cases in (2). Section 7 concludes.

2. Two arguments in favor of a unified analysis

Very-intensified superlatives only raise questions for existing theories of *very* if *very* in (3)-(5) is the same lexical item as *very* in other environments; as such, I begin my investigation by rehearsing two arguments in favor of a unified analysis. The first argument is cross-linguistic and relies on data from Goncharov (2024); the second argument is English-internal and relies on novel data illustrating the truth-conditional import of *very* in superlatives.

2.1. A cross-linguistic argument (Goncharov, 2024)

One argument for unifying *very*-intensified superlatives and other uses comes from the fact that *samyj* and *pàts*, the only other intensifiers known to occur in the full range of non-superlative environments in which *very* can occur, can also modify superlatives (Goncharov, 2024). *Samyj*, e.g., appears not just in positive-form APs (6a), DPs with temporal/spatial nouns (6b), DPs with *ta že* 'same' (6c), and emphatic definites (6d), but also in superlatives (6e).³ According to

³All Russian data come from Goncharov (2024); see her Appendix for the parallel data with *pàts*.

Goncharov (2024), (6a-e) are semantically on a par with the parallel *very*-sentences in English.

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|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>(6) a. Samyj vysokij čelovek
 SAMYJ tall man
 ‘the very tall man’⁴</p> <p>b. v samom načale
 at SAMYJ beginning
 ‘at the very beginning’</p> <p>c. ta že samaja mašina
 that FOC SAMYJ car
 ‘the very same car’</p> | <p>d. tot samyj čelovek
 that SAMYJ man
 ‘that very man’</p> <p>e. samyj (naj)-vysšij
 SAMYJ SUP-high.SUP
 ‘very highest’</p> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

On a non-unified analysis where the *very* we see in superlatives and the *very* we see in (1)-(2) are distinct items are homophonous in English, it is surprising that every intensifier known to occur in all the constructions in (1)-(2) can also intensify superlatives. To account for the cross-linguistic data, such an analysis would need not only a homophonous *very*, but also a homophonous *samyj* and *pàts*, which is stipulative and misses a generalization. By contrast, on a unified analysis where the *very* we see in superlatives is the same as the *very* we see in (1)-(2), it is unsurprising that there are other intensifiers that have the full range of uses that *very* has.

To conclude this subsection, I note that the intensification strategy used by English, Lithuanian, and Russian is not the only strategy that languages use to intensify superlatives. In Dutch and German, for example, one intensifies superlatives using the prefix *aller-* (7), a prefix which—unlike *very*, *samyj*, and *pàts*—has no uses outside of superlatives and cannot, for example, modify positive forms (German data from Lamoure and Sleeman, 2023).⁵

- (7) Der aller-dümm-ste / *aller-dumme Schüler
 The ALLER-dumb-SUP / ALLER-dumb pupil
 ‘the very dumbest pupil’

The existence of dedicated intensifiers of superlatives does not undermine a unified analysis of *very*-intensified superlatives and other uses of *very*. Rather, (7) merely suggests that the type of intensification exemplified by *very/samyj/pàts* is not available in every language and that languages without this type of intensifier have other strategies for intensifying superlatives.

2.2. A novel semantic argument

Although the cross-linguistic facts from section 2.1 already motivate pursuing a unified analysis of *very*-intensified superlatives and other uses of *very*, we could increase the plausibility of a unified analysis if we could establish that there are cases where *very* in superlatives has the same semantic contribution as *very* in other uses. In this subsection, I argue that while *very*’s contribution in **singular** superlatives is hard to pin down and not obviously related to the

⁴As Goncharov (2024) notes, assimilating (6a) to the English *very tall* breaks with a tradition of referring to (6a) as a superlative; see her Appendix for arguments that this break from tradition is warranted.

⁵Regine Eckardt (p.c.) points out to me that in addition to (7), there is an archaic way of intensifying superlatives in German using *wahrlich* (lit. ‘truly’), which can also intensify positive forms. I leave *wahrlich* to future research.

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contribution of *very* in other uses, *very* in **plural** superlatives has the contribution of a standard-booster, just like *very* in certain other uses. In other words, the *very* we see in superlatives, just like the *very* we see outside of superlatives, can be a standard booster. This fact, I suggest, lends credence to a unified analysis of *very*-intensified superlatives and other uses of *very*.

To make this more concrete, let us look at the role of *very* in singular superlatives and plural superlatives in turn. If we look at singular superlatives only, it seems unclear whether *very* in superlatives is semantically the same as any other use of *very*. For example, *very* in singular superlatives seems quite different from *very* in positive-form APs: while the *very* we see with positive forms has truth-conditional import (8a) and a standard-boosting effect, *very* in singular superlatives seems to lack truth-conditional import altogether, as shown by the oddity of (8b). Additionally, *very* in singular superlatives has (at least at first glance) no obvious semantic similarities with the uses of *very* in (2) beyond a vague sense of intensification.

- (8) a. Sarah is tall but not very tall.
b. #Sarah is the tallest student but not the very tallest student.

When we look at plural superlatives, however, we see that *very* in these cases has clear truth-conditional import and a standard-boosting effect, like *very* in positive-form APs. To put it more precisely: plural superlatives have been argued to be sensitive to a standard-degree (Fitzgibbons et al., 2008), and *very* in plural superlatives boosts that standard-degree. In (9), e.g., *the best applicants* are the ones who meet a high standard of quality (as Fitzgibbons et al. (2008) argue), while *the very best applicants* are the applicants who meet an even higher standard of quality.⁶

- (9) A: Why wasn't Eli on the shortlist? You once told me he was one of the best applicants!
B: He was one of the best applicants, and that's why he got an interview. But although he was somewhere among the best applicants, he wasn't one of the very best applicants.
And only the very best applicants made the shortlist.

The fact that *very* in superlatives has the role of a standard-booster when its effect is truth-conditionally visible favors a theory where *very*-intensified superlatives are not *sui generis* but rather unified with other uses of *very*. The challenge for a unified analysis is to explain why *very* sometimes has a truth-conditionally visible standard-boosting effect (positive APs, plural superlatives) and sometimes has an effect that is not clearly analyzable as standard-boosting (singular superlatives plus the cases in (2), which lack degree morphology and thus, at first blush, cannot invoke a standard-degree). In what follows, I show that despite this variability in *very*'s semantic effect, a unified degree-based analysis is tenable. To deal with *very*'s lack of truth-conditional import in (8b), I appeal to the presupposition of *the*; to deal with (2), I argue that *very*'s role in (2) can, despite appearances, be treated as a form of standard-boosting.

3. Trying to extend the classic degree-based theory of *very* to superlatives

Having argued for unifying *very*'s use in superlatives with other uses, I now show that if we try to formalize a unified analysis by pairing the classic degree-based theory of *very* with a standard entry for *-est* (Heim, 1999), we run into a type mismatch in *very*-intensified superlatives.

⁶Examples like (9) chafe against Bylinina and Sudo's (2015) brief speculation about *very* in their conclusion, where they conjecture that *very* in superlatives must be something other than a standard-booster. Bylinina and Sudo (2015) do not provide arguments for this position, however, as *very* is not their primary concern.

To illustrate this tension between the classic degree-based theory of *very* and the standard view of *-est*, I start by reviewing the standard theory of *-est* (section 3.1) and the classic degree-based theory of *very* (section 3.2) in turn, using Kennedy and McNally’s (2005) theory of *very* as an exemplar. In section 3.3, I show that if we combine the theories from section 3.1 and section 3.2, we cannot generate a *very*-intensified superlative. The upshot is that any theory of *very*-intensified superlatives must depart from a Kennedy and McNally (2005)-style theory of *very*, depart from the standard theory of *-est*, or both. In sections 4-6, I opt to depart from a Kennedy and McNally (2005)-style theory of *very* but maintain the standard theory of *-est* and maintain the idea that *very* is degree-semantic. As mentioned above, I leave comparison of this degree-based view and Goncharov’s (2024) non-degree-based view to future research.

3.1. Background: The standard theory of *-est* (Heim, 1999)

The starting point for the contemporary semantic literature on superlatives is Heim (1999), and Heim’s (1999) theory remains standard today. Heim’s (1999) theory of superlatives uses $\langle d, et \rangle$ entries for gradable adjectives like *tall* (Cresswell, 1976) and assigns *-est* the entry in (10b).⁷

- (10) a. $\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket = \lambda d. \lambda x. d \text{ is a height-degree. } x\text{'s height} \geq d$
 b. $\llbracket \text{-est} \rrbracket = \lambda G_{\langle d, et \rangle}. \lambda C_{\langle e, t \rangle}. \lambda x: x \in C \wedge \forall y \in C [\exists d [G(d)(y) = 1]]$
 $\exists d [G(d)(x) = 1 \text{ and } \forall z [[z \in C \text{ and } z \neq x] \rightarrow G(d)(z) = 0]]$

(10b)’s second argument is a comparison class, a variable denoting the set of entities relevant for the superlative description. For example, the comparison class in *the tallest tree* is the set of relevant trees. (10b) takes a degree predicate G , a comparison class C , and an entity x as arguments. It presupposes that $x \in C$ and that every member of C has a degree on the G -scale; when defined, it returns true iff x has a higher G -scale degree than any other individual in C .

To see (10b) in action, consider a DP like *the tallest tree*, which receives LF (11a) under Heim’s (1999) theory. Note that *-est* moves from its base position and leaves a trace of type d ; after *-est* moves, we merge the comparison class variable C and *the* in turn.

- (11) a. $\llbracket \text{the } [C \text{ [-est } [\lambda d. d\text{-tall tree}]] \rrbracket$
 b. $\llbracket (11a) \rrbracket = \iota x. \exists d [x\text{'s height} \geq d \text{ and } x \text{ is a tree and}$
 $\forall z [[z \in C \text{ and } z \neq x] \rightarrow \neg[z\text{'s height} \geq d \text{ and } z \text{ is a tree}]]]$

As shown in (11b), *the tallest tree* is predicted to denote the unique tree x such that every other tree in the comparison class is shorter than x . This corresponds to intuitions.

Although Heim (1999) focuses on singular superlatives, her analysis provides a basis for a theory of plural superlatives too; all past theories of plural superlatives posit that they have LFs like (11a) plus covert distributivity (Stateva, 2005; Fitzgibbons et al., 2008; Scontras, 2008).

3.2. The classic theory of *very* in degree semantics

Having introduced the standard theory of *-est*, I now introduce the classic degree-based theory of *very*, using Kennedy and McNally’s (2005) variant of the classic theory as an exemplar. My

⁷On top of (10b), Heim (1999) also uses an entry of type $\langle dt, t \rangle$ (or if you syntacticize the comparison class, $\langle dt, dt \rangle$). The difference between the entries is irrelevant here; the classic degree-based theory of *very* has issues with *very*-intensified superlatives under any degree-based theory of *-est*, not just a theory with (10b).

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choice of exemplar is not crucial; the issue that arises when we pair Kennedy and McNally (2005) with Heim (1999) extends to any degree-based theory of *very* known to me.

Kennedy and McNally's (2005) theory of *very*, which is similar to older theories and focuses on the relation between cases like (12a) and (12b), rests on a view where cases like (12b) contain a covert morpheme *pos* at LF (von Stechow, 1984). On this view, (12b) has the LF in (13).

(12) a. Sarah is very tall.

b. Sarah is tall.

(13) [Sarah [C [pos tall]]]

Pos, as defined in (14a), takes a degree predicate G (type $\langle d, et \rangle$), a comparison class C , and an entity x as arguments, returning true iff x meets or exceeds $\text{STANDARD}(G)(C)$, which is the standard-degree on the G -scale as computed for the set C . Using this entry, (13) comes out true iff Sarah's height meets or exceeds $\text{STANDARD}(\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket)(C)$, i.e. the standard of height for the comparison class. The comparison class is, by assumption, the set of relevant individuals, so the predicted meaning for (13) is "Sarah counts as tall when compared to the relevant individuals."

(14) a. $\llbracket \text{pos} \rrbracket = \lambda G_{\langle d, et \rangle} \cdot \lambda C_{\langle e, t \rangle} \cdot \lambda x. G(\text{STANDARD}(G)(C))(x) = 1$

b. $\llbracket (13) \rrbracket = 1$ iff Sarah's height $\geq \text{STANDARD}(\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket)(C)$

Kennedy and McNally (2005) assume that *very* has the same semantic type as *pos*. On this view, (12a) has the LF in (15). The difference between *pos* and *very* is that while *pos* computes the standard relative to the whole comparison class, *very* computes the standard relative to the subset of the comparison class that meets the positive standard (Klein, 1980). The entry in (16a) formalizes this idea, where $\text{BOOST}(G)(C)$ is shorthand for "the standard-degree on the G -scale as computed for the subset of C that meets the positive standard." Using this entry, (15) comes out true iff Sarah's height meets or exceeds $\text{BOOST}(\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket)(C)$. $\text{BOOST}(\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket)(C)$, the standard of height for tall people, will be greater than $\text{STANDARD}(\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket)(C)$, the standard of height as computed for everyone. Thus, (12a) ends up entailing (12b), as desired.

(15) [Sarah [C [very tall]]]

(16) a. $\llbracket \text{very} \rrbracket = \lambda G_{\langle d, et \rangle} \cdot \lambda C_{\langle e, t \rangle} \cdot \lambda x. G(\text{BOOST}(G)(C))(x) = 1$

b. $\text{BOOST}(G)(C) = \text{STANDARD}(G)(\{x \in C: G(\text{STANDARD}(G)(C))(x) = 1\})$

3.3. The compositional issue

The above theory of *very*, when paired with Heim's theory of *-est*, cannot generate a *very*-intensified superlative. To see this, observe that Heim's LF for *the tallest tree*, repeated below in (17), has nowhere that our classic entry for *very* (type $\langle \langle d, et \rangle, \langle et, et \rangle \rangle$) can attach.

(17) [the [C [-est [λd. d-tall tree]]]

If *very* attaches to any node other than *tall* or [λd. d-tall tree], there will be type mismatch between *very* and its sister; *very* needs a first argument of type $\langle d, et \rangle$, and the only $\langle d, et \rangle$ nodes in (17) are *tall* and [λd. d-tall tree]. While inserting *very* next to *tall* or [λd. d-tall tree] avoids immediate crash, we still run into type issues down the line. In particular, if *very* applies to *tall*,

the result of combining them (type $\langle et, et \rangle$) cannot compose with *-est*'s trace (type d). And if *very* applies to $[\lambda d. d\text{-tall tree}]$, the result (type $\langle et, et \rangle$) cannot compose with *-est*.

The crux of the compositional issue is that our classic *very*, just like Heim's *-est*, requires a degree-semantic argument (type $\langle d, et \rangle$) and subsequently outputs a non-degree-semantic object. Because of this, in a DP with just one gradable predicate, *very* and *-est* compete for insertion: there is nowhere *-est* can attach once *very* takes its first argument or vice versa. Note that this problem is highly general in the following sense: as far as I know, all variants of the classic degree-based theory of *very* and all degree-semantic theories of *-est* posit that these items take a gradable predicate and return a non-degree-semantic object. It follows from this (for the reasons above) that if we pair any classic degree-based theory of *very* with any degree-based theory of *-est*, we run into a compositional issue in DPs with *very* and *-est* together.

4. Proposal: A new theory of *very*

In this section, I present the core idea behind a new theory of *very* that seeks to unify all of its uses while maintaining a standard, Heim (1999)-style approach to superlatives. The theory I will pursue agrees with the classic degree-based theory of *very* that *very* is at its core degree-semantic and a standard-booster, and it seeks to unify all uses of *very* under the heading of standard-boosting (even the uses without degree morphology). While my theory borrows the idea that *very* is a standard-booster, it avoids the compositional issue from section 3.2 by severing *very* from gradable predicates. On my theory, *very* does not take a gradable predicate as argument; its only argument is a comparison class, and outputs a modified comparison class.

To make this work, I rely on three background assumptions. First, as hinted at above, I follow Fitzgibbons et al. (2008) in assuming that *-est* is standard-sensitive. In particular, for any degree predicate G and set of entities S , I posit not only a positive standard-degree (call it $\text{STANDARD}_{pos}(G)(S)$) and a boosted positive standard-degree (call it $\text{BOOST}_{pos}(G)(S)$) but also a superlative standard-degree $\text{STANDARD}_{sup}(G)(S)$ and a boosted variant $\text{BOOST}_{sup}(G)(S)$. As in Kennedy and McNally (2005), the boosted standards are defined in terms of their non-boosted versions. For example, $\text{BOOST}_{pos}(G)(S)$ is the result of applying $\text{STANDARD}_{pos}(G)$ to the subset of S that meets $\text{STANDARD}_{pos}(G)(S)$. $\text{BOOST}_{sup}(G)(S)$ is similarly defined.

$$(18) \quad \text{BOOST}_{pos}(G)(S) = \text{STANDARD}_{pos}(G)(\{x \in S : G(\text{STANDARD}_{pos}(G)(S))(x) = 1\})$$

Second, I assume that the comparison class of *pos* and *-est* is not a set but rather an ordered pair consisting of (a) the set of relevant entities; (b) the set of positive and superlative standards for the relevant adjectives, as computed for (a). In other words, if S is the set of salient entities, then *pos/-est*'s comparison class is an ordered pair with two sets: (a) S itself; (b) the set containing, for every relevant adjective A , the positive and superlative standard-degrees for S .

$$(19) \quad \text{Let } S \text{ be the set of relevant atomic entities in a context } c. \text{ Then,} \\ \llbracket C \rrbracket = \langle S, \\ \{d : \exists A [A \text{ is relevant in } c \wedge [d = \text{STANDARD}_{pos}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(S) \vee d = \text{STANDARD}_{sup}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(S)]\} \rangle$$

For example, let's say the relevant people are Meg, Al, Ben, and Dan; the only relevant adjective is *tall*. Further suppose that one must be 69in to count as a tall member of this group and 72in to be one of the tallest. Then, $C = \langle \{\text{Meg, Al, Ben, Dan}\}, \{69\text{in}, 72\text{in}\} \rangle$.

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On top of these assumptions about *pos/-est*, I posit that *same*, nouns like *beginning*, and a silent element in *the very man* take a comparison class with a structure like (19). I show in section 6 that this assumption, when paired with a *very* that modifies comparison classes like (19) and works for positive forms and superlatives, allows for a preliminary account of *very*'s other uses.

Having laid out my core assumptions, I conclude this section by introducing my entry for *very* (20), which takes an ordered-pair comparison class like (19) and returns a modified comparison class. When looking at (20), note that I use $\text{First}(C)$ and $\text{Second}(C)$ to refer to the first and second members of the ordered pair C . Additionally, for a given set S , I use $\text{STANDARDS}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(S)$ as shorthand for the doubleton set containing $\text{STANDARD}_{\text{pos}}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(S)$ and $\text{STANDARD}_{\text{sup}}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(S)$.

$$(20) \quad \llbracket \text{very} \rrbracket = \lambda C: \text{Second}(C) \in D_{\langle d,t \rangle} \cdot \langle \text{First}(C), \\ \{d: \exists A [\text{STANDARDS}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(\text{First}(C)) \subseteq \text{Second}(C) \wedge \\ [d = \text{BOOST}_{\text{pos}}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(\text{First}(C)) \vee d = \text{BOOST}_{\text{sup}}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(\text{First}(C))]\} \rangle$$

In a nutshell, *very* takes an ordered-pair comparison class C , presupposes that its second member is a set of degrees, and returns a modified C whose second member contains boosted standard-degrees. To be more precise, the first member of the ordered pair $\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket$ is the same as the first member of C , but the second member of $\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket$ contains standard-degrees that are boosted relative to those in C . In particular, for every gradable adjective A whose positive and superlative standards are in the second member of C , the second member of $\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket$ contains $\text{BOOST}_{\text{pos}}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(\text{First}(C))$ and $\text{BOOST}_{\text{sup}}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(\text{First}(C))$. For example, if the first member of C is $\{\text{Meg, Al, Ben, Dan}\}$ and the second member of C contains the (unboosted) positive and superlative height-standards for these people, $\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket$ has the denotation in (21).

$$(21) \quad \llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket = \langle \{\text{Meg, Al, Ben, Dan}\}, \\ \{\text{BOOST}_{\text{pos}}(\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket)(\{\text{Meg, Al, Ben, Dan}\}), \text{BOOST}_{\text{sup}}(\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket)(\{\text{Meg, Al, Ben, Dan}\})\} \rangle$$

As an aside, note that going forward, I sometimes refer to $\text{Higher}^G(C)$ and $\text{Lower}^G(C)$; these are abbreviations for the two degrees in $\text{Second}(C)$ for which G is defined. For example, $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ and $\text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ are the two degrees in $\text{Second}(C)$ for which $\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket$ is defined, i.e. the two height-degrees in C . $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ is the higher of the two height-degrees in $\text{Second}(C)$, and $\text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ is the lower of the two. For example, if $\llbracket C \rrbracket = \langle \{\text{Meg, Al, Ben, Dan}\}, \{69\text{in}, 72\text{in}\} \rangle$, $\text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C) = 69\text{in}$ and $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C) = 72\text{in}$.

Finally, note that the compositional machinery below will sometimes invoke degrees like $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \lambda d. [d\text{-tall tree}] \rrbracket}(C)$ rather than $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$. As I've set things up, however, these two degrees are the same: since $\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket(d)$ and $\llbracket \lambda d. [d\text{-tall tree}] \rrbracket(d)$ have the same definedness conditions (d must be a height-degree), $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \lambda d. [d\text{-tall tree}] \rrbracket}(C)$ and $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ both refer to the higher of the height-degrees in $\text{Second}(C)$. Given this, I opt to always use the shorter name.⁸

5. Capturing *very* in positive-form APs and superlatives

Having laid out the basic idea behind my proposal, I now show how it captures *very* in positive and superlative APs. Recall that we want *very* to have a truth-conditionally visible effect with positive forms and plural superlatives but no truth-conditional import with singular superlatives.

⁸Note also that since (19) refers to the relevant **adjectives**, C cannot, e.g., contain $\text{STANDARD}_{\text{pos}}(\llbracket \lambda d. [d\text{-tall tree}] \rrbracket)(C)$, whatever that would be, since $[\lambda d. [d\text{-tall tree}] \rrbracket(C)$ is not an adjective.

Starting with positive-form APs, I model the difference between *Sarah is tall* and *Sarah is very tall* as follows. I assign *Sarah is tall* the LF in (22a) and use the entry for *pos* in (22b), both of which are standard *modulo* our new comparison classes.

- (22) a. [Sarah [C [pos tall]]]
 b. $\llbracket \text{pos} \rrbracket = \lambda G_{\langle d, et \rangle}. \lambda C. \lambda x. G(\text{Lower}^G(C))(x) = 1$

In (22a), *pos* takes $\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket$, C, and Sarah as arguments. I assume that the presence of *tall* makes this adjective relevant, and hence, C in (22a) is an ordered pair consisting of (a) the set of relevant entities; (b) the set containing the positive height-standard for (a), the superlative height-standard for (a), and possibly some non-height standards as well. With this in mind, consider the truth-conditions in (23), noting that these truth-conditions make reference to $\text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$, the lower of the two height-degrees in C. $\text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ is nothing but the positive-form standard-degree on the $\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket$ scale,⁹ so *Sarah is tall* is true iff Sarah's height meets the positive standard.

- (23) $\llbracket (22a) \rrbracket = 1$ iff Sarah's height $\geq \text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$

Turning to *Sarah is very tall*, I assume the LF in (24a). The difference between (22a) and (24a) is that in the latter, the comparison class of *pos* is $\llbracket \text{very C} \rrbracket$, not C. As a result, (24a) yields the truth-conditions in (24b). As discussed in section 4, the height-degrees in $\llbracket \text{very C} \rrbracket$ are boosted relative to their counterparts in C, and thus $\text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very C} \rrbracket) > \text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$. It follows from this that (24b) asymmetrically entails (23), with *very* boosting the standard.

- (24) a. [Sarah $\llbracket \text{very C} \rrbracket$ [pos tall]]
 b. $\llbracket (24a) \rrbracket = 1$ iff Sarah's height $\geq \text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very C} \rrbracket)$

Moving on to plural superlatives, I model the difference between *the tallest trees* and *the very tallest trees* as follows. For the former, I adopt a simplified version of Fitzgibbons et al.'s (2008) theory, one that uses LFs like (25a) and the *-est* in (25b).¹⁰ Note that I adopt a mereological approach to plurality (Link, 1983) where plural individuals are sums of atomic individuals; sums are related to their subparts via the parthood relation \sqsubseteq .

- (25) a. [the [C [-est [$\lambda d. *[\text{d-tall tree}]]]]]$
 b. $\llbracket \text{-est} \rrbracket = \lambda G_{\langle d, et \rangle}. \lambda C. \lambda X: \forall y \in \text{First}(C) [\exists d [G(d)(x) = 1]].$
 $G(\text{Higher}^G(C))(X) = 1$ and
 $\forall Y [\forall Y \in \text{First}(C) \text{ and } G(\text{Higher}^G(C))(Y) = 1] \rightarrow Y \sqsubseteq X]$

As shown in (26a), *-est*'s first argument in (25a) contains Link's distributivity operator *; (26a) relates a degree *d* and a (singular or plural) entity *X* iff all of *X*'s atomic parts are trees whose height meets *d*. As shown in (26b), *the tallest trees* will presuppose that every member of $\text{First}(C)$ has a degree on the scale denoted by (26a); in other words, every member of $\text{First}(C)$

⁹I make the auxiliary assumption that the positive standard must be lower than the superlative standard.

¹⁰See Fitzgibbons et al. (2008) for conceptual arguments that slightly more complexity is needed.

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is a tree. As a result, $\text{First}(C)$ is a set of trees, while $\text{Second}(C)$ contains the positive and superlative $\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket$ -standards for that set of trees. When defined, *the tallest trees* denotes the unique X with the following properties: (a) X 's parts are trees whose height exceeds $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$,¹¹ (b) for any relevant (singular or plural) tree Y all of whose parts exceed $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$, Y is a subpart of X . In other words, *the tallest trees* is predicted to denote the maximal plurality all of whose parts exceed $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$, which (by definition) is the superlative standard for trees.

- (26) a. $\llbracket \lambda d. *[\text{d-tall tree}] \rrbracket = \lambda d. \lambda X. \forall x \subseteq X: x\text{'s height} \geq d \text{ and } x \text{ is a tree}$
 b. $\llbracket (25a) \rrbracket$ is defined iff $\forall Y \in \text{First}(C): \exists d [\llbracket \lambda d. *[\text{d-tall tree}] \rrbracket(d)(Y) = 1]$.
 When defined, $\llbracket (25a) \rrbracket = \iota X. \llbracket \lambda d. *[\text{d-tall tree}] \rrbracket(\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C))(X) = 1$ and
 $\forall Y [\llbracket Y \in \text{First}(C) \text{ and } \llbracket \lambda d. *[\text{d-tall tree}] \rrbracket(\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C))(Y) = 1 \rrbracket \rightarrow Y \subseteq X]$

Just as *the tallest trees* refers to the maximal plurality whose parts meet $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$, *the very tallest trees* (27) will refer to the maximal plurality whose parts meet $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket)$. For the reasons above, $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket)$ will always be greater than $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$; as a result, *the very tallest trees* denotes a subplurality of *the tallest trees*, as desired. To see this, suppose that that three trees (A , B , and C) meet $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ but only A and B meet $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket)$. In this scenario, $\llbracket \text{the tallest trees} \rrbracket = A \oplus B \oplus C$, while $\llbracket \text{the very tallest trees} \rrbracket = A \oplus B$.

- (27) $\llbracket \text{the } \llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket \text{ [-est } \llbracket \lambda d. *[\text{d-tall tree}] \rrbracket \rrbracket \rrbracket$

Turning to singular superlatives, I assign *tallest tree* the LF in (28a); note that it lacks $*$.

- (28) a. $\llbracket C \text{ [-est } \llbracket \lambda d. [\text{d-tall tree}] \rrbracket \rrbracket \rrbracket$
 b. $\llbracket (28a) \rrbracket = \lambda x. x\text{'s height} \geq \text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C) \text{ and } x \in \llbracket \text{tree} \rrbracket \text{ and}$
 $\forall y [\llbracket y \in \text{First}(C) \wedge y\text{'s height} \geq \text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C) \wedge y \in \llbracket \text{tree} \rrbracket \rrbracket \rightarrow y \subseteq x]$

Assuming that nouns like *tree* denote sets of atoms in the absence of a covert $*$, $\llbracket \text{tallest tree} \rrbracket$ (28b) will be a set of atoms. More specifically, $\llbracket \text{tallest tree} \rrbracket$ is true of x iff (a) x is an atomic tree whose height meets $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$; (b) for any relevant tree y who meets $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$, y is a subpart of x . Since the only subpart of an atomic individual is itself, it follows that $\llbracket \text{tallest tree} \rrbracket$ is true of x iff x is the **only** tree that meets $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$. If there are no trees whose height meets $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ or multiple such trees, (28b) denotes \emptyset , and *the tallest tree* is undefined.

To explain why the definedness of singular superlatives is not perceived as dependent on the value of a standard-degree, I assume (following Fitzgibbons et al.) that when we utter *the tallest tree* in a context where there are no trees or multiple trees who meet $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$, we “readjust” the standard to avoid crash, i.e. we give $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ a value that lies between the tallest tree’s height and the next tallest tree’s. Due to this adjustment, *the tallest tree* becomes defined: it refers to the unique tree that meets the adjusted superlative standard.

At this point, we predict that $\llbracket \text{the tallest tree} \rrbracket = \llbracket \text{the very tallest tree} \rrbracket$ when both are defined, explaining *very*'s lack of truth-conditional import in, e.g., *I climbed the very tallest tree*. To see this, let's say Tree A is the tallest tree, i.e. the only tree that meets $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$. Let's also say that *the very tallest tree* is defined: there is a unique tree that meets $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket)$.

¹¹ See section 4 for why I am referring to $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ here and not $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \lambda d. *[\text{d-tall tree}] \rrbracket}(C)$.

Since $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket) > \text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket}(C)$ and only Tree A meets the latter, the very tallest tree must be Tree A.

Given this equivalence, the question arises of why one would ever refer to Tree A as *the very tallest tree* rather than as simply *the tallest tree*. My theory predicts that one might use *very tallest* to highlight how tall Tree A is; by using *very tallest*, one signals that Tree A exceeds the (adjusted) superlative standard not by a bit but by a significant amount. While there is something right about the idea that *the very tallest tree* emphasizes Tree A's height, further research into when *very*-intensified superlatives are preferred over non-intensified ones is needed.

To conclude, note that I predict the ban on *very* in comparatives (**Al is very nicer than Ben*): *very* needs a comparison-class argument, but comparatives contain no *C* on standard theories.

6. Beyond positive forms and superlatives

Having shown that my theory can provide a unified account of *very tall* and *very tallest*, I next offer a preliminary extension of my theory to *very* in “precision cases,” DPs with *same*, and emphatic definites. In each case, I argue that the role of *very* can be conceptualized in terms of standard-boosting and formalize this conceptualization using my entry for *very*.

6.1. *Very* in “precision cases”

Very in “precision cases” (*the very beginning*, *the very front*) has a truth-conditional contribution that falls naturally into the category of standard-boosting. To see this, consider the following examples, which highlight *very*'s truth-conditional import in “precision cases”:

- (29) a. Most people give up on New Year's Resolutions sometime in the beginning of the year, but Eli's laziness is next-level: he gave up at the very beginning of the year!
 b. Context: A just got movie tickets and wanted to be as close to the screen as possible.
 A: I was able to score seats somewhere in the front of the theater, but sadly, I didn't manage to get seats in the very front of the theater.

In cases like (29), one can think of *beginning* and *front* as sensitive to a standard-degree; *the beginning of the year*, e.g., intuitively denotes the maximal time-interval in the year that exceeds a high threshold of earliness. Like the standard-degree in positive-forms and plural superlatives, the “high threshold of earliness” that an interval must meet to count as part of *the beginning* is vaguely defined in most contexts. Once we realize that *beginning* and *front* are standard-sensitive, *very*'s role in (29) is naturally understood as a form of standard-boosting: while *the beginning of the year* refers to the maximal interval that meets a high threshold of earliness, *the very beginning of the year* refers to the maximal interval that meets an even higher threshold. Under this analysis, *the very beginning* denotes an initial subinterval of *the beginning*.¹²

To formalize this analysis, I assume a domain D_i for time-intervals, give *the beginning* the LF in (30a), and give *beginning* the entry in (30b). Note that \subseteq is the subinterval relation here.

- (30) a. [the [C [beginning]]]
 b. $\llbracket \text{beginning} \rrbracket = \lambda C. \lambda t \in D_i. \llbracket \text{early} \rrbracket(\text{Higher}(C))(t) = 1$ and
 $\forall t' [\llbracket t' \in \text{First}(C) \rrbracket \wedge \llbracket \text{early} \rrbracket(\text{Higher}(C))(t') = 1] \rightarrow t' \subseteq t]$

¹²See Goncharov (2024) for similar ideas formalized in a different framework.

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In short, I claim that *beginning* lexicalizes the meaning “earliest part.” To that end, I make certain assumptions about the adjective *early* (which I invoke in (30b)) and *beginning*’s comparison class. Regarding *early*, I follow von Stechow (2007) and use an entry like (31): *early* takes a time-point t , an interval t' , and is true iff all subintervals of t' precede or overlap t .

$$(31) \quad \llbracket \text{early} \rrbracket = \lambda t. \lambda t'. t \text{ is a point and } \forall t'' [t'' \subseteq t' \rightarrow [t'' < t \text{ or } t'' \text{ overlaps } t]]$$

Regarding *beginning*’s comparison class, I assume that it is an ordered pair consisting of two sets: (a) the set containing the salient time-interval and its subintervals; (b) the set containing the positive and superlative standards of earliness, as computed for (a). See (32) for a formal rendition of *beginning*’s comparison class. Note that for a given set of times S , $\text{STANDARD}_{pos}(\llbracket \text{early} \rrbracket)(S)$ is the time-point t such that for any $t' \in S$ that counts as “early,” $\llbracket \text{early} \rrbracket(t)(t') = 1$.¹³ The superlative standard is similarly defined. Note that since $\text{Second}(C)$ is a doubleton in a *beginning*-DP, I refer to $\text{Higher}(C)$ in *beginning*’s entry rather than $\text{Higher}^G(C)$.

$$(32) \quad \text{Let } S \text{ be the set containing the salient time-interval and its subintervals.} \\ \text{Then, } \llbracket C \rrbracket = \langle S, \{ \text{STANDARD}_{pos}(\llbracket \text{early} \rrbracket)(S), \text{STANDARD}_{sup}(\llbracket \text{early} \rrbracket)(S) \} \rangle$$

All the pieces of the analysis are in place, so let us see how it works by looking at an example. Let’s say the relevant time-interval is [2pm,4pm], any subinterval $\leq 2:30\text{pm}$ counts as early, and any subinterval $\leq 2:15\text{pm}$ is one of the earliest. Then, *beginning*’s C argument is an ordered pair consisting of (a) the set containing [2pm,4pm] and its subintervals; (b) the doubleton set $\{2:15\text{pm}, 2:30\text{pm}\}$. In LF (30a), *beginning* takes this ordered pair as argument, and the result is fed to *the*. *The beginning* is predicted to denote the maximal interval whose earliness meets or exceeds $\text{Higher}(C)$. $\text{Higher}(C)$ is the earlier of the two earliness standards in the second member of C , which in our example is 2:15pm. Thus, *the beginning* denotes [2pm,2:15pm], i.e. the initial subinterval of [2pm,4pm] that counts as the “earliest part” in the context.

Turning to *the very beginning* (LF: [the [$\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket$ beginning]]), note that although *beginning*’s comparison class has a different structure type-wise than the comparison class of *pos/-est*, my *very* (20) can still modify it if we assume that times are a subtype of degrees (von Stechow, 2007). After all, while my *very* needs an ordered pair as argument, it puts no type restrictions on $\text{First}(C)$ and merely requires its second member to be a set of degrees. Hence, composition in *the very beginning* proceeds smoothly. If we look back to our definition of *very*, we see that because C in *the very beginning* contains the unboosted positive and superlative standards for the *early* scale, $\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket$ will contain the boosted positive and superlative standards for the *early* scale. *The very beginning* will denote the maximal interval whose earliness meets $\text{Higher}(\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket)$; since the standards in $\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket$ are boosted relative to C , $\text{Higher}(\llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket)$ will be earlier than $\text{Higher}(C)$, so *the very beginning* is an initial subinterval of *the beginning*.

6.2. *Very* in DPs with *same*

Very in DPs with *same* also has a role that one can conceptualize in terms of standard-boosting. To see this, consider (33), noting that it has a reading paraphrasable as “Bill leafed through the same type of book as Mary (i.e. a copy of *Catch-22*) but not the same book-token.”

¹³This definition of $\text{STANDARD}_{pos}(\llbracket \text{early} \rrbracket)(S)$ is parallel to the definition of $\text{STANDARD}_{pos}(\llbracket \text{tall} \rrbracket)(S)$ that I have been assuming. Both follow this schema: for a given set S and adjective A , $\text{STANDARD}_{pos}(\llbracket A \rrbracket)(S)$ is the degree d such that for any x in S that counts as “A,” $\llbracket A \rrbracket(d)(x) = 1$. I assume times are subtype of degrees (see below).

- (33) Context: There are four books on a table: two copies of *Catch-22* and two copies of *Slaughterhouse-Five*. Bill comes, leafs through one of the copies of *Catch-22*, and leaves. Then Mary comes, leafs through the other copy of *Catch-22*, and leaves.
- a. Bill leafed through the same book as Mary, but he didn't leaf through the very same book as Mary.

To see how we can start to integrate (33) into the current theory, note that it is possible to think of *same* as threshold-sensitive: in order for two things to count as “the same,” the number of (relevant) properties they have in common must meet a high threshold. Once we recognize that *same* can be thought of as sensitive to a threshold/standard in this way, the role of *very* in (33) is naturally understood as a form of standard-boosting: while Book A and Book B are “the same” iff the number of shared properties they have meets a super high threshold, they are “the very same” iff the number of shared properties they have meets an even higher threshold. Two copies of *Catch-22* might have enough properties in common to meet the threshold for *same* but have too few properties in common to meet the threshold for *very same*.

In the rest of this section, I offer a rough proof-of-concept for how to formalize this analysis of *very same*, which rests on an analogy between (*very*) *same* and (*very*) *similar*. Starting with the latter, I assign *Book 1 is similar to Book 2* the LF in (34a) and give *similar* the entry in (34b).

- (34) a. $[[\text{Book 1}] [\text{C} [\text{pos} [\text{AP similar} [\text{Book 2}]]]]]$
 b. $[[\text{similar}]] = \lambda y. \lambda d. \lambda x. |\{P: P(x) = P(y)\}| \geq d$

I treat *similar* as a gradable predicate (type $\langle e, \langle d, \text{et} \rangle \rangle$): it takes two individuals y and x , takes a degree d , and returns true iff the number of properties that y and x share is $\geq d$.¹⁴ There is ample evidence for treating *similar* as a gradable predicate like this (though this evidence has received little attention as far as I know): *similar* can partake in comparatives (*A is more similar to B than C*), take the full range of degree modifiers (*very/quite/fairly/extremely similar*), etc.

In (34a), *similar to Book 2* is modified by *pos*. I continue to assume the entry for *pos* from section 5, but I make one tweak to the definition of *pos*'s comparison class: the second member of *pos*'s comparison class contains standard-degrees not just for the relevant $\langle d, \text{et} \rangle$ adjectives but also for any relevant $\langle d, \text{et} \rangle$ APs.¹⁵ I assume that *similar to Book 2* is a relevant $\langle d, \text{et} \rangle$ AP in (34a), and hence, C in (34a) is an ordered pair consisting of (a) the set of relevant entities, call it S ; (b) the set containing $\text{STANDARD}_{\text{pos}}([[\text{similar to Book 2}]](S))$, its superlative counterpart, and potentially other standards as well. $\text{STANDARD}_{\text{pos}}([[\text{similar to Book 2}]](S))$ is the number d such that for any $x \in S$ that counts as similar to Book 2, $[[\text{similar to Book 2}]](d)(x) = 1$.

With this in mind, consider the truth-conditions in (35), noting that (35) makes reference to $\text{Lower}_{[[\text{similar to Book 2}]]}(C)$. $\text{Lower}_{[[\text{similar to Book 2}]]}(C)$ is nothing but the positive-form standard on the $[[\text{similar to Book 2}]]$ scale;¹⁶ hence, *Book 1 is similar to Book 2* comes out true iff the number of properties that Book 1 and Book 2 have in common is at least $\text{STANDARD}_{\text{pos}}([[\text{similar to$

¹⁴It is likely better to say “the number of relevant properties that y and x share is $\geq d$ ”; I ignore this wrinkle here.

¹⁵Technically, given the existence of adjectives like *early*, this type restriction should be relaxed to $\langle d, \langle \tau, t \rangle \rangle$.

¹⁶The $[[\text{similar to Book 2}]]$ scale is the number scale; thus, for $\text{Lower}_{[[\text{similar to Book 2}]]}(C)$ to mean what we want it to, we must ensure that there are no numerals other than the similarity standards in $\text{Second}(C)$. To deal with this, I assume that $[[\text{pos}]](G)(C)$ is defined only if there are exactly two degrees in $\text{Second}(C)$ s.t. $G(d)$ is defined.

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Book 2])(First(C)). In other words: Book 1, when compared to the other salient individuals, has enough properties in common with Book 2 to count as “similar to Book 2.”

$$(35) \quad \llbracket (34a) \rrbracket = 1 \text{ iff } |\{P: P(\text{Book 1}) = P(\text{Book 2})\}| \geq \text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{similar to Book 2} \rrbracket}(C)$$

As shown in (36), *Book 1 is very similar to Book 2* comes out true iff the number of properties shared by Book 1 and Book 2 meets $\text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{similar to Book 2} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very C} \rrbracket)$, which is just $\text{BOOST}_{\text{pos}}(\llbracket \text{similar to Book 2} \rrbracket)(\text{First}(C))$. In other words, just as (34a) expresses the meaning “Book 1, when compared to all salient entities, counts as similar to Book 2,” (36) means “Book 1, when compared to entities similar to Book 2, counts as similar to Book 2.”

$$(36) \quad \llbracket \llbracket \llbracket \text{Book 1} \rrbracket \llbracket \text{very C} \rrbracket \llbracket \text{pos} \llbracket \text{similar Book 2} \rrbracket \rrbracket \rrbracket = 1 \text{ iff} \\ |\{P: P(\text{Book 1}) = P(\text{Book 2})\}| \geq \text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{similar to Book 2} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very C} \rrbracket)$$

To see that *very*’s role here amounts to standard-boosting, consider the cases in (37), noting that *compared to*-phrases have been argued to determine the set of individuals relative to which positive-form standard-degrees are computed (i.e. $\text{First}(C)$, in my terms). Assuming this analysis of *compared to*-phrases (Kennedy, 2007), (37) teaches us that when $\text{First}(C)$ ’s members have few properties in common with *Anna Karenina* (37a), we assume a lower threshold for what counts as “similar” than when $\text{First}(C)$ ’s members share many properties with *Anna Karenina* (37b). Hence, by restricting $\text{First}(C)$ to individuals that are similar to Book 2 (i.e. to individuals that share many properties with Book 2), *very* in (36) boosts the similarity threshold.

- (37) a. Compared to a toenail clipper, this piece of paper is similar to *Anna Karenina*.
b. Compared to *Catch-22*, *War & Peace* is similar to *Anna Karenina*.

Turning to *same*, I assign *Book 1 is the same as Book 2* the LF (38a) and give *same* the entry in (38b). Note that this analysis of *same* bears many similarities to Charnavel’s (2015) analysis, the main difference being that Charnavel (2015) does not treat *same* as standard-sensitive.

- (38) a. $\llbracket \text{Book 1} \rrbracket \llbracket C \llbracket \text{same Book 2} \rrbracket \rrbracket$
b. $\llbracket \text{same} \rrbracket = \lambda y. \lambda C. \lambda x. |\{P: P(x) = P(y)\}| \geq \text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{similar to } x \rrbracket}(C)$

In short, I propose that *same* in (38a) and *similar* in (34a) both take a C argument whose second member contains the positive and superlative standards on the $\llbracket \text{similar to Book 2} \rrbracket$ scale; however, *same* invokes $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{similar to Book 2} \rrbracket}(C)$ instead of $\text{Lower}^{\llbracket \text{similar to Book 2} \rrbracket}(C)$. As a result, (38a) will come out true iff the number of properties Book 1 and Book 2 share meets $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{similar to Book 2} \rrbracket}(C)$, the “superlative” standard of similarity. Turning to *Book 1 is the very same as Book 2*, it should be clear that it will come out true iff the number of properties the two books share meets $\text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{similar to Book 2} \rrbracket}(\llbracket \text{very C} \rrbracket)$, the boosted “superlative” standard of similarity. Assuming the boosted “superlative” standard is higher than the unboosted one, two things can meet the threshold for *same* but not the threshold for *very same*, as desired.

While this analysis is a rough sketch, it provides a proof-of-concept for how to capture *very same* in terms of standard-boosting. A fuller analysis would need to explain, among many other things, why *same* is intuitively different from *most similar*, whose meaning my *same* lexicalizes. I suspect that the way to differentiate *same* and *most similar* lies in separating “sameness” thresholds from superlative similarity thresholds, but I leave this to future research.

6.3. *Very* in emphatic definite descriptions

To see how we can start to integrate cases like *the very man* into our theory, consider (39), a typical example of an emphatic definite from Goncharov (2024). The crucial thing to note is that one can replace *the very man* in (39) with *the very same man* without a clear meaning shift.

(39) Sophie is talking to the very man we saw yesterday.

Given that (39) permits a paraphrase with *very same*, the most brute-force way to integrate (39) into the present theory would be to claim that (39) contains a covert *same*. While this idea seems stipulative, it turns out that one can implement this idea in a fairly non-stipulative way. In particular, we can assume, following Goncharov (2024), that all emphatic definites with *very* are anaphoric and furthermore adopt Hanink’s (2018, 2021) theory of anaphoric definites. On this view, anaphoric definites contain a silent index head Idx_i with the meaning “same as $g(i)$ ”; $g(i)$ is what the assignment function g maps to the index i . On top of this received theory of anaphoric definites, I make a novel assumption about the type of $\llbracket \text{Idx}_i \rrbracket$. In particular, while Hanink (2018, 2021) and Goncharov (2024) assume that $\llbracket \text{Idx}_i \rrbracket$ is of type $\langle e, t \rangle$, I will assume that $\llbracket \text{Idx}_i \rrbracket$ additionally takes an ordered-pair comparison class argument. In other words, $\llbracket \text{Idx}_i \rrbracket$ lexicalizes the meaning $\llbracket \text{same} \rrbracket(g(i))$, where $\llbracket \text{same} \rrbracket$ is as defined in section 6.2.

(40) a. $\llbracket \text{the very man} \rrbracket^g = \llbracket \llbracket \text{the} \rrbracket \llbracket \llbracket \text{very } C \rrbracket \text{Idx}_i \rrbracket \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket \rrbracket^g$
 b. $\llbracket \text{Idx}_i \rrbracket^g = \lambda C. \lambda x. \{ \{ P: P(x) = P(g(i)) \} \} \geq \text{Higher}^{\llbracket \text{similar to } g(i) \rrbracket^g} (C)$

Returning to (39), I assume that $g(i)$ gets identified with “the man we saw yesterday” (see Goncharov (2024) for technical details); given this, it should be clear that the object DP in (39) is predicted to mean “the man who is the very same as the man we saw yesterday,” corresponding to intuitions. There is clearly much more to be said about emphatic definites and their role within a degree-based theory, but the analysis in (40) is a starting point.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined an under-studied use of *very*, argued that it should be unified with *very*’s other uses, and pursued a unified degree-based theory of *very* built on a new theory of comparison classes. The next steps for my theory are to (a) scrutinize certain uses more closely, especially *very same* and *the very man*; (b) put forth a restrictive hypothesis about what words have the kind of C argument that *very* modifies; (c) adjudicate between my theory and Goncharov’s (2024). Regarding (b), I suggest that the kind of ordered-pair comparison class that *very* modifies is present for all and only words that depend on a contextual standard-degree; for non-standard-sensitive words with a C argument, such as (possibly) quantifiers (von Stechow, 1994), their C is just a set. Regarding (c), one open question concerns whether Goncharov’s (2024) non-degree-based theory can extend to superlatives while maintaining the many good predictions of a degree-based, Heim (1999)-style theory of *-est*. Regardless of whether a degree-based or non-degree-based approach is ultimately correct, however, the advances made in this paper open the door to fruitful comparison of two unified theories of *very*.

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